Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Vabasion, I had to look up TDLR, as never seen it before, am I right in thinking it's "too long, didn't read?"
If so, I take umbrage with, what appears to me to be a flippant remark. If you've read the first post it explains what I've set out to do, and my reasons why. If the timeline is too long for you, or not interesting enough for you to want to read, I'm fine with that, this is a bit of a niche subject, and I don't expect the vast majority of people to find it interests them. But your post suggests that you can't be bothered to read my work, just an idle curiosity, in which case, I'd say don't bother, this timeline isn't for you.
MWI 41112412 The Plan Is Ready
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 24 November;
The planning team had worked hard for three months, identifying strategic goals, objectives, both desirable and obtainable, and likely defensive positions. These had to be balanced against what of their own forces were available, what units could be used for, their strengths and capabilities. Both Army and RAF units were included in the plans, along with some Royal Navy involvement in coastal operations.
The main objective was the occupation of Songkhla, a small coastal port on the eastern side of the Kra Isthmus, 50 road miles from the Malayan border. The strategic aim of denying it to the Japanese, meant logistically, a Japanese invasion force, once landed on the Kra Isthmus, with the purpose of attacking Northern Malaya, was estimated as being able to maintain just a single division, owning Songkhla would allow them to tripled that!
The problem was how to hold Songkhla, where might a defensive stand be made, how far up the Kra Isthmus might they go. And how many brigades, battalions, etc, did they need for this. And of course, the entire force might be cut off by landings much further south along the eastern shores of Malaya. So, the east coast of Malaya had to be defended, as well as forces found to advance into Thailand.
And as always, logistics came into it, not only denying the Japanese a port for their logistical needs, but the need to supply the British led forces in southern Thailand. It was recognised that it would be highly unlikely that any supply could be from the sea, with the expectation that Japan would have control of the sea’s that far north. In addition, the road network of southern Thailand was far poorer than Malaya, the roads, in the main, being earth packed or at best gravelled. Therefore, the British occupying force would have to be supplied and supported along a single-track railway and the one metalled road, the main highway, which ran close to the railway, down the Kra Isthmus to Hat Yai, all exposed to interdiction from the air.
It had always been accepted that British forces would have to advance into Thailand quickly, on the outbreak of war, to seize “the Ledge”, a narrow road which ran high along a cliff edge above the Pattani river, about 40 miles inside the Thai border. This road, from the small port of Pattani, allowed a back door route, coming into Malaya just south of Sungai Petani, bypassing both the Jitra and embryonic Gurun defensive lines, thus compromising the entire defence of North-Western Malaya. In addition, it would always be desirable to advance into Thailand from the Jitra line, to provide some forward positions. So, come what may with regard to the Matador operation being implemented or not, these advances had to happen.
In addition, any advance on Hat Yai and Songkhla, would have to be paired with an occupation of the port of Pattani, south of them, and the small but strategically important town of Yala which led to Pattani. This would require a force of its own, in addition to the main thrust towards the Kra Isthmus. Also, an advance into the Kra Isthmus couldn’t be done without leaving troops to occupy both Hat Yai and Songkhla. A major factor in planning these advances, was the recognition that Pattani, Songkhla and Hat Yai all held a battalion size garrison of Thai infantry, with some small support elements. Therefore, the British would have to conduct, as Lord Gort put it, “a Blitzkrieg of their own” to secure the strategic points and be able to neutralise the Thai forces. The capabilities of the Thai forces weren’t held in particular high regard, but given the chance, they could seriously impair any advance and endanger the entire operation.
Speed and surprise would be essential, but the single road north, from Alor Star, through Hat Yai and up into the Kra Isthmus would not be able to take the entire force. Although stated as metalled, its composition was poorly constructed, and indeed in parts reverted back to a gravelled road. In addition, it had a lot of bridges, required to cross the many streams and small rivers, but many, built to carry oxen and cart, were very narrow, restricting them to one way only operation for motor vehicles. Significantly, the Thai authorities had been upgrading their bridges in the Songkhla and Pattani provinces, large number of cut timber were being left beside them, while a few small working parties strengthen the bridges, or rebuilt them wider. Intelligence coming from friendly Thai sources indicated that this was at the behest of the Japanese. Off the main highways, the capacity of road bridges was much in question, other than those around the towns, the rest had to be crossed with extreme caution.
As a consequence, much heavy equipment would have to be taken by rail, and married up with the parent units at the appropriate locations. This in turn required a lot of planning, use of the single-track railway would require following a very controlled timetable of movement, the marshalling yards and engine turntable at Hat Yai being a major key to this. To enable this part of the plan to function, many trains would have to be preloaded and parked in sidings in Northern Malaya, well apart from the rest of their units, fully underlining the need for an early decision on whether to launch Matador or not. If it wasn’t to be implemented, it would take several days in some instances, before the heavy equipment could be unloaded and joined up with their corresponding units in their defensive positions.
All these problems highlighted the dangers of Operation Matador, implemented too late, or thrown badly off its timetable, would cause chaos, and potentially place the entire attacking force in danger of defeat, as well as compromising the defence of Northern Malaya. This was something both Singapore and London were painfully aware of, and had to be balanced against the rewards of a successful operation, the breaking of Thai neutrality notwithstanding.
Nevertheless, Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff had agreed to the Matador plan in principle, although not its implementation, giving Lord Gort the authority to begin the preparations to make it viable, and so they begin loading spare rail stock, and moving them to their allotted sidings, some as far down as Gemas, while a few units within the command, not allocated to the main defences, would be moved to better locations, to help facilitate the operation. There was a lot of work to be done, rail sidings still uncomplete, trains not yet released owing to ongoing domestic operations, and troops still training, but over the next couple of weeks the pieces of the jigsaw would come together. There would be an alternative military option, to that of just defending Malaya at the Jitra Line, on the table, if the time came.
The planning team had worked hard for three months, identifying strategic goals, objectives, both desirable and obtainable, and likely defensive positions. These had to be balanced against what of their own forces were available, what units could be used for, their strengths and capabilities. Both Army and RAF units were included in the plans, along with some Royal Navy involvement in coastal operations.
The main objective was the occupation of Songkhla, a small coastal port on the eastern side of the Kra Isthmus, 50 road miles from the Malayan border. The strategic aim of denying it to the Japanese, meant logistically, a Japanese invasion force, once landed on the Kra Isthmus, with the purpose of attacking Northern Malaya, was estimated as being able to maintain just a single division, owning Songkhla would allow them to tripled that!
The problem was how to hold Songkhla, where might a defensive stand be made, how far up the Kra Isthmus might they go. And how many brigades, battalions, etc, did they need for this. And of course, the entire force might be cut off by landings much further south along the eastern shores of Malaya. So, the east coast of Malaya had to be defended, as well as forces found to advance into Thailand.
And as always, logistics came into it, not only denying the Japanese a port for their logistical needs, but the need to supply the British led forces in southern Thailand. It was recognised that it would be highly unlikely that any supply could be from the sea, with the expectation that Japan would have control of the sea’s that far north. In addition, the road network of southern Thailand was far poorer than Malaya, the roads, in the main, being earth packed or at best gravelled. Therefore, the British occupying force would have to be supplied and supported along a single-track railway and the one metalled road, the main highway, which ran close to the railway, down the Kra Isthmus to Hat Yai, all exposed to interdiction from the air.
It had always been accepted that British forces would have to advance into Thailand quickly, on the outbreak of war, to seize “the Ledge”, a narrow road which ran high along a cliff edge above the Pattani river, about 40 miles inside the Thai border. This road, from the small port of Pattani, allowed a back door route, coming into Malaya just south of Sungai Petani, bypassing both the Jitra and embryonic Gurun defensive lines, thus compromising the entire defence of North-Western Malaya. In addition, it would always be desirable to advance into Thailand from the Jitra line, to provide some forward positions. So, come what may with regard to the Matador operation being implemented or not, these advances had to happen.
In addition, any advance on Hat Yai and Songkhla, would have to be paired with an occupation of the port of Pattani, south of them, and the small but strategically important town of Yala which led to Pattani. This would require a force of its own, in addition to the main thrust towards the Kra Isthmus. Also, an advance into the Kra Isthmus couldn’t be done without leaving troops to occupy both Hat Yai and Songkhla. A major factor in planning these advances, was the recognition that Pattani, Songkhla and Hat Yai all held a battalion size garrison of Thai infantry, with some small support elements. Therefore, the British would have to conduct, as Lord Gort put it, “a Blitzkrieg of their own” to secure the strategic points and be able to neutralise the Thai forces. The capabilities of the Thai forces weren’t held in particular high regard, but given the chance, they could seriously impair any advance and endanger the entire operation.
Speed and surprise would be essential, but the single road north, from Alor Star, through Hat Yai and up into the Kra Isthmus would not be able to take the entire force. Although stated as metalled, its composition was poorly constructed, and indeed in parts reverted back to a gravelled road. In addition, it had a lot of bridges, required to cross the many streams and small rivers, but many, built to carry oxen and cart, were very narrow, restricting them to one way only operation for motor vehicles. Significantly, the Thai authorities had been upgrading their bridges in the Songkhla and Pattani provinces, large number of cut timber were being left beside them, while a few small working parties strengthen the bridges, or rebuilt them wider. Intelligence coming from friendly Thai sources indicated that this was at the behest of the Japanese. Off the main highways, the capacity of road bridges was much in question, other than those around the towns, the rest had to be crossed with extreme caution.
As a consequence, much heavy equipment would have to be taken by rail, and married up with the parent units at the appropriate locations. This in turn required a lot of planning, use of the single-track railway would require following a very controlled timetable of movement, the marshalling yards and engine turntable at Hat Yai being a major key to this. To enable this part of the plan to function, many trains would have to be preloaded and parked in sidings in Northern Malaya, well apart from the rest of their units, fully underlining the need for an early decision on whether to launch Matador or not. If it wasn’t to be implemented, it would take several days in some instances, before the heavy equipment could be unloaded and joined up with their corresponding units in their defensive positions.
All these problems highlighted the dangers of Operation Matador, implemented too late, or thrown badly off its timetable, would cause chaos, and potentially place the entire attacking force in danger of defeat, as well as compromising the defence of Northern Malaya. This was something both Singapore and London were painfully aware of, and had to be balanced against the rewards of a successful operation, the breaking of Thai neutrality notwithstanding.
Nevertheless, Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff had agreed to the Matador plan in principle, although not its implementation, giving Lord Gort the authority to begin the preparations to make it viable, and so they begin loading spare rail stock, and moving them to their allotted sidings, some as far down as Gemas, while a few units within the command, not allocated to the main defences, would be moved to better locations, to help facilitate the operation. There was a lot of work to be done, rail sidings still uncomplete, trains not yet released owing to ongoing domestic operations, and troops still training, but over the next couple of weeks the pieces of the jigsaw would come together. There would be an alternative military option, to that of just defending Malaya at the Jitra Line, on the table, if the time came.
TLDR is asking for a summary. It’s an interesting topic but it’s hard to grasp what changed over the several chapters I’ve read on multiple occasions. But I can skip it
Ref: Matador
It was fairly obvious from as early as the 5th Dec that the Japanese were coming and IMO the British leadership should have pulled the trigger once the Japanese had been identified as sending their invasion fleet to sea.
I've long come to the conclusion that 'Neutrality' should only be respected by a given nation if that neutral nation can defend itself against said given nations actual enemy or potential enemy nation.
In the example of Thailand in Dec 1941 its fairly clear that they could not defend themselves against the Japanese if they chose to invade
Its also clear that such an invasion would have but one reason and that would be to use Thailand as a jumping off point for an attack on the Malaysian Peninsular.
For that reason the British would have been correct to have launched Matador well before the 7th Dec (which they did OTL only after faffing about for most of the day and then being limp wristed about it with some units not ready to conduct the op despite the lead time).
I have also seen some talk that such a pre-active decision to launch Matador early would play poorly in the USA
This however did not happen when Britain occupied Iceland and in fact the USA provided a garrison to free up the British ground forces stationed there in May 1941 despite the USA still being Neutral.
So I do not agree that such a move would play poorly in the USA.
It was fairly obvious from as early as the 5th Dec that the Japanese were coming and IMO the British leadership should have pulled the trigger once the Japanese had been identified as sending their invasion fleet to sea.
I've long come to the conclusion that 'Neutrality' should only be respected by a given nation if that neutral nation can defend itself against said given nations actual enemy or potential enemy nation.
In the example of Thailand in Dec 1941 its fairly clear that they could not defend themselves against the Japanese if they chose to invade
Its also clear that such an invasion would have but one reason and that would be to use Thailand as a jumping off point for an attack on the Malaysian Peninsular.
For that reason the British would have been correct to have launched Matador well before the 7th Dec (which they did OTL only after faffing about for most of the day and then being limp wristed about it with some units not ready to conduct the op despite the lead time).
I have also seen some talk that such a pre-active decision to launch Matador early would play poorly in the USA
This however did not happen when Britain occupied Iceland and in fact the USA provided a garrison to free up the British ground forces stationed there in May 1941 despite the USA still being Neutral.
So I do not agree that such a move would play poorly in the USA.
RR
Just a comment.. Hart has done all he can to prepare the Asiatic Fleet and His marines to the best of his ability and what Washington has allowed him. His 3rd commandant since 1939 for the 16th Naval District Rear Adm. Francis Rockwell, whose last command was the USS Nevada so this was a real promotion. Rockwell assumed command of the District on November 3rd 1941. He had exactly 37 days from assuming command until the majority of it was destroyed, with 500 USN and Philippine employee fatalities and 1,500 USN, Employee and civilian wounded and the majority of the base burned. He arranged over the next 3 weeks salvage of what could be salvaged (previously commented on) from Cavite, and Sangley Point and moved to Bataan or destroyed (too much because of Mac Arthur's ill planned open city decision and timing) . He then oversaw the evacuation and movement of the remaining Fleet Train South. After Admiral Hart evacuated to take Command of ABDA Rockwell remained in command of USN&USMC personnel in the Philippines until evacuated under orders on another of the PT boats that evacuated MacArthur. He was ordered out because he had been read into the Station CAST operations which was under him until all personnel were evacuated. This was controversial because these men were evacuated before nurses, necessity rules.
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Hi, just a thought, excuses if this has already been covered & I've forgotten.
Lot of shipping & troop movements, lot of extra construction work & training exercises. Too much to be hidden.
What sort of intelligence gathering were the Japanese doing, was it effective, does the information get filtered down to the people who need to know it?
Lot of shipping & troop movements, lot of extra construction work & training exercises. Too much to be hidden.
What sort of intelligence gathering were the Japanese doing, was it effective, does the information get filtered down to the people who need to know it?
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
And that is the biggest problem ITTL, and was to an extent a problem IOTL, the shear extent of the dysfunctional command structure in the Philippines. Where as ITTL the British have a very cooperative command structure, which has a clear understanding of the situation, and a clear focus on what needs to be done, to address the problems before it. Nether the British or the Americans have the resources or the time to enact the improvements they need to ensure that they can either, adequately deter the Japanese from attacking, or defeat an attack if launched. However ITTL, the fact that Churchill has been forced to face up to the reality of the situation in the Far East sooner, and has taken such measures as can be accomplished with the minimum of resources, and has placed a very competent command team military and civil. That not only work well together, but also are competent, and have to a large extent brought the existing officials along with them. Has allowed them to with what little is available, make the best of a very weak hand. Where as the Americans, have the problem that their command structure is basically dysfunctional, and the president is piling on the pressure to the Japanese, but failing to allocate the resources needed to back up his actions. As with his administration during the first two administrations, FDR consistently failed to head the wise words of his uncle Teddy, ‘ walk softly and carry a big stick.’ He was leading a very divided nation, that hadn’t yet really recovered from the depression, and had grand aspirations for the way he envisioned the way he thought the world should be, but didn’t have the stick to back up his words. Where he should have strengthened the position in the Philippines and Pacific first, and then dictated to the Japanese, he did the opposite, thinking that he could achieve his goals, without having done the vital work necessary. Had the Americans started the improvements to the defences of the Philippines in a constant manner from 1938, there was a good chance that the Japanese would have backed down, as is they started too late. And failed to establish a coherent command structure, which was working towards agreed goals, or establish a good working relationship with the other powers in the region. FDR wanted two results, constrain Japanese expansion, and remove colonialism generally from the region, and the rest of the world. Forgetting that he needed the cooperation of the colonial powers to achieve the constraint of the Japanese, thus his failure to establish the a good relationship between them and the administration in the Philippines, especially the major other power the British.
RR.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Cuchulainn, that's a good point you've raised, and it leaves me squirming a bit.
I have covered off Japanese intelligence of Malaya/Singapore in the post MWI 41092512 Bicycles In Taiwan, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-24206203, but it is quite limited. My thinking is the Japanese appraisal believed the 8th Australian Division to be in training, and due be deployed to the Middle East at some time soon, the Indian units are extremely poorly trained, and somewhat unreliable, despite the arrival of Hurricane aircraft, their numbers are too few, while other types remain obsolescent or worse, obsolete and the Royal Navy is very weak. Only in November and later might Japanese intelligence begin to review those beliefs, but their own clock is ticking, and if they don't attack soon, they never will. So to some extent, they will down play any improvements in Allied defences, while at the same time reinforcing the belief that if there is to be war, it has to be now. There will be a few last minute changes in the Japanese OOB which did happen historically, which I will also have, and once the fighting starts, we'll see how badly the Japanese might prioritise one objective over another.
Incidentally, I now think that post should have been labelled Bicycles in Formosa, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Formosa
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I wouldn't worry too much and would cite Midway as the classic example of Japan adhering to a plan no matter what intelligence of potential negatives come to light during either planning or execution of same - the famous wargame in which Kaga gets sunk and then reappears being only one example as per 'Shattered Sword'
Their need for oil is their top priority;, there's no other plausible source given the then-existing geological knowledge; and they could not gain control of the DEI oil fields without also controlling Malaya and Singapore.
MWI 41112514 A Spy In The Sky
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 25 November
The changes to the Hong Kong garrison hadn’t gone unnoticed by the Japanese, the Indian presence had gone, excepting the Sikh policemen and commercial enterprise. Both Indian infantry battalions had left, and all the Indian artillerymen, as well as the Middlesex machine gun battalion. But the British had recruited heavily among the Chinese population, and a number of new units had been formed, along with the re-manning of others with Chinese replacing Indian personnel.
Japanese spies had confirmed there were two new infantry battalions, 1st and 2nd, of the Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, but a third infantry battalion was probably in existence, which would be made up of the trainers and recruits of the still functioning army training establishment, at least that was what two independent sources had said, while a full mechanized Chinese battalion was also in existence, possibly numbered the 4th, but split up around the colony, so as not to be noticed. Indeed, in an act of deception, they used trucks supposedly owned by the RAOC and RASC.
The British artillery park had also undergone a change, apart from the Indian gunners being replaced by Chinese ones, a number of new fortified gun positions had sprung up around Hong Kong Island, more than enough to re-house the removal of the Stonecutters battery. This was harder to verify, sources were quite vague, and security on the Island had noticeably tightened, anyone wishing to cross over needed a good reason, shopping, sightseeing, and bird watching weren’t sufficent, visiting a friend needed an authorised pass, the point being made, when challenged, that they could always come visit you in Kowloon.
And so, deliberate over flights of Hong Kong were planned and made. The weakness of the RAF meant an unmarked Mitsubishi G3M, equipped with cameras, was able to make regular flights, at just 7,000ft, in no danger of being intercepted by one of the three Vildebeest bombers that the RAF had. Photographs were taken, developed and studied by the intelligence unit of the 23rd IJA Army, the unit who had been given the task of capturing Hong Kong if war breaks out.
And with the mindset of the Army being it would be war; they were making their preparations. The 38th Infantry Division, the best of the three divisions that the 23rd Army had, was assigned to capturing Hong Kong, and her units were practicing river crossings, using newly arrived collapsible boats, their engineers practicing blowing up obstacles, and defusing demolition charges, along with assembling pontoon bridges. Recognising the fixed defences would be difficult to break down, pretty much the entire 23rd Army’s artillery park had been assigned as support, along with both of her combat engineer regiments. This meant the number of field guns available for the division had been more than doubled, while 150mm and even 240mm howitzers had arrived, to crack open those big coastal gun concrete emplacements that the British had.
To support the ground forces, the Army Air Force had moved the 1st Air Brigade to Pai Yuen airfield just northeast of Canton, about 90 miles away from Hong Kong. The main formation in this brigade was the 45th Air Regiment, which had been loaned for the mission, equipped with the Ki-32 light bomber, 29 of its aircraft had flown down from Manchuria, where it was home based. Also available was the 10th Independent Air Sqn, with Ki-27 fighters, nine had been successfully flown down from Taiyuan, a tenth one crashing enroute.
To ensure the attack on Hong Kong was not interrupted by the Chinese Army, another infantry regiment had been assigned by the 23rd, the 66th, which supported by some artillery, would cover the 38th Division’s rear during operations.
Elements of the IJN 2nd China Fleet, under command of Rear Admiral Nimi Masaichi, would blockade the port from the sea, as well as deploying a bombardment group of a light cruiser and several destroyers, along with an assault group of SNLF marines to occupy some of the outlying islands.
The changes to the Hong Kong garrison hadn’t gone unnoticed by the Japanese, the Indian presence had gone, excepting the Sikh policemen and commercial enterprise. Both Indian infantry battalions had left, and all the Indian artillerymen, as well as the Middlesex machine gun battalion. But the British had recruited heavily among the Chinese population, and a number of new units had been formed, along with the re-manning of others with Chinese replacing Indian personnel.
Japanese spies had confirmed there were two new infantry battalions, 1st and 2nd, of the Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, but a third infantry battalion was probably in existence, which would be made up of the trainers and recruits of the still functioning army training establishment, at least that was what two independent sources had said, while a full mechanized Chinese battalion was also in existence, possibly numbered the 4th, but split up around the colony, so as not to be noticed. Indeed, in an act of deception, they used trucks supposedly owned by the RAOC and RASC.
The British artillery park had also undergone a change, apart from the Indian gunners being replaced by Chinese ones, a number of new fortified gun positions had sprung up around Hong Kong Island, more than enough to re-house the removal of the Stonecutters battery. This was harder to verify, sources were quite vague, and security on the Island had noticeably tightened, anyone wishing to cross over needed a good reason, shopping, sightseeing, and bird watching weren’t sufficent, visiting a friend needed an authorised pass, the point being made, when challenged, that they could always come visit you in Kowloon.
And so, deliberate over flights of Hong Kong were planned and made. The weakness of the RAF meant an unmarked Mitsubishi G3M, equipped with cameras, was able to make regular flights, at just 7,000ft, in no danger of being intercepted by one of the three Vildebeest bombers that the RAF had. Photographs were taken, developed and studied by the intelligence unit of the 23rd IJA Army, the unit who had been given the task of capturing Hong Kong if war breaks out.
And with the mindset of the Army being it would be war; they were making their preparations. The 38th Infantry Division, the best of the three divisions that the 23rd Army had, was assigned to capturing Hong Kong, and her units were practicing river crossings, using newly arrived collapsible boats, their engineers practicing blowing up obstacles, and defusing demolition charges, along with assembling pontoon bridges. Recognising the fixed defences would be difficult to break down, pretty much the entire 23rd Army’s artillery park had been assigned as support, along with both of her combat engineer regiments. This meant the number of field guns available for the division had been more than doubled, while 150mm and even 240mm howitzers had arrived, to crack open those big coastal gun concrete emplacements that the British had.
To support the ground forces, the Army Air Force had moved the 1st Air Brigade to Pai Yuen airfield just northeast of Canton, about 90 miles away from Hong Kong. The main formation in this brigade was the 45th Air Regiment, which had been loaned for the mission, equipped with the Ki-32 light bomber, 29 of its aircraft had flown down from Manchuria, where it was home based. Also available was the 10th Independent Air Sqn, with Ki-27 fighters, nine had been successfully flown down from Taiyuan, a tenth one crashing enroute.
To ensure the attack on Hong Kong was not interrupted by the Chinese Army, another infantry regiment had been assigned by the 23rd, the 66th, which supported by some artillery, would cover the 38th Division’s rear during operations.
Elements of the IJN 2nd China Fleet, under command of Rear Admiral Nimi Masaichi, would blockade the port from the sea, as well as deploying a bombardment group of a light cruiser and several destroyers, along with an assault group of SNLF marines to occupy some of the outlying islands.
Driftless
Donor
OK. However, the Commonwealth OOB in Hong Kong is different the OTL, with some potentially more useful manpower and equipment being moved South, correct?
Though, I'm not sure the fates of the Hong Kong Chinese soldiers are safe from Japanese retribution.
The Chinese troops in British service probably have a good idea already of how they will be treated by the Japanese, I doubt that surrendering will be seen as a good life choice, better to fight to the death.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
and
Hi Driftless and Kelgar04, the two new Hong Kong Chinese battalions are a direct replacement for the two Indian Battalions that left to join the Malaya garrison. The Middlesex machine gun battalion has been replaced as best as possible by the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC), but this is less capable. There has been about a dozen artillery pieces transferred away, and the Indian gunners replaced by local Chinese. And of course there is no Force C, the Canadians have not been sent!
So the defences are weaker, the Japanese mention of the ability of the British to create a third infantry battalion, is somewhat off, and their idea that there is a mechanised battalion is pure fancy, a product of Major General Maltby's deception plans