WI: no Free France

What if the government of Free France was never created (Perhaps if Charles de Gaulle was arrested by the Nazi/Vichy government before he could go to England)? What would be the consequences of Vichy France being the only "France" during the rest of WWII?
 
No presence in the UNSC, lack of the strategic industries developped later on through the impulse of the CNR, de Gaulle and such. Aerospace technologies, nuclear tech, a lot of these are very unlikely to be developped, or maybe on the scale of Italy’s, meaning under close US partnership... which can still lead to world-class expertise, Italy being among the best in the world for solid-fuel rocketry, for example.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It would have a not-inconsiderable impact on the war itself, for the Free French did provide considerable manpower to the Allied cause, especially in 1943, as well as critical intelligence from within France. But the main impact would be after the war. De Gaulle's great achievement was that he kept the fire of France burning through the course of the war and it was able to emerge from the conflict with its national pride and dignity intact. As @Rufus Shinra just pointed out, it's unlikely that France would have a seat on the UNSC, for one thing.
 
What if the government of Free France was never created (Perhaps if Charles de Gaulle was arrested by the Nazi/Vichy government before he could go to England)? What would be the consequences of Vichy France being the only "France" during the rest of WWII?
No presence in the UNSC, lack of the strategic industries developped later on through the impulse of the CNR, de Gaulle and such. Aerospace technologies, nuclear tech, a lot of these are very unlikely to be developped, or maybe on the scale of Italy’s, meaning under close US partnership... which can still lead to world-class expertise, Italy being among the best in the world for solid-fuel rocketry, for example.

The thing is, its basically impossible not to have a Free France. The Appel du 18 Juin is a touching moment and doubtless de Gaulle was a patriotic and heroic man, but for the first several years of the war his own influence was essentially minimal, and there are inevitably going to be certain colonies which have to defect to the British, because their position is untenable otherwise - even if just the Pacific. Inevitably, the British will find somebody else to speak on the radio, because there's no reason not to, it is necessary to have some fig leaf about who is really controlling the French colonies during the war to not feed additional Vichy propaganda and resistance, and so there will be a Free France, even less independent and active at first, but some sort of Free France. Leaving asides the only big potential butterfly which might result, Bir Hakeim, the war will go on roughly as otl, and the sans de Gaulle Free French will eventually become something more meaningful when the French Africa as a whole defects after Operation Torch, and then for the rest of the war its contribution is basically that of OTL. And then France will probably get in the end a UN seat, which for various reasons (I would link over the post I made about the subject on another board but my wifi here doesn't permit me to access it) it made quite a deal of sense to get anyway (the British were the ones to propose the French candidature and were very ardent about it, and the French were the only nation which could complement the American-desired China that nobody else wanted) and the French diplomatic corps will be professional enough to angle for. It might even be helped without the personal antagonism between Roosevelt and de Gaulle, which might make up for a less skilled management of prestige and military affairs.

I would also have my doubts about a non-Gaullist France not being involved in high value prestige projects. Instead it would be switched to different organizations and styles. Military nuclear ambitions in addition to the extant civil program began to be examined in earnest from at least the period of the Suez disaster in 1956, but the idea was part of a pan-European project. A France of a surviving 4th Republic without de Gaulle would be more like Italy indeed for its political structure and political economy, but it might very well follow a pan-European project instead. The same can be said that without a Gaullist political voice, there might be less effective opposition to the European Defense Community and other pan-European projects. The same degree of massive investment into civilian nuclear power strikes me as unlikely, the rebirth of the aeronautic industry was well laid under the OTL 4th republic already, long before de Gaulle ever returned from his traverse in the desert. I'd expect a lot less independent foreign policy which is more beholden to the US, a more europeanist outlook, a less romantic myth about Free France, and a much more complex and even more painful dealing with Algeria - although maybe the immediate post-war French government would lack the vigor to try to reclaim Indochina... Inevitably a lot of the same economic structures are going to fall into place, dirigisme dated already from the 4th republic.

Canada? Or maybe Brazil?
The Brazilians are unacceptable to the Soviets and the British due to being perceived as an excessively American influenced state, basically just giving the US another vote. And lacking any sort of international prestige or real influence or power. This is not just my speculation, they were considered for the role OTL and rejected. Canada, ditto with the same rejection from the Soviets.

So, would there be only four permanent UNSC seats and if not, who would fill the fifth seat?
If France didn't get the Security Council seat, then more likely there are only 3: France's inclusion was a quid pro quo because China was assumed as being an American puppet that the Americans were using to expand their influence. Neither the British or the Soviets would settle for them without alternate concessions, and just what those could be I don't know. The irony of course is that historically the Americans were opposed to the French inclusion until ultimately coming on board with the British opinion (at which point the Soviets threw in the towel) and wanted the Chinese, but then the French ended up being their ally and the Chinese became Red China, but life does take many turns.

the Raj could get the seat.
Neither the Americans nor the Soviets are going to let a British colony on board and sit down at a table as ostensible equals with them.... Even the British might be highly uncertain about it, given that they know that it is going to be free soon, and might very well have a grudge.
 
So, would there be only four permanent UNSC seats and if not, who would fill the fifth seat?

I suppose the first. With the permanent members having the veto power, there's no reason to have an odd number of seats, and any other Allied nation than the Big Four would have been seen as a second seat for one of them.
 
Just a thought, but perhaps the lack of a seperately organized Free French administration-military unit (French forces may still fight, but like other exiles perhaps as elements within the Commonwealth army), would provide the Allies with more flexibility in terms of "sounding out" potential defectors among the Vichy leadership in Africa? Without any competing questions of government legitimacy or the need to placate the Gaulists, it'd be solid strategy once the Med is secured and the forces in Libya on the ropes to have Britain and the US reach out to see if they can't get the North African front to "flip" without a fight by offering clemency and the mantle of leadership post-war.
 
Recipe for chaos in the 1950's and 1960's with no De Gaulle 'Deus ex Machina' to lower into the vicious factions that might well have descended into civil war if the army staged a coup which is far from unlikely. The Algerian War would have a different ending. Militarily French forces had tamed the insurrection but De Gaulle had the vision and gravitas to pull out nevertheless.

The genius of De Gaulle was not to believe in his own propaganda.
 
What if the government of Free France was never created (Perhaps if Charles de Gaulle was arrested by the Nazi/Vichy government before he could go to England)? What would be the consequences of Vichy France being the only "France" during the rest of WWII?

If it had not been de Gaulle then it would probably have been someone else, although a bit later.

Probably Catroux who joined Britain by Singapore in late July 1940.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Catroux

Now, the point was that although then not being yet a prominent general of the French army colonel at the beginning of the war and general in June 1940) nor a significant member of the political stage (he was but an advisor to the head of the French government who appointed him as under-secretary of war), de Gaulle was a born Statesman and had a vision, both strategically for the war and politically for his country.

Nothing proves that Catroux or anyone else would have achieved what de Gaulle did achieve because of his vision and of his personality.

So there might have been a postwar France much more controlled by the US but also much more unstable, with a higher risk of a bloody civil war such as Greece went through.

But all this will not prevent France developing its high tech industries as it did OTL. Most of these were developed not under de Gaulle’s government but under the French 4th republic which was a full member of NATO under US command.
 
Darlan if assassination is avoided.

This is different. Darlan would hardly have joined free France. But he would have been an ideal pawn for the US and Britain because he could easily have been blackmailed like all those who had been heavily compromised in the Vichy government and its policy of collaboration with Germany.
 
With Darlan the term Free French might have been meaningless. Petain had appointed Darlan as chief of the NW Africa colonies in case the opportunity to flip presented itself. Petains instruction to Darlan was to follow the neutrality policy if possible, but if he had to choose to then take the Allies side. The three days resistance Darlan directed vs the Allied invasion was in part from a effort to satisfy the Germans the French were complying with the requirements of the Armistice: 'Prevent any other nation from occupying the French colonies.' & in part due to a breakdown in Allied efforts to communicate to Darlan. Paxtons 'Vichy France' or Jacksons 'The Dark Years' outline the situation Darlan found himself in. In any case Darlan was on the way to negotiating recognition as the leader of the French outside Metropolitan France when he died. Petains expectations in this are not entirely clear, he kept his plans in this close to his chest and largely unrecorded. One distinct possibility is Petain expected the Germans to dissolve the French government, with he and his cabinet arrested. In that case he seems to have laid the ground for Darlan as the last senior member government member, unrestrained now by the Germans, and representing legitimate continuation. As it was Petains government was not dissolved, even after being transported to Germany in August 1944. Hitler still thought he had use for the collaborationists like Laval.

As far as Darlans exposure as a collaborationist he was hardly blackmail material. His policies as prime minister were know, and were in any case the least of the leaders in retains cabinet. One of the reasons Darlan was removed as prime minister was his policy of resistance to occupation and strict neutrality was failing. Laval persuaded Petain he could accomplish more for France through a greater cooperation with the Axis nations. This does not whitewash Darlan, nor waive away his dithering in the crisis as the Allies in faded Algeria & Morocco in in November 1942. He had the opportunity to seize the moment and decisively turn the colonies over to the Allied cause in a day. Instead he tried to run a path between to many competing factions and a impossibly complex policy from Petain & tainted his reputation. But, as far as collaboration, what he had done while in Petains government was know & hardly blackmail material.
 
And the cultural impacts? Would France be seem more as a "traitor" and "Axis scum"?

Depends on what the makeup of the French Resistance ITTL would be like. If, for example, we had a more Greek-like French Resistance akin to EAM/ELAS (i.e. the franc-tireurs et partisans given a more prominent and active role), then the interpretation of Vichy France would be one way; if the French Resistance was more Polish-like (with internal structures similar to the Home Army and Secret State), then it would be another way - although with complications pertaining to the colonial empire. Either way, how the Resistance is organized ITTL will have implications for what cultural impact on France would the absence of de Gaulle contain and entail.
 
Quoted to save me typing something along the same lines:
The suggestion that if de Gaulle had died there would not have been a Free French government is, frankly, ridiculous. Regardless of de Gaulle there would have been a Free French for two reasons; firstly because there were French soldiers and sailors in England, many of whom still wanted to fight, they would have organised some organisation to represent their interests. And secondly, and more importantly, because the British needed there to be a Free French government so that they can avoid the impression that they were plundering the colonies of their erstwhile ally.

When de Gaulle landed in England there were 21,000 French troops there; men who’d taken part in the Norwegian campaign or who had been evacuated from Dunkirk. None of them had fought under de Gaulle and few would have known much about him or been inspired by what they did; de Gaulle had spent most of the First World War in a German prisoner of war camp, hand been promoted slowly in the inter-war period, had written a book on strategy that had been ridiculed in France, his involvement in the fighting in 1940 had consisted of a few days and had seen the armoured division he commanded almost completely destroyed without even slowing the German spearheads, before he’d been asked to join the collapsing Reynaud government as its most junior minister. As things turned out, less than a third of them joined the Free French army, most preferring to either be repatriated to France or go into internment in England. Those that did join the F.F. did so for reasons other than enthusiasm for de Gaulle, as he him-self fully admitted. De Gaulle described their motivation as:

‘A taste for risk and adventure pushed to the pitch of art for art’s sake, a contempt for the cowardly and the indifferent, a tendency to melancholy and so to quarrelling during the periods without danger, given place to an ardent cohesion in action, a national pride sharpened to the extreme by their country’s ill-fortune and by contact with well equipped allies, and above all, a sovereign confidence in the strength and courage of their own conspiracy.’

Nor was de Gaulle any more successful in rallying French colonies to his banner; only French Equatorial Africa went over to the Free French cause, and for reasons entirely unrelated to de Gaulle’s leadership. At Dakar, the last campaign against the Vichy French where Free French forces took the lead and de Gaulle commanded in person, the allies were defeated. After that, allied forces led the campaigns in Vichy colonies, often without any prior consultation with de Gaulle. Nor did progressively greater success inspire more enthusiasm for the Free French cause; Vichy forces in Madagascar and the Levant fought bitterly hard to the finish and almost all declined to join the Free French, instead choosing to be repatriated.

The Free French forces fighting in the Levant and North Africa were not commanded in the field by de Gaulle, he was the political, not military leader of a government in exile that served British needs; they wanted someone who they could hand over liberated Vichy colonies to and thereby avoid appearing to be plundering the France; the Fashoda complex. Nor was de Gaulle the British first choice; that had been Georges Mandel, the French Interior Minister, who General Spears had been sent to France to persuade to join him in flying to England. Unfortunately Mandel decided to head for French North Africa and try to rally French resistance from there, was arrested by Petain and ended up being murdered by the Gestapo.

Without de Gaulle, someone else would have filled the position and the Free French would have proceeded much as they did. The shape of post-war French politics would have been different, possibly immensely different depending on who stepped forward to fill the gap, but during the war and in the allied conferences that decided the immediate post-war period, little would have changed.

A higher profile leader leading to a more successful Free French was certainly possible, but depended entirely on events during the last days before French Capitulation.

When the government abandoned Paris and relocated to Bordeaux, the righting was well and truly on the wall; France would fall. Premier Reynaud proposed to General Weygand that the French should do as the Dutch had done; seek a military capitulation only, while leaving the government freedom of action to continue the struggle from overseas. Weygand indignantly refused and Reynaud, despite having the authority to dismiss Weygand for failure to carry out orders, did not do so, instead he resigned; he was by that stage on the verge of a mental and physical breakdown. If Reynaud had dismissed Weygand and appointed someone else as commander of the French army, with authorisation to capitulate only those forces in mainland France, those members of the government willing to continue the fight could have flown to either North Africa or England and been able to issue orders to the French colonies with the full authority of the legitimate French Government.

The French cabinet were divided between those in favour of capitulation and those wanting to continue the struggle from France’s overseas empire. In Anglo-American terms these would have been ‘the hawks’ and ‘the doves’, in France they were referred to as ‘the hards’ and ‘the softs’, which possibly suggests something concerning French though processes at the time. By the 14th of June, the softs formed a definite majority of the cabinet, but there were still key members in the hards camp, principal amongst them being Interior Minister Georges Mandel and Defence Minister (and former Prime Minister) Edouard Daladier, both of whom headed for North Africa to try to continue the struggle from there. The Minister for the Navy, Cesar Campinchi and the Minister of State, Louis Marin, were also leading hards.

If either Mandel or Daladier (or in a best case scenario, both) had flown to England but otherwise events continued as IOTL; Reynaud resigning, Petain becoming premier and asking for an armistice, then they would have had much more pull than de Gaulle had, both in terms of being able to persuade French soldiers there to join the Free French and in politically when dealing with the British and Americans. Daladier in particular, could have used the dissolution of the French parliament on July 10th and Petain’s assumption of the presidency to denounce him and declared that he, as most senior remaining member of a legitimate French cabinet sworn in by President Lebrun, was assuming the duties of the premier and leading a French Provisional Government in Exile.

As heads of an exile government, neither Daladier nor Mandel would have been perfect, but then an obscure Brigadier-General with no political experience and a prickly personality wasn't either. Daladier was a virtual manic depressive who sustained himself through the crisis of 1940 by drinking heavily; many witnesses describe him reeking of Absinthe during cabinet meetings, but his public image was stronger and inspired more respect than his private one. Mandel’s character was outstanding for the role of an exiled leader; he’s was calm, unflappable, resolute and determined, the only thing going against him was that he was a Jew, and this was something that the Vichy regime and the Germans would have used for maximum propaganda effect. The best scenario would have been for both Daladier and Mandel to have got to England, preferably with Campinchi as well; Daladier would have become the head of the provisional government with Mandel providing the reliable anchor and capable administration, while Campinchi would have been able to issue orders to the French Fleet with at least some confidence of outweighing the orders issued by Darlan.

None would have equalled the prestige of Petain, but they all had more political prestige, clout and public profile than de Gaulle had, with the possibility of more colonies and men joining the Free French cause.
 
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