No code books from SMS Magdeburg 1914

[Jim Smitty]

Ok this is fairly straight forward. The SMS Magdeburg doesn't run aground in 1914 off Osmussaar during the opening stages of WWI. Meaning no naval code book are taken as prizes by the Russians. How does this effect the course of the naval war in the First World War? Because as I recall those broken codes were critical for the British during the war.

But what are your thoughts on the subject? Would this be a game changer or would it simply allow the Germans to win a few more naval battles but the final outcome is still the same?

 

[calvinhobbesliker]

Were there any other code books captured later?

 

[Jim Smitty]

Were there any other code books captured later?

I honestly don't know. But I know it was the code books from the Magdeburg that put the Allies in the driver seat in naval operations OTL

 

[naraic]

The code books were valuable but not vital. My understanding is that other forms of intelligence were sufficient to know when the Germans are coming to sea to code books only gave extra notice.

So if Jellico stopped having 48 hours notice and only found out the hsf was coming as it left port what would the result be?

Probably an extra 10% of the fleet would be left behind for any battle. I doubt much changes in any real way.

 

[trajen777]

The impact could have been massive. If you read Dreadnought and Steel Castles it goes into great detail of how the code book allowed the Brits to not be caught with a partial fleet at sea. The German plan was to catch part of the Brit fleet at sea with a superior force and defeat it then they would be at closer to parity with better ships then the Brits for a full battle. The Germans came close several times and except for the timidity of the Germans and the code breading they had 2-3 chances to do just that. If this had happened where the Germans had defeated and sunk 20 - 33 % of the Brit fleet you would have had a very different outcome.

 

[rast]

There were 3 German naval codes: military, merchant, diplomatic. The SMS Magdeburg case gave the military code to the Entente. It was the most important capture. - The British did not break any code, but in the end (mid-1915) they had all 3 code books and could read all German naval radio (and cable) communication (until mid-1917, when the Germans eventually introduced new codes, end of reading, no break in). Without the Magdeburg book, Room 40 would have been far less efficient.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The code books were valuable but not vital. My understanding is that other forms of intelligence were sufficient to know when the Germans are coming to sea to code books only gave extra notice.
...

Signal analysis would have been better developed. Even if you can't read the content of the message the fact that it is being sent means something. The patterns of call and response between HQ & fleet units can tell a great deal to monitors who have been eavesdropping for a couple years. It becomes clear the enemy fleet is putting to sea and accurate estimates of the strength and composition can be made if the analysts are doing their job correctly. Not having the message content leaves you in the dark on why they are putting to sea, and where they are headed, but other forms of intelligence can answer those questions.

So instead of telling Jellicoe the contents of the messages Room 40 tells hiom the HSF is heading to sea with a list of the following ships suspected with it. Jellicoe then makes a guess what they are up to.

In the training exercises of my 20+ year career we never received decrypted message intel. We always had to figure it out the hard ways by deploying recon, considering signal analysis, examining the likely enemy goals, studying what we knew of their OB, looking at the result of prisoner interrogation, and looking at where and how the enemy was fighting. All those fragmentary bits create a jigsaw puzzle picture from which the astute commander gains insight into what the enemy is thinking.

 

[BlondieBC]

Ok this is fairly straight forward. The SMS Magdeburg doesn't run aground in 1914 off Osmussaar during the opening stages of WWI. Meaning no naval code book are taken as prizes by the Russians. How does this effect the course of the naval war in the First World War? Because as I recall those broken codes were critical for the British during the war.

But what are your thoughts on the subject? Would this be a game changer or would it simply allow the Germans to win a few more naval battles but the final outcome is still the same?

Very little. The Germans lost multiple naval code books. I have looked at ATL in this regard, but the Germans just did not take code books seriously enough to avoid losing to the Germans.

 

[BlondieBC]

Were there any other code books captured later?

Yes. It has been 5 plus years on most of my reading, but seems like the Germans lost 3-5 naval code books plus one Diplomatic code book.

 

[rast]

Tactial radio traffic during operations was done with low power and thus could not be intercepted at that time. Intelligence hence was limited to what the fleet commander wanted to tell the admiral staff, which communication was often only started after contact with the enemy. That part of SIGINT perhaps wasn't decisive at all. - But ships on mining missions and other solitary vessels - submarines, most of all - were often communicating with fleet command, telling their position and their further intentions. Being able to read all this certainly made a difference.