Malaya What If

[Fatboy Coxy]

Though, I'm not sure the fates of the Hong Kong Chinese soldiers are safe from Japanese retribution.

and

The Chinese troops in British service probably have a good idea already of how they will be treated by the Japanese, I doubt that surrendering will be seen as a good life choice, better to fight to the death.

Hi Driftless and Cuchulainn, certainly the Chinese will be aware of previous Japanese atrocities, and their general attitude to the Chinese people, but it may well be thought that serving in his majesties armed forces will provide them a level of protection beyond the norm. On the other hand, these Chinese are all volunteers and the main reason they signed up is to defend their colony against Japanese aggression, and can be expected to fight well, although they are very green. We'll just have to see how well they all do!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Hi all, just realised a small but significant faux pas in my MWI 41112318 Totensonntag, Sunday Of The Dead post, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-24570979. I'd failed to replace Godwin-Austen, the historical commander of XIII Corps with Lt Gen Lewis Heath, so I just popped back and edited that!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Wednesday 26 November;

Looking back, it was the final nail in the coffin of there being any peaceful solution in the Far East, and ever since the question has been how the USA appeared to be so uncoordinated in its approach to dealing with Japan. That’s not to say the they could have predicted with certainty how Japan would react, but their access to Japan’s diplomatic messages gave some ideas to how Japan might react.

Nevertheless, the Hull Note, was a defining moment for Japan, when she accepted privately that war was the only way forward. Admittedly her hopes for a peaceful solution hadn’t been high, the war plans were not only complete, but troops were being deployed into their starting positions for war.

It was the last few acts of a play that had been played out by two sides who never really thought they could find a solution but were honour bound to try. It had started on November 6, when Ambassador Nomura presented the Americans with what later was called Proposal A. It proposed making a final settlement of the Sino-Japanese war with a withdrawal of some Japanese troops. However, unknown to the Japanese, the Americans, having broken the Japanese diplomatic codes, knew there was a second option, Proposal B, and so rejected the initial offer on November 14.

True to plan Nomura responded with the second proposal, B, on November 20, which offered to withdraw Japanese forces from southern Indo-China, if the USA ended aiding China, to jointly freeze military deployments in Southeast Asia, except for the Japanese in northern Indo-China, provide Japan with a substantial quantity of oil and put pressure on the Dutch to trade with Japan.

This clearly was not going to be acceptable to the USA, and a counter offer, suggesting a temporary Modus Vivendi including the USA offering a monthly supply of fuel for civilian use was being constructed, when Roosevelt got wind of Japan’s war plans and that fact more troops were being shipped to Indo-China. At that point he told Secretary Hull not to put forward the counter offer.

The Americans knew the Japanese Foreign Ministry had a deadline of November 29 for negotiations, and expected a surprise attack to happen somewhere. And so, on November 26, Hull presented Nomura with the now famous ‘Hull Note’ which included in its conditions, that Japan makes a complete withdrawal of its troops, not only from Indo-China, but China itself! If Japan was looking for war, here it was! From then on Japan rolled on with its war plans, while the Americans warned the British of the very likelihood of war, anytime soon. And how the USA was caught surprised has become an eternal question.

 

[Puzzle]

From then on Japan rolled on with its war plans, while the Americans warned the British of the very likelihood of war, anytime soon. And how the USA was caught surprised has become an eternal question.

Here we go! I’ve been following this timeline and it’s felt glacial at time but I’m very much looking forward to the kickoff.

 

[Parma]

1941, Wednesday 26 November;

Looking back, it was the final nail in the coffin of there being any peaceful solution in the Far East, and ever since the question has been how the USA appeared to be so uncoordinated in its approach to dealing with Japan. That’s not to say the they could have predicted with certainty how Japan would react, but their access to Japan’s diplomatic messages gave some ideas to how Japan might react.

Nevertheless, the Hull Note, was a defining moment for Japan, when she accepted privately that war was the only way forward. Admittedly her hopes for a peaceful solution hadn’t been high, the war plans were not only complete, but troops were being deployed into their starting positions for war.

It was the last few acts of a play that had been played out by two sides who never really thought they could find a solution but were honour bound to try. It had started on November 6, when Ambassador Nomura presented the Americans with what later was called Proposal A. It proposed making a final settlement of the Sino-Japanese war with a withdrawal of some Japanese troops. However, unknown to the Japanese, the Americans, having broken the Japanese diplomatic codes, knew there was a second option, Proposal B, and so rejected the initial offer on November 14.

True to plan Nomura responded with the second proposal, B, on November 20, which offered to withdraw Japanese forces from southern Indo-China, if the USA ended aiding China, to jointly freeze military deployments in Southeast Asia, except for the Japanese in northern Indo-China, provide Japan with a substantial quantity of oil and put pressure on the Dutch to trade with Japan.

This clearly was not going to be acceptable to the USA, and a counter offer, suggesting a temporary Modus Vivendi including the USA offering a monthly supply of fuel for civilian use was being constructed, when Roosevelt got wind of Japan’s war plans and that fact more troops were being shipped to Indo-China. At that point he told Secretary Hull not to put forward the counter offer.

The Americans knew the Japanese Foreign Ministry had a deadline of November 29 for negotiations, and expected a surprise attack to happen somewhere. And so, on November 26, Hull presented Nomura with the now famous ‘Hull Note’ which included in its conditions, that Japan makes a complete withdrawal of its troops, not only from Indo-China, but China itself! If Japan was looking for war, here it was! From then on Japan rolled on with its war plans, while the Americans warned the British of the very likelihood of war, anytime soon. And how the USA was caught surprised has become an eternal question.

Von Clausewitz avant la lettre .....

 

[justinmil22]

this is what all the patience and buildup has been for time for the fireworks

 

[prester.john208]

1941, Wednesday 26 November;

Looking back, it was the final nail in the coffin of there being any peaceful solution in the Far East, and ever since the question has been how the USA appeared to be so uncoordinated in its approach to dealing with Japan. That’s not to say the they could have predicted with certainty how Japan would react, but their access to Japan’s diplomatic messages gave some ideas to how Japan might react.

Nevertheless, the Hull Note, was a defining moment for Japan, when she accepted privately that war was the only way forward. Admittedly her hopes for a peaceful solution hadn’t been high, the war plans were not only complete, but troops were being deployed into their starting positions for war.

It was the last few acts of a play that had been played out by two sides who never really thought they could find a solution but were honour bound to try. It had started on November 6, when Ambassador Nomura presented the Americans with what later was called Proposal A. It proposed making a final settlement of the Sino-Japanese war with a withdrawal of some Japanese troops. However, unknown to the Japanese, the Americans, having broken the Japanese diplomatic codes, knew there was a second option, Proposal B, and so rejected the initial offer on November 14.

True to plan Nomura responded with the second proposal, B, on November 20, which offered to withdraw Japanese forces from southern Indo-China, if the USA ended aiding China, to jointly freeze military deployments in Southeast Asia, except for the Japanese in northern Indo-China, provide Japan with a substantial quantity of oil and put pressure on the Dutch to trade with Japan.

This clearly was not going to be acceptable to the USA, and a counter offer, suggesting a temporary Modus Vivendi including the USA offering a monthly supply of fuel for civilian use was being constructed, when Roosevelt got wind of Japan’s war plans and that fact more troops were being shipped to Indo-China. At that point he told Secretary Hull not to put forward the counter offer.

The Americans knew the Japanese Foreign Ministry had a deadline of November 29 for negotiations, and expected a surprise attack to happen somewhere. And so, on November 26, Hull presented Nomura with the now famous ‘Hull Note’ which included in its conditions, that Japan makes a complete withdrawal of its troops, not only from Indo-China, but China itself! If Japan was looking for war, here it was! From then on Japan rolled on with its war plans, while the Americans warned the British of the very likelihood of war, anytime soon. And how the USA was caught surprised has become an eternal question.

A case of too much intelligence? If they'd taken up Nomura or the proposed summit, things could have played out differently.

 

[El Pip]

A case of too much intelligence? If they'd taken up Nomura or the proposed summit, things could have played out differently.

With Proposal A the devil was in the detail. The 'peace settlement' was if Japan and China reached a peace deal (and the US was to pressure China into doing so) then in two years time Japan might withdraw some troops, unless the peace deal allowed the troops to stay. Proposal A also required the US to accept 'non discrimination' in trade (i.e. no embargoes) and to accept Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, which amongst other things stated that Japan was master of the 'new order' in Greater East Asia.

There's no way that is being accepted while Proposal B is obviously even less acceptable, there is such a vast chasm between the two sides there is very little to talk about until one sides moves and neither will.

Overall I'd say even without any signals intelligence there is no way Hull and FDR take up either of those options, or even make enough concessions that Japan thinks a summit is worth delaying their war plans for.

 

[Driftless]

How much of the timing of the attacks was connected to the operational readiness of the new IJN Carriers? IIUC, there was a narrow window of perceived military advantage*, as well as diplomatic stalemate. *(the Japanese carriers were ready, the IJA was as ready as practical, and the US war production was still revving up)

 

[Butchpfd]

How much of the timing of the attacks was connected to the operational readiness of the new IJN Carriers? IIUC, there was a narrow window of perceived military advantage*, as well as diplomatic stalemate. *(the Japanese carriers were ready, the IJA was as ready as practical, and the US war production was still revving up)

Pearl Harbor and the timing of the attack was directly related to the availability of the 3rd Carrier Division. It was ready, Yamamoto knew about the 2 Ocean Navy act, and the 1936 and 193838 Naval construction plans by the USN. All of which would produce an unending stream of ships beginning in the spring of 1942 and hitting it's stride by fall. Japan had to act now or never.

 

[prester.john208]

With Proposal A the devil was in the detail. The 'peace settlement' was if Japan and China reached a peace deal (and the US was to pressure China into doing so) then in two years time Japan might withdraw some troops, unless the peace deal allowed the troops to stay. Proposal A also required the US to accept 'non discrimination' in trade (i.e. no embargoes) and to accept Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, which amongst other things stated that Japan was master of the 'new order' in Greater East Asia.

There's no way that is being accepted while Proposal B is obviously even less acceptable, there is such a vast chasm between the two sides there is very little to talk about until one sides moves and neither will.

Overall I'd say even without any signals intelligence there is no way Hull and FDR take up either of those options, or even make enough concessions that Japan thinks a summit is worth delaying their war plans for.

From Intelligence Warnings of the Pearl Harbor Attack Before Dec. 7, 1941 - History
"""
On November 15, as Ambassador Grew, the most pro-Japanese diplomat in the State Department, was warning the United States to expect a Japanese surprise attack if negotiations were not concluded, Saburo Kurusu arrived as a special envoy on an emergency visit to Washington. “Daddy” Kurusu, known to Japanese diplomats as a kindly father figure, fluent in English and married to an American, joined Nomura on a visit to the White House two days later. Kurusu told Roosevelt and Hull that the Tojo government continued to hope for peace. Unfortunately, Kurusu was the signer of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Hitler and Mussolini. Hull lectured Kurusu and Nomura about the alliance with Hitler—the alliance that Konoye had indicated Japan would let slide in case Germany attacked the United States.

“I made it clear,” Hull recalled, “that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific areas, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute.”

The Japanese listened to Hull’s fantasies about Hitler’s taking over the United States, appalled at his lack of information about Nazi Germany’s actual military potential. The Germans had no four-engine bombers except for a few converted airliners used as long distance patrol planes. Their best battleship, the Bismarck, had been surrounded and sunk by the British in May 1941. The Wehrmacht had failed to cross the twenty-mile-wide English Channel in 1940 despite temporary air supremacy. Did Hull really expect the Germans to take on the British and American Navies at the same time and then ferry troops three thousand miles across the Atlantic when they were already badly over-committed in Russia, North Africa, and the Balkans?

A memorandum from Harry Dexter White called for Japanese withdrawal from Indonesia, much of the Southeast Pacific, China, and to allow its internal economy to be highly regulated by Western colonial powers. (As White was a Soviet mole, the memorandum was drafted with the purposes of demanding impossible conditions). When the news of the American ultimatum reached Tokyo, the Japanese were horrified. Foreign Minister Togo tried to resign to avoid the shame of having to negotiate such preposterous terms. The emperor, groping for a way to save his throne and perhaps his life without war, called a meeting of Japan’s former prime ministers. One by one, the weary old men, fearful for their country if not for their own lives, appeared before the emperor to try to find a way to avoid a revolution at home or destruction at the hands of America or Russia.
"""
Soviet Mole Harry White’s Efforts to Trigger the Pearl Harbor Attack
White proposed ten aggressive demands to be presented to Japan:

1. Withdraw all military, Naval, air police forces from China (boundaries as of 1931), from Indo-China and from Thailand.
2. Withdraw all support—military, political, or economic—from any government in China other than that of the national government. [This referred to Pu Yi, the last Manchu emperor of China, who was the Japanese puppet ruler in Manchukuo, Japan’s colony in Manchuria.]
3. Replace with yen currency at a rate agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, England, and United States all military scrip, yen and puppet notes circulating in China.
4. Give up all extra-territorial rights in China.
5. Extend to China a billion yen loan at 2 percent to aid in reconstructing China (at a rate of 100 million yen a year).
6. Withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided U.S.S.R. withdraws all her troops from the Far Eastern front except for an equivalent remainder.
7. Sell to the United States up to three-fourths of her current output of war material—including Naval, air, ordnance, and commercial ships on a cost-plus 20 per cent basis as the United States may select.
8. Expel all German technical men, military officials, and propagandists.
9. Accord the United States and China most-favored nation treatment in the whole Japanese Empire.
10. Negotiate a 10-year non-aggression pact with United States, China, British Empire, Dutch Indies (and Philippines).

 

[JWilly48519]

Even a diplomatic-sabotage-minded mole would be cognizant of how a proposed agreement would be seen by his colleagues as either incompetent or suspicious if drafted so as to completely ignore the broadly understood primary strategic need of the other side.

For the Japanese, that was resources...and particularly, oil.

They were getting all the coal they needed from Korea and Manchukuo, and plain carbon steel too. But, they had no oil supply.

Did the State Department's proposals somehow include assuring the Japanese that they could buy DEI oil?

 

[El Pip]

Did the State Department's proposals somehow include assuring the Japanese that they could buy DEI oil?

The actual Hull Note sort of did but only indirectly. It unfroze all the Japanese funds in the US and the US agreed to pressure the other governments to go along with it, so Japan could at least buy oil on the wider market. In reality though if Japan withdrew completely from China and Indo-China (which was point 3 of the note) then her oil demands would fall dramatically.

The small amount I know of Hull is that he was generally very hard line and tended to make huge demands while offering little or nothing in exchange. He spent the 1930s trying to arrange a US-British Empire trade deal where he demanded the almost full opening up of the Imperial Preference system, offered effectively no dropping of US tariffs or restrictions in exchange, and then complained that the British weren't taking his proposal seriously. He was also very hardline with Mexico about compensation for nationalisations, but achieved very little as the Mexicans realised it was bluster and not serious negotiations.

Maybe he had some other triumphs elsewhere, but even if Japan had been willing to negotiate I don't think Hull would have done anything apart from repeat his demands and expect Japan to just agree.

 

[JWilly48519]

...if Japan withdrew completely from China and Indo-China (which was point 3 of the note) then her oil demands would fall dramatically.

Acknowledging that the American proposal was written to otherwise demolish any potential for Japan to imperially dominate Asia, it nonetheless was a fact that the Japanese saw themselves as destined to have such an empire; and, in the great power context of the time, that required naval power; and Japan was inexorably approaching a zero level for naval boiler oil, even for a smaller navy. So even at a lower demand rate for motor fuels and lubricants for its land and air forces, the vagueness of "urge other powers to sell Japan oil on the open market" would have to have been seen by the Japanese as operationally crippling its navy, and fundamentally conflicting with its imperial destiny. So the draft proposal was a non-starter from the Japanese perspective on that basis, even without any of its other poison pills.

 

[prester.john208]

The actual Hull Note sort of did but only indirectly. It unfroze all the Japanese funds in the US and the US agreed to pressure the other governments to go along with it, so Japan could at least buy oil on the wider market. In reality though if Japan withdrew completely from China and Indo-China (which was point 3 of the note) then her oil demands would fall dramatically.

The small amount I know of Hull is that he was generally very hard line and tended to make huge demands while offering little or nothing in exchange. He spent the 1930s trying to arrange a US-British Empire trade deal where he demanded the almost full opening up of the Imperial Preference system, offered effectively no dropping of US tariffs or restrictions in exchange, and then complained that the British weren't taking his proposal seriously. He was also very hardline with Mexico about compensation for nationalisations, but achieved very little as the Mexicans realised it was bluster and not serious negotiations.

Maybe he had some other triumphs elsewhere, but even if Japan had been willing to negotiate I don't think Hull would have done anything apart from repeat his demands and expect Japan to just agree.

George Kennan agrees with you.*

By Aug. 1, all trade between the U.S. and Japan had ceased, and the embargo reduced Japan’s oil imports by 90 percent, effectively crippling its ability to push on in the war and likely forcing Japan to retreat until all valuable gains in Asia were lost.

"Not only would Japan be forced to get out of China and all its gains, but the military would completely lose face at home and probably lose power," said Harvard University Professor Edwin O. Reischauer.

In a final attempt at diplomacy, Japan sent a special envoy, Saburō Kurusu, to Washington.

Discussions were held between Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Kichisaburō Nomura and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Kurusu and Nomura knew that by Nov. 17, the Japanese fleet was already assembling in the Kuril Islands. If no diplomatic settlement was reached by Nov. 29, the fleet would depart for Pearl Harbor.

Hull believed that the meetings were fruitless, and that war was inevitable because of the State Department’s ability to decode Japanese messages, but he had no idea that the Japanese fleet was already in motion.

Some historians and scholars point to Hull’s significant lack of experience in international diplomacy as a major factor in the breakdown of relations which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

"In a sense, Cordell Hull was an unfortunate person to have in that position at that time. I don’t think he was sensitive to different points of view, systems outside our own system," said George Kennan, a highly esteemed historian, diplomat and professor. "He was very rigid on his concept of the law and his concept of what he thought international law was, and the Japanese had very different views."

"Cordell Hull was a delightful honorable gentleman, naive as a child about international affairs, whose qualifications for presiding over the foreign policies of the United States were almost null," Kennan added. "He knew nothing about the outside world, and he was not in a position really even if you tried to tell him."

Kurusu and Nomura called an emergency meeting with Roosevelt on Nov. 26 as a last-ditch effort to reach a settlement — the Japanese fleet had departed and was en route to Pearl Harbor.

If negotiations were successful, the fleet would return. If not, the attack on Pearl Harbor would proceed.

Roosevelt rejected Japan’s final offer of diplomacy on Nov. 27 and demanded that it withdraw from Indochina and China. Expecting Japan to refuse, he issued war warnings to the Pacific.

* 3 decades of warnings of an inevitable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor went unheeded

 

[prester.john208]

Even a diplomatic-sabotage-minded mole would be cognizant of how a proposed agreement would be seen by his colleagues as either incompetent or suspicious if drafted so as to completely ignore the broadly understood primary strategic need of the other side.

For the Japanese, that was resources...and particularly, oil.

They were getting all the coal they needed from Korea and Manchukuo, and plain carbon steel too. But, they had no oil supply.

Did the State Department's proposals somehow include assuring the Japanese that they could buy DEI oil?

The White note demanded that Japan leave Manchuria as well, so they lose coal and steel and the the factories they had built there.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

The White note demanded that Japan leave Manchuria as well, so they lose coal and steel and the the factories they had built there.

I think it was unclear whether Manchuria was to be evacuated as ‘part of China’ or not. The Japanese assumed the worst, for them.

Did the USA ever clarify their position on Manchuria?

 

[prester.john208]

I think it was unclear whether Manchuria was to be evacuated as ‘part of China’ or not. The Japanese assumed the worst, for them.

Did the USA ever clarify their position on Manchuria?

Its my understanding that the clarifying note was mistranslated, by the State Department, and said all of China including Manchuria vs China except for Manchuria.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Its my understanding that the clarifying note was mistranslated, by the State Department, and said all of China including Manchuria vs China except for Manchuria.

Thanks

 

[Butchpfd]

Acknowledging that the American proposal was written to otherwise demolish any potential for Japan to imperially dominate Asia, it nonetheless was a fact that the Japanese saw themselves as destined to have such an empire; and, in the great power context of the time, that required naval power; and Japan was inexorably approaching a zero level for naval boiler oil, even for a smaller navy. So even at a lower demand rate for motor fuels and lubricants for its land and air forces, the vagueness of "urge other powers to sell Japan oil on the open market" would have to have been seen by the Japanese as operationally crippling its navy, and fundamentally conflicting with its imperial destiny. So the draft proposal was a non-starter from the Japanese perspective on that basis, even without any of its other poison pills.

The Japanese were already suffering from what would become " Victory Disease", so assured of destiny being on their side.