Why are Sealion threads so hated on this site?

Earling

The carrying capacity to transport 11 divisions, never mind supply them, or any reinforcements, did not exist.

For the scenario to work the Germans therefore have to cross the channel, land and then immediately march on London, facing no resistance, whereupon the British surrender.
This is despite having no heavy equipment and so no obvious way to break any defences stronger than the home guard. They have no prospect of resupply - so in just a few hours of fighting they would have no ammunition, and in a few days they have no food. Obviously they could capture such along the way, but it would be patchy and its unlikely the British would obliging leave significant portions around. Especially once the poor state of German forces became known - as it surely would be.

Scenarios where Sea Lion works always require the RAF, RN and British Army to cease to exist for unspecified reasons. This seems fanciful.

Barbarossa by contrast may have failed in its overwhelming objective, but it got to the gates of Moscow which is more than Sea Lion is going to do. If Moscow had fallen, the whole Volga would be potentially vulnerable in the next season's campaign, and if it had fallen there wouldn't be much of the USSR left. I realise this is a lot of ifs, but to do hind sighting - we know the attack towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus was a road to nowhere. Its cities like Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod), Kazan and Kuybyshev (Samara) that were critical to the Soviet War effort.
 
wcv215

wcv215

Alan said:
He is actually entitled to his opinion. If Manstein were alive and posting on this site, he for one would be supporting Glenn, because the argument he presents in Lost Victories is quite similar.
Click to expand...
Manstein was a war criminal who should have been swinging on a rope in 1945. His book is nothing but an ass-covering bit of lies trying to claim that it was really just the Nazis who were bad, and totally not the Wehrmacht that eagerly and happily backed everything they did.
 

RodentRevolution

Banned
Alan said:
You can download the full text of his book here. This is the text version. there are other formats available.

https://archive.org/stream/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/Erich_Von_Manstein_Lost_Victories_djvu.txt

I shall quote one key passage from his book:

"Desirable though the attainment of air supremacy prior to the invasion always was, a careful
review of all the factors involved should still have prompted the German Supreme Command
to commit the Luftwaffe for its decisive blow only in immediate conjunction with the

invasion.

One can, of course, object that on this basis the Luftwaffe's resources would have been called

upon to perform too many tasks, namely:

to attack British air bases in the south of England;

to cover the embarkation in the French harbours;

to protect the transports as they crossed the Channel;
to support the first wave of invasion troops during their landing;
and, in co-operation with the navy and coastal artillery, to prevent
the British Fleet from interfering.

But not all these tasks would have been simultaneous, even if they had to be solved in close
succession. For example, the British Fleet — apart from the light naval forces stationed in
harbours in the south of England - could probably not have intervened until after the first

wave of troops had landed.

Everything would have depended on the outcome of a big aerial battle which would have
started over the Channel or southern England as soon as the army and navy began invading.
The conditions experienced by the Luftwaffe in this battle would, nevertheless, have been
immeasurably more favourable than in its raids on the interior of the country.

Naturally such a mode of action meant staking everything on one card. That, however, would
have been the price one was bound to pay in the circumstances if the invasion were to be

risked at all."
Click to expand...

Yet as already appraised the problems included that

1: The transport craft required for just the first waves were not yet in position in the embarkation ports.
2: The light forces of the RN in the Channel were already as strong or stronger than the entire operational surface fleet of the KM.
3: The Luftwaffe never demonstrated the ability to suppress just the Fighter Command portion of the RAF in one almighty blow, let alone Bomber and Coastal Command at the same time
4: There is some doubt as to the ability of the Luftwaffe to suppress the British coastal defences enough to enable a landing at the required beaches.
5: There would have been no time for the KM to clear the British defensive minefields through which the landing forces would have had to pass.
6: German studies of landing ops strongly suggested the first wave forces were only sufficiently strong to hold the beaches upon which they landed, they would need to be reinforced by a much stronger second wave
7:The plans for preventing RN and RAF interference required the landing of numerous artillery and AA, the KM however could only squeeze about 30% of the required artillery aboard the first wave landing craft.
 

Alan

Admittedly other German generals were much more pessimistic. Here is is Rundstedt's point of view given in conversation with Liddell hart.

The military reasons for its cancellation were
various. The German Navy would have had to control
the North Sea as well as the Channel, and was not strong
enough to do so. The German Air Force was not sufficient
to protect the sea crossing on its own. While the leading
part of the forces might have landed, there was the danger
that they might be cut off from supplies and reinforce-
ments. I asked Rundstedt whether it might not have
been possible to keep the invasion forces supplied by air for
a time — as was done on a very large scale in Russia during
the winter of 194 1. He said the system of air supply was
x not sufficiently developed in 1 940 for this possibility to be
considered.
 

Aber

Alan said:
The way Glenn is treated reminds me of the way heretics were treated by the Papal Courts. He is actually entitled to his opinion.
Click to expand...

Glenn239 has a long history not only here, but on other websites, of taking unconventional positions and arguing at length even when presented with alternative viewpoints and full facts (mostly on WW1) and this is reflected in the responses to him.
 

TDM

Alan said:
You can download the full text of his book here. This is the text version. there are other formats available.

https://archive.org/stream/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/Erich_Von_Manstein_Lost_Victories_djvu.txt

I shall quote one key passage from his book:

"Desirable though the attainment of air supremacy prior to the invasion always was, a careful
review of all the factors involved should still have prompted the German Supreme Command
to commit the Luftwaffe for its decisive blow only in immediate conjunction with the

invasion.

One can, of course, object that on this basis the Luftwaffe's resources would have been called

upon to perform too many tasks, namely:

to attack British air bases in the south of England;

to cover the embarkation in the French harbours;

to protect the transports as they crossed the Channel;
to support the first wave of invasion troops during their landing;
and, in co-operation with the navy and coastal artillery, to prevent
the British Fleet from interfering.

But not all these tasks would have been simultaneous, even if they had to be solved in close
succession. For example, the British Fleet — apart from the light naval forces stationed in
harbours in the south of England - could probably not have intervened until after the first

wave of troops had landed.

Everything would have depended on the outcome of a big aerial battle which would have
started over the Channel or southern England as soon as the army and navy began invading.
The conditions experienced by the Luftwaffe in this battle would, nevertheless, have been
immeasurably more favourable than in its raids on the interior of the country.

Naturally such a mode of action meant staking everything on one card. That, however, would
have been the price one was bound to pay in the circumstances if the invasion were to be

risked at all."
Click to expand...

OK I'll be honest that sounds like rather wishful thinking and understating the difficulties on his part
 

fastmongrel

wcv215 said:
Manstein was a war criminal who should have been swinging on a rope in 1945. His book is nothing but an ass-covering bit of lies trying to claim that it was really just the Nazis who were bad, and totally not the Wehrmacht that eagerly and happily backed everything they did.
Click to expand...

There are lies, damn lies and retired Generals memoirs
 
wcv215

wcv215

TDM said:
OK I'll be honest that sounds like rather wishful thinking and understating the difficulties on his part
Click to expand...
Like I said above, that's because he's being actively disingenous. Manstein was one of many Germany generals, and the foremost, to create the "Hitler meddling" myth which says that it was Hitler who lost the war, and that if the generals had gotten their way Germany would have won. His argument as presented is in the exact same vein. We COULD have done it, but Hitler wouldn't let us. Most of his memoir is dedicated to this, and what isn't is dedicated to inventing the clean Wehrmacht myth, which has a similiar acquaintance with reality (that is to say, none.)
 

sloreck

While Hitler meddled and was often considered to be the Allies secret weapon, the fact is when it came to logistic planning or considerations Grofaz was almost always absent. Logistics were almost always the weak point of any German campaigns, North Africa and Barbarossa in particular. Tactical victories encouraged the Germans to overextend themselves, which then would leave then vulnerable during pauses and really never able to prepare for the next step. Really none of this required hindsight or some special knowledge the Heer did not have. Only the logistical idiocy of Japan kept the Germans from appearing as stupid as they were.
 

ObssesedNuker

Alan said:
If Manstein were alive and posting on this site, he for one would be supporting Glenn, because the argument he presents in Lost Victories is quite similar.
Click to expand...

The current consensus among military historians is that for all of Manstein's genius at operational maneuver he was still as grossly deficient at logistics, intelligence, and strategy as most other German general and this is reflected in his memoirs such as Lost Victories, which contain many proposals that have not withstood the scrutiny of the opening of many archives that had previously been closed following the end of the Cold War. Even your quoted section demonstrates this, as it shows that Manstein has a total lack of comprehension about how air warfare works at pretty much every level.
 

ObssesedNuker

Well, Glenn is correct that Germany trying and failing Sealion isn't an insta-lose for Germany the way Barbarossa going to pieces is, but he is wrong that it leaves them in a better or same strategic position. The loss of the Rhine river barges creates economic problems that affects Germany's ability to invade Russia, pursue any form of Mediterranean option, and even prosecute the naval and air wars against Britain. More immediately, the loss of airborne and amphibious assets would also mean stuff like Crete simply doesn't happen.
 

TDM

wcv215 said:
Like I said above, that's because he's being actively disingenous. Manstein was one of many Germany generals, and the foremost, to create the "Hitler meddling" myth which says that it was Hitler who lost the war, and that if the generals had gotten their way Germany would have won. His argument as presented is in the exact same vein. We COULD have done it, but Hitler wouldn't let us. Most of his memoir is dedicated to this, and what isn't is dedicated to inventing the clean Wehrmacht myth, which has a similiar acquaintance with reality (that is to say, none.)
Click to expand...

Yeah, also IIRC (it's been a long time since i read it) to go with the "we could have won if hadn't have been for that meddling Hitler", there was at times a healthy dose of 'and we'd have won because we were so awesome'. Guy couldn't resist a chance for self-puffery while also blaming others.

On the wider analysis I remember my basic reaction to reading his book and was to eyeroll and mutter yeah right truly the German army were the real victims in all this.
 
Last edited:

steamboy

TDM said:
Yeah, also IIRC (it been long time since i read it) to go with the "we could have won if hadn't have been for that meddling Hitler", there was at times a healthy dose of 'and we'd have won because we were so awesome'. Guy couldn't resist chance for puffery while also blaming others.

On the wider analysis I remember my basic reaction to reading his book and was to eyeroll and mutter yeah right truly the German army were the real victims in all this.
Click to expand...

I've not read his book myself but I would basically assume

https://i.redd.it/42zsxjm78rex.gif

in a nutshell?
 

Alan

"Any competent officer can command a Panzer Division, it takes a genius to supply one" is a famous quote from Mantauffel. Given the achievements of the German Panzer troops in extremely logistically challenging environments, I'm curious as to where this notion that German generals had little understanding of logistics comes from.
 

Alan

During Barbarossa, the Germans reached the gates of Moscow, the foothills of the Caucacasus, and kept armies supplied by air at Chlom and Demyansk. They kept an army of 3 million men supplied through the worst Russian winter in living memory, despite the absence of metalled roads. Their failure in Barbarossa was due to a number of strategic and political mistakes, and the the fact that the winter came early. Even General de Gaulle marvelled that they got so far.

The main factor underlying most German failures during the war was the irrational and brutal nature of Nazi ideology. It alienated potential allies and subjected peoples who might have otherwise been sympathetic, such as the Ukrainians, diverted vital resources to genocidal projects, and made the states aligned against them totally unwilling to compromise.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Top
Top