I've seen a few threads here and there about Japan in a post-Central powers victory in world war I, but nothing concerning Indochina or a Japanese siberia in a cp victory, only in OTL. Standard USA doesn't join, German victory against Entente by 1918 post brest-litovsk via Spring offensives sort of TL. Germany historically planned to give their prized naval base at Tsingtao to the Japanese in a peace settlement and planned to enter into an alliance with them post-war (although this was protested by people like the Kaiser who often ranted about the "yellow peril" and because, like his naval officers, preferred to maintain the naval base). So German colonies aside, what are the chances/possibilites of Japan receiving French Indochina from the Germans? What about in Siberia, with the Russian Civil war raging. I've read that, besides economic issues, the US was Japan's main opposition to annexing or setting up any sort of permanent puppet in the Russian far east. The plans on siberia were mostly supported by the IJA, and with Germany's victory, the German leaning IJA may have more power and thus more influence internally, perhaps more successfully pushing for their plans to go forward. With no American Expeditionary force and a more isolationist USA due to the lack of involvement in the war and thus not trying to push itself onto the world stage, perhaps Japan could have had some sort of puppet state in the Russian far east. Then again, they are hostile to a larger Japan, and the Japanese are given Indochina, it would make the British and Americans very uncomfortable and thus prevent any sort of Siberian state. Would both/either expansionist paths be too much of a Japanese wank/ASB?
Maximum Japanese territorial expansion in a CP victory TL
- Thread starter No_Names_Left321
- Start date
Why should the germans - aside from rather questionably hold position to be able to ... grant - turn almost 180° and grsnt Japan french Indochine or even Siberia (at least Amur province I assume you talk about) ?
Admitted, Germany would have not much if any power to project ther but I would assume Germany would rather like to see these territories under french or british - european white - rule than under japanese rule not at least as the japanese seized german assets in a very insidious manner. Why should the germans also reward this ?
Admitted, Germany would have not much if any power to project ther but I would assume Germany would rather like to see these territories under french or british - european white - rule than under japanese rule not at least as the japanese seized german assets in a very insidious manner. Why should the germans also reward this ?
McPherson
Banned
There was more than enough sea-power and economic power left and angry enemies to prevent that Japanese wet dream from even getting out of the white paper stage.
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Agreed that there is no way of Japan getting French Indochina as part of the peace settlement. If Imperial Germany for whatever reason is able to get France to give up French Indochina in the peace settlement they are going the colony for itself, not hand it over to the Japanese. Even if Imperial Germany is looking to ally with Japan after the war there is no reason to do this. Selling the German Pacific Islands plus the German concessions in China to Japan (which they have no way of forcing Japan to give back anyway) would be enough to make Japan inclined to listen to German alliance offers, then Germany can offer support for a free hand in the Russian Far East (whatever that is worth against American diplomatic/economic pressure), support for further Japanese control in North and Central China (if Germany has gained French Indochina it could change focus in China and take over French Concessions in South China, if not Germany has little power to project into China anyway and might be willing to let Japan expand in China as long as it sells Chinese resources to Germany) and if Germany is feeling generous (and has not gained French Indochina) it might force France, Belgium and Italy to hand over their concessions in China to Japan (losing its concessions in China is bad for France but less bad than losing French Indochina).
This could lead to a German-Japanese alliance that is pushing aggressively into China in the 1920s (only possible if conservatives or nationalist liberals continue to hold power in both Japan and Germany, which is possible under the right circumstances but not a given), most likely via proxies in the warlord era, and France, possibly Italy and to a degree Great Britain, supporting Chinese Nationalists against this alliance, which would make the warlord era more bloody and possibly even longer (of course nationalist sentiment could force the warlords to come to an agreement in order to fight Japanese and German expansion).
The Russian Far East is a more interesting case. Whether Japan is able to establish a buffer state in the Maritime Provinces and annex northern Sakhalin depends on a number of factors:
1) the situation in the Russia, which in turn depends largely on when peace happens and what the situation in Germany is: lets say peace happens in 1919 (Germany and the Entente & allies are exhausted, Germany isn’t able to deliver a finishing blow in France and the Entente is unable to dislodge Germany from Belgium and France, both sides are experiencing social unrest at home, and so a peace conference is called sometime in 1919 and latest at the end of 1919 a peace treaty is signed) and Germany is too exhausted to intervene military in the Russian Civil War but is all too happy to send volunteers and weapons to the Whites (the alliance with the Soviets was one of convenience and is no longer needed) which means the Soviets are distracted and the Japanese have a bit more breathing room in the Russian Far East which might give them enough time to set up a semi-viable buffer state propped up by Japanese bayonets (basically a Far Eastern version of Manchukuo).
2) Government and popular support for an intervention in the Russian Far East: the intervention wasn't that popular to begin with, even in the Diet, especially if the intervention as poorly planned as IOTL (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_intervention_in_Siberia#Effects_on_Japanese_politics) there is social unrest in Japan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rice_riots_of_1918) which a lengthy military intervention will only heighten, especially once the body bags are starting come home from the Far East, but if the army and the conservatives play their cards right and the intervention goes better than IOTL (better planning, clearer goals…) than they might be able to hang on to power.
3) US diplomatic response: the US will not support such an endeavor but depending on who is president at the time and what the national mood is in the US (for example there might be political recriminations against the current administration that it failed to prevent Germany from essentially winning the war which could consume significant attention and political capital or there could be a turn towards non-intervention or there could be a distraction in Mexico…), the administration might not do more than protest
Of course, no Russian government, be it Soviet or a shaky White regime, is going to be happy with the state of affairs in the Russian Far East and sooner or later will try to regain the territory, which could lead to a 2nd Japanese-Russian war, which would likely be unpopular at home and coupled with potential Japanese adventures in China (in concert with Germany or alone) and social unrest at home (conservatives hold on to power and refuse to enact universal male suffrage) could lead to revolution in Japan caused by imperial overstretch coupled with an unpopular regime with a narrow base of popular support.
This could lead to a German-Japanese alliance that is pushing aggressively into China in the 1920s (only possible if conservatives or nationalist liberals continue to hold power in both Japan and Germany, which is possible under the right circumstances but not a given), most likely via proxies in the warlord era, and France, possibly Italy and to a degree Great Britain, supporting Chinese Nationalists against this alliance, which would make the warlord era more bloody and possibly even longer (of course nationalist sentiment could force the warlords to come to an agreement in order to fight Japanese and German expansion).
The Russian Far East is a more interesting case. Whether Japan is able to establish a buffer state in the Maritime Provinces and annex northern Sakhalin depends on a number of factors:
1) the situation in the Russia, which in turn depends largely on when peace happens and what the situation in Germany is: lets say peace happens in 1919 (Germany and the Entente & allies are exhausted, Germany isn’t able to deliver a finishing blow in France and the Entente is unable to dislodge Germany from Belgium and France, both sides are experiencing social unrest at home, and so a peace conference is called sometime in 1919 and latest at the end of 1919 a peace treaty is signed) and Germany is too exhausted to intervene military in the Russian Civil War but is all too happy to send volunteers and weapons to the Whites (the alliance with the Soviets was one of convenience and is no longer needed) which means the Soviets are distracted and the Japanese have a bit more breathing room in the Russian Far East which might give them enough time to set up a semi-viable buffer state propped up by Japanese bayonets (basically a Far Eastern version of Manchukuo).
2) Government and popular support for an intervention in the Russian Far East: the intervention wasn't that popular to begin with, even in the Diet, especially if the intervention as poorly planned as IOTL (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_intervention_in_Siberia#Effects_on_Japanese_politics) there is social unrest in Japan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rice_riots_of_1918) which a lengthy military intervention will only heighten, especially once the body bags are starting come home from the Far East, but if the army and the conservatives play their cards right and the intervention goes better than IOTL (better planning, clearer goals…) than they might be able to hang on to power.
3) US diplomatic response: the US will not support such an endeavor but depending on who is president at the time and what the national mood is in the US (for example there might be political recriminations against the current administration that it failed to prevent Germany from essentially winning the war which could consume significant attention and political capital or there could be a turn towards non-intervention or there could be a distraction in Mexico…), the administration might not do more than protest
Of course, no Russian government, be it Soviet or a shaky White regime, is going to be happy with the state of affairs in the Russian Far East and sooner or later will try to regain the territory, which could lead to a 2nd Japanese-Russian war, which would likely be unpopular at home and coupled with potential Japanese adventures in China (in concert with Germany or alone) and social unrest at home (conservatives hold on to power and refuse to enact universal male suffrage) could lead to revolution in Japan caused by imperial overstretch coupled with an unpopular regime with a narrow base of popular support.
McPherson
Banned
Just one note. The Japanese either cremated their honored dead and shipped their ashes back or they buried or cremated the remains in the field and shipped personal effects back to the families to be enshrined in the tombs of the ancestors. These were presented in box-like urns or ceramic or wood funeral containers. There were no "body bags". The Japanese were/are very sensitive about their war dead.
McP.
McP.
Kaiser Wilhelm the Tenth
Banned
The Germans will never cede Indochina to Japan- they have no ability to project power into the Pacific. However, I could see the Japanese simply plunging the dagger into France's back, nabbing Indochina or setting up puppet states there. This would of course come at a cost in diplomatic standing with Washington and London but might well be possible.
1) By 1918, even if they won Germany would be economically and politically exhausted. Germany wasn't a military dictatorship and to a certain extent did have to answer to a elected civilian Government.
2) Germany had too many issues to deal with post war to launch a expedition to retake its Asian Colonies. For example:
- It would be extremely focused on maintaining Brest-Livtosk and solving issues in Russia.
- Austria-Hungary was a corpse in 1918 and not in a great place internally and would need support.
- Depending on the peace terms, the Ottomans might need help reestablishing control over it's territory and fighting Communists in the Caucuses.
3) Sending the entire German High Seas Fleet on a expedition to Asia to face Japan just seems a bit logistically impractical to me.
4) Depending on the outcome of the Russian Civil War, Germany is going to need a new ally against the Russians.
5) Japan is perfectly stable both economically and politically at this point and has the entirety of its military to use in any conflict.
6) If the Germans won WW1, US banking industry which funded the Entente might lose a lot of money on their investments. This could trigger an economic crisis and would make the US more anti-German than ever. Although this wouldn't be enough to start a German American War by itself, Germany will probably have to view the US as its main enemy moving forward and will need a potential ally against them.
Conclusion: It makes no sense for Imperial Germany economically, politically, or Militarily to move against Japan in any way, shape, or form, nor would Japan have any real reason to give in to any German demands.
2) Germany had too many issues to deal with post war to launch a expedition to retake its Asian Colonies. For example:
- It would be extremely focused on maintaining Brest-Livtosk and solving issues in Russia.
- Austria-Hungary was a corpse in 1918 and not in a great place internally and would need support.
- Depending on the peace terms, the Ottomans might need help reestablishing control over it's territory and fighting Communists in the Caucuses.
3) Sending the entire German High Seas Fleet on a expedition to Asia to face Japan just seems a bit logistically impractical to me.
4) Depending on the outcome of the Russian Civil War, Germany is going to need a new ally against the Russians.
5) Japan is perfectly stable both economically and politically at this point and has the entirety of its military to use in any conflict.
6) If the Germans won WW1, US banking industry which funded the Entente might lose a lot of money on their investments. This could trigger an economic crisis and would make the US more anti-German than ever. Although this wouldn't be enough to start a German American War by itself, Germany will probably have to view the US as its main enemy moving forward and will need a potential ally against them.
Conclusion: It makes no sense for Imperial Germany economically, politically, or Militarily to move against Japan in any way, shape, or form, nor would Japan have any real reason to give in to any German demands.
Germany's aims in the First World War by Fritz Fischer. https://archive.org/details/FischerFritzGermanysAimsInTheFirstWorldWar/page/n261/mode/2up
Taken from a chapter where Germany considered a separate peace with Russia and Japan.
"In the first version, drafted on May 8 for the immediate negotiations, Germany offered Japan -with the consent of the Reich Naval Office -‘cession of Tsingtao and the German possessions in the Pacific now in Japanese occupation’ and Germany’s consent to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over China, except those areas falling within the Russian sphere of interests. In return, Japan was to mediate peace with Russia on the following basis..." (232)
"Japan herself was to safeguard existing German economic enterprises in China and guarantee the most favored nation treatment for German commerce; she was to recognize that the Dutch East Indies were not a Japanese sphere of interest. She was to conclude a defensive treaty with Germany against Britain and France at the end of the war, or at the latest on the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance."(232).
"The realignment along the Germany-Japan axis had been suggested by Moltke to the Chancellor on August 2, 1914, in his improvised program of a world war against Britain, 1 and reappeared in the altered form a year later in the attempt made by Zimmermann, after the U.S.A.’s breach with Germany but before her adherence to the Entente, to draw Japan over to Germany’s side and into the war against the U.S.A. and Britain. In this plan, Zimmermann was hoping to exploit the latent hostility between Japan and Britain masked by the Alliance, and the open antagonism between Japan and the U.S.A" (235).
I could go on with quotes. There is another quote (which I cant seem to find for the time being) about how Germany's leaders believed that there will be some final showdown after ww1 between Germany and the USA/Britain. Thus they wanted to align with Japan to serve as a Bulwark against an "Anglo-Saxon" alliance. Note that these quotes were around 1915/1916, and thus Russia hadn't fallen into anarchy and civil war yet. Germany's war aims went from separate peace with Russia to weakening it, under the guise of "self determination" since they had taken polish, ukranian, cossack, finish, georgian, etc territory but stayed clear of most ethnically Russian territory. Without the USA being directly involved in the war, it's not hard to see the Germans giving support to the Japanese for their Siberian plans, with Seymenovs "Great Mongolian State" having more support and perhaps a Green Ukraine also being set up in Siberia, both as Japanese Puppets. The Dutch East Indies were off the table for Japan, as mentioned above, and with the Germans wanting a strong Japan, it wouldn't be surprising that they might support ceding Indochina to the Japanese (whether or not the British and USA will support/recognize the move is another matter).
McPherson
Banned
It is one thing to propose, but it is another to get someone to accept. Where is the leverage? For example, the Germans in the Spanish American War, proposed to the Americans to split the Philippines and offered a small coaling station and trading outpost in the Bismarck Islands to sweeten the deal. That so infuriated the Americans after that clown von Diderichs high handed his "neutrals rights" in Manila Bay, that the Americans took the whole Archipelago and immediately added the Germans to the color coded war plans.
The Germans in the era were not too good at diplomacy after Billy the Brainless fired Bismarck.
Wow that's fascinating, boy Germany really were all over the place in this time period. Who could hope to trust them? 9 years between the triple intervention and this.
Or, alternatively, Germany grabbing Indochina themselves...
Then Japan taking it while Germany's busy with a hypothetical second European conflict.
Well, faced with a two-front war against 3 powerful enemies, and faced with the likelihood of having to prop up a weak ally or 2 on a couple other fronts, it would make sense that the Germans would cast about for potential allies wherever they may find them....