Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
In a previous post I alluded that it was my opinion that the American establishment both political and military were criminally incompetent, for not making adequate plans for the war in the Atlantic. I would like to explain my position and the reasoning behind it, while we await the next instalment by our author of the conflict in the Far East, and the role of tanks in it. During the inter war years the Joint Planning Committee, engaged in the preparation of a number of war plans, which were colour coded, with orange referring to war against Japan and red to war against Britain. While the USN put a lot of effort into WP Orange, running numerous extensive war games at its Staff College in the Pringal Hall facility. A smaller number of such War Games were also run, mostly in the War Game Red series, as at the time Britain was the only other potential naval opponent. While the JPC, might have set a few junior officers to update War Plan Black, Germanys military weakness up until the ascension of Hitler and his gang, was guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles. However once Hitler got in, and especially after the Anglo German Navel Agreement of 1935, someone should have been regularly updating War Plan Black, and a number of war games run, based on a conflict with Germany. In fact there should have been multiple games run, such as war with Germany, were Britain is involved alongside America, war with Germany were Germany is linked to Japan, etc etc. And given the prolific words of a former head of the USN in 1919, warning about a German submarine campaign against the American East Coast, some very basic preparations should have been made.

Instead the American establishment, political and military, instead ignored events in Europe, and only concentrated on the Pacific. Once the European war started, instead of examining what was happening and sending numerous observers, the Americans essentially went to sleep. By mid 1940, the Americans should have been preparing and putting in place measures to deal with a submarine campaign or the East Coast and in the Caribbean. Ready to be implemented in short order, such as the British had in the years leading up to WWII. Instead they were dismissive of the advice they received from the British, and while concentrating on the Pacific, failed to make any preparations, for what was obvious to anyone other than a blind fool, America was going to be involved in the war like it or not. Throughout 1941 FDR, as he did in the Pacific, turned the screws on the Germans in the Atlantic. But still no significant preparations were made, and even once war broke out, the Americans resisted all efforts by the British to implement a combined approach to the Atlantic campaign. The Atlantic was the only major theatre of WWII, that didn’t have a Supreme Allied Commander appointed, mostly because the Americans were insistent that he was to be an American. While the British were not going to have their vital life line under American control, and an American in charge of the Home Fleet. Do I see there being any major changes ITTL compared to ours, no, the same fools and idiots will be in charge. There will however be minor changes, with the British not having to support a major campaign in North Africa, and hopefully Singapore remaining in British hands, there will be slightly more escort vessels available for the Atlantic. But the Germans will as they did engage in a submarine campaign on the East Coast and Caribbean. There are going to be tough times ahead, and this will be even more a bone of contention between the British and Americans. But after a miserable 1942, I would expect that early in 43, about six months earlier the Battle of the Atlantic, will effectively be over.

RR.
 
In a previous post I alluded that it was my opinion that the American establishment both political and military were criminally incompetent, for not making adequate plans for the war in the Atlantic. I would like to explain my position and the reasoning behind it, while we await the next instalment by our author of the conflict in the Far East, and the role of tanks in it. During the inter war years the Joint Planning Committee, engaged in the preparation of a number of war plans, which were colour coded, with orange referring to war against Japan and red to war against Britain. While the USN put a lot of effort into WP Orange, running numerous extensive war games at its Staff College in the Pringal Hall facility. A smaller number of such War Games were also run, mostly in the War Game Red series, as at the time Britain was the only other potential naval opponent. While the JPC, might have set a few junior officers to update War Plan Black, Germanys military weakness up until the ascension of Hitler and his gang, was guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles. However once Hitler got in, and especially after the Anglo German Navel Agreement of 1935, someone should have been regularly updating War Plan Black, and a number of war games run, based on a conflict with Germany. In fact there should have been multiple games run, such as war with Germany, were Britain is involved alongside America, war with Germany were Germany is linked to Japan, etc etc. And given the prolific words of a former head of the USN in 1919, warning about a German submarine campaign against the American East Coast, some very basic preparations should have been made.

Instead the American establishment, political and military, instead ignored events in Europe, and only concentrated on the Pacific. Once the European war started, instead of examining what was happening and sending numerous observers, the Americans essentially went to sleep. By mid 1940, the Americans should have been preparing and putting in place measures to deal with a submarine campaign or the East Coast and in the Caribbean. Ready to be implemented in short order, such as the British had in the years leading up to WWII. Instead they were dismissive of the advice they received from the British, and while concentrating on the Pacific, failed to make any preparations, for what was obvious to anyone other than a blind fool, America was going to be involved in the war like it or not. Throughout 1941 FDR, as he did in the Pacific, turned the screws on the Germans in the Atlantic. But still no significant preparations were made, and even once war broke out, the Americans resisted all efforts by the British to implement a combined approach to the Atlantic campaign. The Atlantic was the only major theatre of WWII, that didn’t have a Supreme Allied Commander appointed, mostly because the Americans were insistent that he was to be an American. While the British were not going to have their vital life line under American control, and an American in charge of the Home Fleet. Do I see there being any major changes ITTL compared to ours, no, the same fools and idiots will be in charge. There will however be minor changes, with the British not having to support a major campaign in North Africa, and hopefully Singapore remaining in British hands, there will be slightly more escort vessels available for the Atlantic. But the Germans will as they did engage in a submarine campaign on the East Coast and Caribbean. There are going to be tough times ahead, and this will be even more a bone of contention between the British and Americans. But after a miserable 1942, I would expect that early in 43, about six months earlier the Battle of the Atlantic, will effectively be over.
Britain lost a fair few ships in the Malta convoys, except that ITTL I don't think they've needed one since Operation Excess back at the start of the year. That's a fair few escort vessels free for other duties.

I do wonder if the Raid on Alexandria will still happen, or if the Italians have given up on naval operations.
 
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A 115mm gun could be interesting for NATO. That basically negates the 120mm gun currently in use.

17pdr to 102mm to 115 mm would be quite nice for British tanks.

Possibly more likely 17pdr to 94mm (Carden is thinking of using a 4in/102mm L/45 naval gun's case mated to a shell and thus barrel calibre the same diameter as the 3.7in/94mm AA gun) then to 113-115mm through boring the 4/3.7in 94mm gun out like they did with the 84mm 20pdr IOTL to make the 105mm L7.

The same factors leading the British to adopt a smaller calibre gun like the 20pdr IOTL as their primary tank gun in the late 1940s are still most likely to be there ITTL; they're still going to prefer APCBC and APCR as the primary anti-tank ammunition as sabot and HEAT aren't developed enough to replace them until later. Sabot still is going to have issues with accuracy at longer ranges, and HEAT still isn't going to be the best at functioning at high velocities while retaining acceptable armor penetration so the 94mm 4/3.7in is probably still going to be preferred by the establishment over a 102mm/105mm version.

I think that we still might see something like the 120mm L/55 be developed ITTL (maybe in a 125-130mm version)? as there's a good chance the 113-115mm gun, that would presumably be developed from Carden's 94mm, would still be rifled and the pressures for adopting a smoothbore gun would still be there, especially one that can use longer sabot rounds for better performance, and to counter the Soviet tanks that would be designed with heavier armor to counter the 113-115mm gun. Probably won't see a 120mm L/44 equivalent in wide use to arm MBTs like IOTL, though; a longer gun like the L/55 would be developed from the outset due to the improved performance of the 113-115mm gun as compared to the L7 meaning a shorter 120-130mm gun won't be enough of an improvement.
 
The same factors leading the British to adopt a smaller calibre gun like the 20pdr IOTL as their primary tank gun in the late 1940s are still most likely to be there ITTL; they're still going to prefer APCBC and APCR as the primary anti-tank ammunition as sabot and HEAT aren't developed enough to replace them until later. Sabot still is going to have issues with accuracy at longer ranges, and HEAT still isn't going to be the best at functioning at high velocities while retaining acceptable armor penetration so the 94mm 4/3.7in is probably still going to be preferred by the establishment over a 102mm/105mm version.
Sabot only had accuracy issues with the original 17-pounder, the 77mm didn't really run into the same issues. As to HEAT, smoothbore barrels aren't a thing yet, so HEAT isn't going to be the best, however, HESH is in development, and that improves with spinning. HESH also doesn't worry about actual penetration.
 
The way we're going, I'm expecting to see the Vickers 75mm HV gun go into service with the shell of the 17lber on the Victor similar to the OTL 77mm Gun, while the gun on the proposed Venom/Centurion would possibly be a hybrid of the 17lber breech mechanism mated to maybe a lengthened and bored out 94mm '32 lbr' L45 barrel similar to how the 20lber was modified into the 105mm L7 gun post war.

That MBT would see the UK through the early Korea/Cold War period, while still giving it room to grow with a 105mm gun, which would probably be developed by the UK 'Establishment' as a reaction to the overshadowing of the 20lber by the Vickers offering.

Of course, this still leaves Vickers with one more potential leapfrog with the potential use of the 3.7in AA gun case necked out to a potential 113mm to use the RN's existing 4.5in HE shell, only to be eventually topped again by the 120mm Royal Ordnance L11 L55 gun.

Either way, I can see Vickers having a lot more success post war with their export tanks simply because Carden has the foresight to keep them ahead of the game compared to other Western tank designs.
 
Sabot only had accuracy issues with the original 17-pounder, the 77mm didn't really run into the same issues. As to HEAT, smoothbore barrels aren't a thing yet, so HEAT isn't going to be the best, however, HESH is in development, and that improves with spinning. HESH also doesn't worry about actual penetration.

Well yes, sabot might not have had issues in the 77mm HV, but that doesn't mean that the British aren't going to be wary of it even still (as inaccurate sabot is still likely going to happen with the 17pdr), wary enough that they aren't going to bet on sabot being the primary anti-tank ammunition for their new gun when making the decision during the war or soon after post-war. They're probably going to go with the safer choice of a smaller calibre, higher velocity gun, like they did with the 20pdr IOTL.

And as to HEAT, even though it doesn't have smoothbore barrels to fire from, it's still going to be extremely deadly after the early-mid 1950s; remember, the reason why the Leopard I and AMX-30 were designed to have little in the way of armor was that the capabilities of tank ammunition, especially HEAT, was felt to be so great such that trying to armor a tank enough to resist tank main guns wasn't practical. And that was before the introduction of smoothbore guns, with the rifled 105mm L7 and the T-54's rifled 100mm being expected to be each side's primary tank guns.
 
@allanpcameron
Did the Italians still successfully steal the American codebooks from an embassy in September 1941 in this timeline, or was that butterflied? (The original timeline event I refer to here is the one which led to Bonner Fellers becoming an unwitting and valuable source for the Axis.)
It might have been too late (if they did in this timeline) to save the Axis position in North Africa, but it might have consequences for other operations/theatres, it seems to me.
 
Well yes, sabot might not have had issues in the 77mm HV, but that doesn't mean that the British aren't going to be wary of it even still (as inaccurate sabot is still likely going to happen with the 17pdr), wary enough that they aren't going to bet on sabot being the primary anti-tank ammunition for their new gun when making the decision during the war or soon after post-war. They're probably going to go with the safer choice of a smaller calibre, higher velocity gun, like they did with the 20pdr IOTL.
That sabot was issued at all means they weren't too concerned about it.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Will the Italians carry out a human torpedo attack against the British Fleet in Alexandria, ITTL, as they did in ours. While there is no question that the Italian special forces were both brave and highly competent, this is as much a political question as military. Given the present situation in the Mediterranean, the Italian leadership has to take consideration of Italys long term best interests. At the moment Italy is on the losing side of a conflict in both East Africa, North Africa and the Mediterranean, and seriously annoying your principal opponent, might not be a good idea. In OTL at this time the situation was very different Italy looked as part of a combination with Germany, to be on the winning side. So an attack against the principal port and fleet of their opponent, was a very good idea, and would assist their long term aims. However ITTL, the situation is very different, and Italy will have to take this into consideration. In my opinion it would best serve Italys interests to do all in its power, to build bridges with the British. And an attack on Alexandria right now, is definitely not going to do that, nor will it have significant effect on the remaining campaign in the Mediterranean. And this must be the principal factor that the Italian government, such is under Uncle Benito, needs to take into consideration. So I believe that the drive behind the attack, while it might be high among parts of the military, will be low among the majority of the political establishment. But it will be up to our esteemed author to decide, whether this operation happens, or is even mentioned.

RR.
 
Will the Italians carry out a human torpedo attack against the British Fleet in Alexandria, ITTL, as they did in ours
I kind of butterflied it away back on 31 October 1941 update:
The Italian navy’s ‘Decima Flottiglia MAS’, after their successful attack on Suda Bay in March, had attempted to derail the British build-up with an attack on Malta in June which had been a disaster, and Tobruk harbour in September. This mission had been partly successful, two merchant ships had been sunk, but the loss of the adapted submarine Sciré in the aftermath of that attack had made more attacks problematic.
 
15 December 1941. Rangoon, Burma
15 December 1941. Rangoon, Burma

News that the Japanese had occupied Victoria Point at the very south of Burma was confirmation that the threat to Burma was every bit as real as that to Malaya. General Auchinleck, C-in-C India Command had flown into Rangoon to inform Lieutenant-General Donald McLeod GOC (Burma Army) that the British Chiefs of Staff had transferred Burma Command from Far East Command to India Command. Faced with the task of defending Burma with even less resources than Malaya, McLeod’s time as had been spent trying to make the most of the little he had. Auchinleck knew this and was keen on letting McLeod know that his work had been appreciated. Major-General Bill Slim was on his way to Rangoon, with his 10th Indian Division following as fast as possible.

Auchinleck, assuring McLeod that it was no reflection on the job he had done, told him that he had requested Lieutenant-General Harold Alexander to take over as GOC Burma Army. The arrival of 10th Indian Division, and whatever other reinforcements would come, would have Slim in charge, probably as Corps Commander, and Alexander would hopefully be able to coordinate with the Chinese and Americans to defend the Burma Road. Alexander wanted McLeod to stay on to make sure that Slim and Alexander were both fully briefed about the current situation.

As well as 10th Indian Division, Auchinleck had ordered 7th Indian Division to move to Burma with all haste. Major-General Arthur Wakely would be arriving shortly to get the lay of the land but would be subordinate to Bill Slim. Auchinleck was also happy to say that he had negotiated with London that the 9th (Highland) Division would come to Burma rather than go to Malaya. While Percival wasn’t happy at this change, Auchinleck saw the need for Burma Command to have a British Division as well as the Indian and Burma Infantry Divisions. McLeod was also informed that 14th Indian Division would be prepared for moving to Burma but needed a few more months training before it would be fit to be deployed. At a push, its three Brigades could be used as line of communication troops by Slim if he wished. In addition to the 11th African Division and the Burma Division, that would give an army of six Divisions by about April 1942.

The question that McLeod had always asked himself was how Burma could be defended. His answer was always that it couldn’t, large parts of the country could be protected with a large enough force, but realistically much of east Burma on the border with Thailand couldn’t. Burma had three rivers that could slow an enemy invading from Thailand. The River Salween was the first but defending the western bank would mean that Moulmein and everything south would have to be abandoned. That was where the majority of 11th African Division was stationed. The River Sittang was the next defensible position, but there were plenty of reasons for wanting to keep the enemy as far from Rangoon as possible. The road to Mandalay would also have to be defended, but that too would be a difficult feat. The last line of defence would be the River Irrawaddy, after that the border with India would be the next stop.

From McLeod’s point of view the only real way to defend Burma would be to win a clear victory over the invading army, forcing them back. Depending on the size of the Japanese army that invaded, if Alexander and Slim had enough time to get their Corps and Divisions ready, and concentrated, then perhaps the Japanese could be defeated. Having small units, even Brigades, spread out trying to defend too many places would invite piecemeal destruction. Of course, having a large force concentrated, if that were destroyed or even cut off, would hand the Japanese a great victory. General Auchinleck was well aware of the problem and wanted to make sure that Alexander when he arrived would keep McLeod around, perhaps on his Staff, to help make the transition.

General Auchinleck was also pleased to inform McLeod, and his senior RAF officer, Group Captain Edye Manning (AOC 221 Group) that the RAF had also transferred 221 Group to AHQ India’s command. Air Marshall Playfair (AOC-in-C) had been busy trying to organise some aid for Manning’s Group, but the Indian cupboard was bare.

Once more it was Wavell’s Middle East Command that were trying to put together reinforcements for Malaya and Burma. AM Arthur Tedder had been Far East AOC for two years between 1936-38, knowing something of the situation, he was sending a group of officers who had brought about the transformation of the Middle East RAF. There was a need to get more mobile Radar sets and some way of integrating early warning systems with the fighters to be able to meet air raids in a timely fashion. Tedder knew that reading the reports and having actually done it was different. So, the men who would come into Manning’s team would be able to bring that experience to bear. Tedder was also trying to persuade the Air Ministry to get a Wing of Spitfires to Malta to even up the odds against the latest German and Italian fighters. If this happened, then this would free up Hurricanes that could be sent to India and then to Burma and Malaya.

The need for more pilots and aircraft was a matter of priority. Having 221 Group in India Command meant that planes could be flown to the well-established care and maintenance facilities in India, to be overhauled before passing onto the forward bases. It was AM Playfair’s hope that 221 Group could be expanded to have it entirely as a Fighter Group and create another Group which would be a bomber group. India Command had also just taken over 222 Group (General Reconnaissance) from Far East Command, this took in all RAF units in Ceylon and flying boat bases in the Indian Ocean and its islands.

Some of the Indian Air Force squadrons were currently transitioning onto Lysanders, but what Manning needed now was fighter aircraft. Currently all he had for the defence of Burma were sixteen Buffalos of No 67 (Fighter) Squadron and twenty-one P.40s of the American Volunteer Group. These had been based at Kunming for the defence of the Burma Road but had been specially detached by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for the defence of Rangoon. There was no point in having the Burma Road if ships bringing supplies for China couldn’t dock at Rangoon and the supplies carried by train to Lashio. Pre-war estimates were that 280 aircraft was the minimum necessary to meet an invading enemy. Manning was pleading for at least another squadron of Hurricanes and one of Blenheim bombers to carry the fight to the enemy, even if it was only a raid on Victoria Point to let the Japanese know Burma wouldn't be a complete walk-over.

General Auchinleck was about to fly to Singapore to meet with ACM Brooke-Popham and General Percival’s command. He wanted some of McLeod’s Staff to join him. The reports of how the Japanese were fighting, in the air and on the ground, would be worth studying in more detail before the troops in Burma actually had to face them.
 
Interesting that the British are planning to build up to a 6-division force in Burma, while remaining confident that the 5-6 divisions currently in or heading for Malaya will be enough to hold Malaya/Singapore. For the Japanese, of course, Malaya (tin & rubber) and the East Indies (oil) are the primary objectives and Burma is an afterthought. If the Japanese fail to break through quickly in northern Malaya, I'd expect the forces used in Burma OTL to be diverted south to reinforce the Malaya offensive.

The road network in Burma is terrible, and it has no rail connection to either India or Malaya. Does the port at Rangoon have enough capacity to supply 6 divisions?
 
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Interesting that the British are planning to build up to a 6-division force in Burma, while remaining confident that the 5-6 divisions currently in or heading for Malaya will be enough to hold Malaya/Singapore. For the Japanese, of course, Malaya (tin & rubber) and the East Indies (oil) are the primary objectives and Burma is an afterthought. If the Japanese fail to break through quickly in northern Malaya, I'd expect the forces used in Burma OTL to be diverted south to reinforce the Malaya offensive.

The road network in Burma is terrible, and it has no rail connection to either India or Malaya. Does the port at Rangoon have enough capacity to supply 6 divisions?
Isn't Burma also an oil producing area?
 
It is (Yenangyaung area), but getting the oil back to Japan (by sea transport from Rangoon) would be impractical as long as Malaya, Java or Sumatra remained in Allied hands.
Doesn't getting the oil back from the DEI have the same problems?
Or it just that one area uses army troops while the other navy ones?
 
Doesn't getting the oil back from the DEI have the same problems?
Or it just that one area uses army troops while the other navy ones?
Rangoon is west of the Malay peninsula - the only routes from there to Japan go through the Malacca Straight, or the Sunda Straight or south of Java.
You can get Borneo oil from Balikpapan back to Japan without going near Malaya. OTOH, the Japanese won't be getting much oil home from Sumatra without taking Singapore and Java.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Thank-you for reminding me of the previous events in the Mediterranean, which will have made any attempt raid Alexandria, incredibly difficult. Which only reenforces the extent of the political and military capital, that would have to be expended, to achieve such an attack. In regards to the shortage of aircraft, particularly fighters in both the Mediterranean and Far East, this can be traced to the failure of the Air Ministry in London. Their fixation with the possibility of a renewed German bombing campaign against the UK, ignoring the fact that the Luftwaffe was fully committed to the campaign in the Soviet Union and Mediterranean. And thus didn’t have the assets to spare to renew a campaign against the UK, other than tip and run attacks by fighter bombers. And their persistence in carrying out costly fighter sweeps over France, when they could have significantly reduced the fighters retained in the UK, especially the more modern Spitfires, was to my mind criminal. Had the British Air Ministry made a true analysis of the situation vis a vis Germany, post the Blitz and after the invasion of the Soviet Union. Along with seriously looking at the results of the various operations carried out over France, which were very wasteful and achieved little to nothing of what the were intended to do. This would have allowed the home defence fighter force to be reduced to two thirds the minimum requirement, while waiting for new production of aircraft and pilots to bring it up to full strength by early 43, the earliest it would be needed. And thus they could have released far more aircraft, especially fighters for use in the Mediterranean and Far East. As is ITTL, given just how overextended and weak the Japanese forces were that are invading Burma, and how little chance there is of them getting reinforcements from Malaya. Unless they can win an overwhelming victory inside the first month, the Japanese have just opened up another hard to support front, in an area where the British once they get their act together will have all the advantages. Yes the British will struggle to supply six divisions through Rangoon, along with providing facilities to move the inbound supplies in transit to China over the Burma road, and export the rice, tin and timber, that they normally did. But within six months, and with a great deal of effort, plus typical British improvisation, something will have been worked out.

RR.
 
It seems to me that the forces assigned to Burma will be more than enough.

According to the book "Disaster in the Far East 1940-1942"
It was estimated that the total force which the Japanese could bring against Burma, using land communications only, would be about two divisions, of which one division would be on the road running through Chieng Rai. The Chiefs of Staff considered in January 1941 that, although four enemy divisions could be maintained at railhead on the Bangkok – Chieng Mai railway, it was unlikely that even one division could be maintained on the Burma side of the frontier, owing to the limited road communications. The situation would, however, be completely altered should the Japanese get control of sea communications in the Bay of Bengal

Once the initial panic evaporates, I think they will think of their estimates and might find that concentrating 6 divisions against at best 2 IJA divisions might be an overkill, especially when the Malay Barrier* is in mortal danger. Moreover, they cannot sustain a 6 division army at the thai border or to advance in Thailand, not before massive infrastructue is built.

*The Malay Barrier includes also the Sumatra-Java-Timor line.
 
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