I suspect that answer is not "it will be mostly as OTL with the exception of a one or more specific things I've thought of which I was going to talk about later but will happily divulge ahead of time" and more "it will be mostly as OTL and if there's any differences I haven't decided on them yet, so I'm saying 'mostly' ".
Jimmy Two: America in Carter's Second Term
- Thread starter Vidal
- Start date
Maybe Pan Am doesn't purchase National Airlines and still survives to the present day.
A victory for Jimmy Carter! I wonder how he'll deal with Afghanistan.ON STRIKEJuly 11, 1981
“The president simply doesn’t give a damn about labor.”
-Landon Butler
The White House — Washington, DC
The meeting had covered most of the essential issues. Energy and the environment. Healthcare reform. Updates on Congressional relations. It would end with a discussion of Charlie Kirbo’s nomination to the Supreme Court. But before it closed, Jack Watson decided it was time to bring the president in on the issue of the PATCO negotiations.
The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization union had been negotiation with the Federal Aviation Administration for months about securing a new contracts. Their demands were extensive. They wanted their work week reduced to 32 hours, a $10,000 pay increase for all air-traffic controllers, and a more expansive benefits package that included early retirement. The FAA was not in the position to award such a contract.
Months later, the FAA decided to come back to the table with a proposal for a three-year contract that would include $105 million in raises to be paid at 11.4% increases over the course of three years. Their proposal represented a raise that was more than twice what other federal government employees were making. By the end of the three-year period, air-traffic controller salaries would exceed private sector pay by 8%. PATCO rejected the proposal, citing the fact that it did not include the earlier retirement they had requested or a reduction in their work week. [1]
Watson had been monitoring the negotiations closely and sending over periodic briefings to the president. Stu Eizenstat was also deep in the conversation, and he was meeting regularly with Transportation Secretary Neil Goldschmidt. None of them liked where the negotiations were heading, and Watson feared a nationwide walkout from the air-traffic controllers. He also feared the reaction he’d get from the Carter White House.
Jimmy Carter’s first brush with a union strike came in December of 1977 when a four-month strike from coal miners brought about a 60% reduction in the production of coal. The situation angered Carter for many reasons and left him with a residual bitter feeling towards organized labor. First, Carter viewed the strike as particularly offensive given the nation’s energy demands. He found any decisions hat would jeopardize American energy production as selfish and short-sighted. Second, he came to personally dislike George Meany, the head of the AFL-CIO, who misrepresented Carter’s interactions with Meany during the strike.
When Carter left a lunch meeting with Meany, he turned to Stu Eizenstat and said, “Stu, I will never do this again.” [2] He was plainly referring to a cordial meeting with Meany, but his comment also carried an edge to it — a feeling that he would not let himself be pushed around by labor again. As Carter saw it, he had the interests of the nation to look out for while labor was only preoccupied with their own bottom line.
The Carter administration’s handling of the Coal Strike received outsized attention from the press. Wrote the New York Times: “Mr. Carter's handling of the situation will shape the public's impression of his early Presidency probably more than any other with the possible exception of the Middle East. The prolonged strike touches the two areas in which he has been most criticized: his competence as an executive and his ability to lead.” [3]
The Carter administration had been hesitant to get the federal government heavily involved in the negotiations, preferring to let them continue without White House involvement for months. Watson looked at that decision and learned a lesson: The White House should prevent the strike from happening in the first place, and it could do so by getting involved earlier.
“Mr. President, the FAA is still having trouble finalizing a deal with PATCO for a new contract. The last agreement, as you know, would have marked a significant concession toward the union, but it was rejected by PATCO leaders,” Watson began.
Jordan interrupted and asked for the details of the agreements.
“Initially, PATCO asked for a $10,000 pay raise for air-traffic controllers, a reduction to a 32-hour work week, and a new retirement package, with the main component being an earlier retirement age,” Watson explained. “The FAA came back to them with a three-year contract that offered n 11.6% pay raise each year for the three years, but they didn’t concede on the work week or on an earlier retirement age.”
Jordan was scribbling notes. “And where does that put them in relation to the private sector.”
Carter already knew these answers as he’d been keeping up with Watson’s memos, but Eizenstat jumped in to give Jordan the numbers. “Right now, air-traffic controllers are about 18% behind the private sector when it comes to their wages. The FAA’s offer would get them to 8% ahead of the private sector by the end of the contract.”
Jordan nodded. “So they’re hosing us.”
Watson feared this would be the reaction. “I don’t know that I would go that far. It’s a unique job — demanding, stressful — we know the mental health of these air-traffic controllers is impacted by the kind of job they do.”
“Nobody made them do it,” the president offered. It was a sentiment he’d held during the Coal Strike.
“I understand, Mr. President, but we are also talking about one of the most critical jobs in our nation’s economy. We cannot afford a strike at the peak of summer air travel,” Watson said.
“We can’t afford to offer them these concessions, either, Jack. What are you proposing?”
“I think it’s time for us to get involved in the negotiations and see what kind of a deal we can hammer out between PATCO and the FAA.”
Jordan sighed. “Stay out of it, Mr. President. This isn’t our fight, and if we look like we’re tipping the scales we alienate either the right or the left. We have too much ongoing right now to piss off labor — the fate of healthcare is practically up to them, we need to hold the liberals on Kirbo — it’s too risky to get involved at this point.”
“Or this is an opportunity to for us to get labor back on our side, and that will give us additional leverage with them when it comes to healthcare.”
“Jack, I want to be clear about something,” Carter said now, “I am not going to give in to a 32-hour work week. Why should their work week be an entire day less than the average American’s? What happens to our economy if we set a precedent that the president will give in to the demands of labor when they want to work less for more pay?”
“I think if we can offer them a better retirement package, we can get them to concede on the 32-hour work week,” Eizenstat added. “Their initial demands are outrageous, and, in my opinion, that’s a clear sign that they asked for a lot knowing they’d need to make concessions. They just want someone to come to the table with them.”
“The FAA already has,” Carter said.
“But not enough. We can find some kind of compromise on the early retirement issue.”
Carter looked at Jordan who continued to shake his head no. “Say what’s on your mind, Ham.”
“Mr. President, I think we are asking for trouble if we wade into this. You and I both know our relationship with labor is strained enough. If we get involved and don’t give in to their demands, we could be blowing up our relationship with them when we need them for this healthcare bill.”
“Mr. President, with all due respect to Ham’s opinion, I don’t think we can afford to not do this. Labor is going to expect you to come to the table at this point. The negotiations have gone on too long already. If you’re not there, your absence will say enough. And I would also point out that PATCO is its own beast here. It falls under the umbrella of organized labor, but we know the biggest unions aren’t always on the same page,” Watson interjected.
“Ham, Jack — get me a memo from each of you outlining the issue, and I’ll decide from there. What’s next?”
July 18, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
President Carter summoned representatives of the FAA and PATCO to the White House Roosevelt Room for a negotiation about the new contracts. It was a familiar role for Carter as he had long been eager to play the middle man — between nations, between candidates, between staffers with different opinions on an issue. Here, Carter hoped to negotiate a reconciliation that would prevent the union from going on strike.
Robert Pool, President of PATCO, was not willing to compromise. He saw his fight as an ideological battle for the Democratic Party. Carter was the first anti-union Democrat to be president since the New Deal, at least the way he saw it, and he wasn’t willing to roll over for the president. His demands had been made, and he expected them to be met, or he would walk.
PATCO had joined the Teamsters and the Air Line Pilots Association in endorsing Reagan over Carter. Now, they expected to inflict pain on him during their first term.
As Poli walked into the White House, he stopped to address the scrum of reporters waiting outside. “I have no doubt,” he said, “that if we were going to meet with President Ronald Reagan right now, it would be to say thank you for his help in meeting our demands. We have here a president who is not a friend of labor, but we will not come up short. We are not asking for anything more than is necessary to ensure the continued health and safety of our employees and all of those who fly commercially in the United States.”
“Hell of a way to make an entrance,” Jordan grumbled.
Poli’s blustering rhetoric forecast an equally gloomy negotiation. Carter was several minutes late to the meeting, reflecting a near-total disinterest in the actual proceedings. As Jordan would later recall, “I didn’t think he should be there, and he didn’t want to be.” But Carter agreed that it was important to try and avoid a standoff that threatened to ground commercial flights in the United States.
“Welcome, everyone,” the president said as he arrived in the Roosevelt Room. He took his seat at the center of the table. Poli sat on his right and FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond sat at his left.
“I think it’s important that the American people know its government is doing everything it can to avoid a strike that would cripple air travel and imperil our economy. Everyone at this table has a responsibility to avoid a strike from happening, and so that will require compromise on the part of all of us. It’s my hope that we can come to a working proposal that both sides can take from here and discuss with their memberships and colleagues.”
When he was done with his brief statement, the president turned it over to Poli to begin the meeting.
Poli quickly launched into a dramatic telling of the complex job of being an air traffic controller, noting the stress and long hours, and demanding pay commensurate with airline pilots. “Our jobs are no less important,” he said at the table. “We are expecting higher pay,” he continued. “Our most experienced air traffic controllers deserve a salary of $73,000 a year, and they deserve an hourly schedule that accounts for the stressful nature of their job.”
Bond found it difficult to sit through Poli’s remarks having already resigned himself to the fact that a strike was imminent. He wanted desperately to remark upon the fact that back in November, Poli had reminded his members that they had a $2 million strike fund ready to go should they need it, and he’d released a contingency plan for how the federal government should respond to a strike. [4] Now, sitting at the White House, Bond couldn’t shake the feeling this was all performative on Poli’s part. Nonetheless, he proceeded.
“Mr. President, I first want to say thank you for inviting us to be here. Your commitment to the stability of America’s air economy is much appreciated. The position of the FAA has been clear throughout this entire process: We agree with the premise that air traffic controllers deserve better compensation and working conditions, and we are happy to bargain to that effect, but we cannot, in good conscience, endorse the total and uncompromising proposal set forth by Mr. Poli and his union. It is not fiscally prudent, nor would it be fair to others involved in the industry.”
After opening statements, Carter asked each side to briefly summarize their positions on each of the major sticking points: salary, work hours, and early retirement/benefits package. Unsurprisingly, Carter quickly came to the conclusion that the FAA was getting the worse end of the deal and that the union’s demands were over-the-top.
Just as Jordan feared, Carter’s involvement was only going to bring the White House into further conflict with labor, all while Kennedy and other Democrats on the Hill were desperately seeking their support on healthcare legislation.
They broke for lunch and then returned to hear the president’s assessment of the negotiations. Carter decided to begin with where he thought there was room to meet the PATCO members, namely earlier retirement. Poli was enthused and quickly latched on to the president’s support. His eagerness was short-lived.
“But Richard, I can hardly justify moving the hourly schedule down to a 32-hour work week. Most Americans work a 40-hour work week. Why should the air traffic controllers get more pay for less work? You’re trying to have it both ways.”
Poli was predictably offended. “Mr. President, we are not asking for more pay for less work. We are asking that our salary reflect the work we are already doing, and we are asking that our schedules reflect the realities and tenor of the job we’re called upon to do. Air traffic controllers monitor screens, coordinate with pilots in the air, and are responsible for the safety of thousands of Americans each day. It is an incredibly demanding job, and if we are going to keep the skies safe, we need to ensure that our air traffic controllers are well-rested and ready to do the job when they show up to work.”
Carter smiled. Does he realize he’s talking to the man with the most stressful job on the planet? Carter wondered to himself.
“Thank you, Richard. I appreciate your perspective.” Carter had little else to say. He appreciated it, but he didn’t agree with it.
The president turned to Bonds and asked if he had any closing statement he’d like to make. Bonds shook his head no.
“Well, I think we all have a lot more to think about. Richard, I would encourage you to go back to your members and see where you’re able to make compromises. Langhorne, when he does that and returns with answers, I hope the FAA is able to accommodate them.” Then, Carter stood and adjourned the meeting.
As he walked out of the room, Watson asked what he thought of the meeting.
“It was a waste of time,” Carter said. “They’re going to strike.”
August 3, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
The Carter White House continued to work behind the scenes to craft an agreement between PATCO and the FAA. Stu Eizenstat was heavily involved in the negotiations and presented a final White House proposal that included some $150 million in pay increases over three years (Poli asked for $600 million), nearly the entire benefits package as requested by the union, but with a 40-hour work week.
It seemed as though Poli may relent and take the Carter proposal. Even Ted Kennedy, friend of labor in the 1980 Democratic primaries, was privately urging the union to take the deal, believing they’d overextended their hand.
Jordan and Caddell, usually astute readers of the political winds, put it bluntly in an Oval Office conversation: “They overplayed their hand,” Jordan said. Caddell echoed, “They have to take the deal.”
Pat Caddell was wrong.
By the evening of August 2nd, the Carter White House had yet to hear from Poli, and Eizenstat felt a lump developing in his throat. “Mr. President, I don’t have a good feeling about this,” he said.
Carter, for his part, was not phased by the back-and-forth. Typically, the president was intimately involved in negotiations of this caliber, but he’d been rather hands-off in his approach to PATCO. He was simply uninterested in bowing to labor.
As Carter and his team sat in the Oval Office on the evening of the 2nd, the president opined that the strike would end as he hoped. “Long-term, this will be good for the Party,” he said. “Our victory over Kennedy last year proved that labor’s chokehold is undeserved. Now, this — it’ll be the final nail in their influence, and it’s all their doing.”
Jordan nodded in agreement. Anne Wexler worried about how she was goin to clean up the mess with interested parties if PATCO really did strike.
Carter’s hostility towards organized labor was not reflective of a lack of concern for the working man. Instead, it was the opposite. He believed that the union bosses, especially at the national level, had become too power-hungry for their own good. They had stopped worrying about their members and the greater good and instead become focused on their own paychecks and influence. Carter did not hope that a defeated PATCO strike would bring about the demise of organized labor. Instead, he hoped it would be a needed reality check for the union leaders and bring them back to the table with reasonable negotiations that would advance the original goals of the labor movement.
In the days leading up to the 2nd, Carter had said publicly that any strike by PATCO would be in violation of federal law, and he urged Poli to avoid that outcome.
At seven o’clock the next morning, Carter learned that his warnings were not heeded. PATCO had declared a strike. The FAA’s offer rejected, Carter told his team to release the statement they’d already drafted. Carter invoked the Taft-Hartley Act and ordered the striking controllers back to work. Approximately 1,000 controllers crossed the picket line and went into work that day.
Three hours later, Rik Hertzberg and Chris Matthews arrived in the Oval Office with a prepared address for the president to deliver. Carter read it over. Matthews, for whom blue collar values were especially important, was proud of the address. “Mr. President,” he said, “I think we hit the right note here.”
Carter leaned back in his chair behind his desk and read it over, mumbling the words to himself. He made a few edits and put the speech down.
“It’s good. Thank you,” he said, and then he waved them out of the office.
Then, the president called Watson, Jordan, and Powell into the Oval and explained that he was going to order them back in and give them 72-hours before they were all fired. Jordan, unsympathetic to the workers, muttered that it was “generous.” Hearing no objections, the president went forward with his speech, delivered from the Rose Garden.
“Today is a sad day,” Carter began. “I am disappointed that the air traffic controllers have chosen to reject a favorable union contract and launched into an illegal strike.
“From the outset, my administration has been involved in these negotiations, seeking to bring both sides to the table so that we could arrive at a fair and honest compromise.
“In the end, my responsibility is to all of the American people. It is in the interests of all — including the air traffic controllers — that this strike come to a swift end. Under my direction, Attorney General Bill Clinton has moved to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, and we have ordered the striking air traffic controllers back to work.
“I am pleased to report that a small number have already gone back to their duties. Anyone who does not return to work in the next 72-hours will be dismissed from their position.
“I have not taken this action lightly, but they are completely necessary to ensure the safety of those Americans who are traveling by air, and to ensure that the economic disruption caused by this action are minimal.
“The package I have proposed is generous. It includes substantial pay increases and earlier retirement options. It does not meet every demand set forth by the PATCO union leaders, and I recognize that, but no compromise can. We must balance the needs of our air traffic controllers, who serve honorably in a high-stress environment, with the economic and budgetary realities of the day. My proposal does that. Theirs does not.
“I hope that we can resolve this matter in the next 72 hours. If not, I am prepared to replace them with trained military who can do the job, and we will begin hiring to replace those fired immediately.
“Thank you.” [5]
August 4, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
Richard Poli awoke on August 4th dismayed to learn that nearly a third of his union had crossed the picket line and gone back to work that morning after the president’s threat of firing the union members.
That morning, the press coverage was favorable to Carter. Poli couldn’t believe the framing of the issue on the Today Show’s intro that morning: “Face-off. President Carter stands up to the air traffic controllers union and orders them to work, invoking the Taft-Hartley Act. The president says he is acting with the nation’s best interests in mind. Will union leaders blink?”
Carter watched it with excitement. Bonds appeared on the show via satellite that morning. “Tom, let me be perfectly clear with you: The president gave the union leaders advanced warning of this. We said from the outset that if they chose to go on strike, the president would have no other options. They decided to go ahead. Frankly, I do not think the union leadership is acting in the interests of its membership, but that’s not for me to determine.”
That afternoon, Poli arrived at the White House for another meeting with Bonds and Carter’s senior staff. The president was not there at the start of the meeting.
“Richard, our offer still stands,” Bonds said, “You can take the higher salaries, you can get most of what you wanted on the benefits package —”
Poli wasn’t there to argue the merits. “This is an insult to the American labor movement,” he began.
Theatrically, Carter had just walked into the room through a door on the other side.
“With all due respect, Richard, your demands are an insult to the American labor movement.” Poli scrambled to his feet. “We have been nothing but generous and nothing but forgiving. You have our deal, bring it to another vote. It still stands. I do not want to fire all of these people.”
“You can’t afford to fire us,” Poli said. “It’ll be a disaster.”
“We are managing today, aren’t we?” Carter said unblinking. Many flights had been canceled, but the use of military-trained controllers and the fact that nearly a third of those in the union had showed up for work had avoided a grounding of all commercial flights.
Poli hammered home the need for more money for raises and a shorter work week, but Carter was not in the mood to compromise.
“You have our offer, Richard,” he said, and he left the meeting.
Eizenstat and others continued to discuss the proposal with PATCO members, but the conversations were circular. They had been having the same debate for months. Now, it seemed the only question left was who would cave first. Carter had given strict instructions: It would not be the government.
August 5, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
Stu Eizenstat walked into the Oval Office on the morning of August 5th with some news for the president. The nigh before, he’d gotten drinks with one of Poli’s staffers at the hotel bar at the Willard, and while they’d tried to avoid talking about the negotiations, it was inevitable that work crept its way into their conversations. Such was the way of the town.
Sitting across from Carter, Eizenstat argued that PATCO just needed an off-ramp. “At this point, if they just take your deal and return to work, it shows they’ve lost. Poli is worried about what comes next for him if —”
“He should be,” Jordan interrupted unhelpfully.
“Regardless, my point is that any modest move in their direction is going to be enough to get them to our position, and we can end this whole thing.”
“I don’t like it,” Powell chimed in. “The public loves this display of strength, and frankly, it’s exactly the kind of thing we need after the Hostage Crisis to shore up your numbers on being a strong leader. It’s going to give us the momentum we need to get healthcare over the finish line.”
“The opposite,” Eizenstat argued. “If we don’t move an inch in the union’s direction, labor is going to be too pissed to come to the table on healthcare, and they’ll sink the whole thing. We can’t afford a defeat on that issue again.”
“We didn’t lose it last time,” Jordan said.
“That’s not the point, Ham, come on,” Eizenstat pleaded. “If we just increase the amount of money for raises — just a bit — I really think they’ll cave. And if they don’t, it only reaffirms that you’ve done everything you can to get them back to the table before we fire them, and if we’ve done that, then nobody on the Hill can say we hate labor when we try to round up votes for healthcare.”
“What do you have in mind, Stu?”
“Mr. President, I say let’s give them $200 million. It’s only a third of what they asked for.”
Jordan scoffed. “They’re hanging us out to dry.”
“Offer ‘em one seventy-five. If they want it, they can have it. If not, they’ve lost out. And they have until two o’clock today. I’m not going to spend another whole day on this.”
“Thank you, Mr. President.” Eizenstat left to place a call.
• • •
That afternoon, Carter invited Richard Poli and other representatives of PATCO to the Rose Garden for a press conference. They had secured a deal. PATCO blinked and took the offer of $175 million. They’d conceded the 32-hour work week, some of their benefits request, and some of the salary increases they’d hoped to secure, but standing behind the podium, Poli declared it a “win,” and he was polite at the White House.
“This is not a perfect deal, but I appreciate the president’s continued willingness to come to the table with us. Ultimately, it is a step in the right direction, and we look forward to continuing these conversations under the next administration,” Poli said. Vice President Mondale smiled behind him.
The reporters attempted to goad Poli into disparaging the president, but he largely avoided it. Gone was the bluster of his earlier statements when the negotiations had begun. Now, he was humbled by the fact he’d nearly lost his job — and his union.
The president shook Poli’s hand and thanked him for his work “on behalf of some of the hardest-working Americans.”
“I know that this is not the deal that many in PATCO wanted,” the president conceded, “and, frankly, I wish there was more for me to offer, but this is a responsible agreement that takes into account the realities of our present day economic situation. It is my hope, too, that in the future we will be able to more fully express our gratitude to the air traffic controllers who do such important work.”
>>>>>>>>>>>>
[1] This is all per OTL.
[2] The Outlier, 295.
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/1978/03/12/archives/a-test-of-crisis-management.html
[4] https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch...-strike/e5497593-1dc9-4ed9-9823-3026637b051e/
[5] I’ve based this off of Carter’s remarks during the coal industry strike. You can read those remarks here.
I have two comments to make about this story, which both involve spelling. The words in question are in bold italics. The first one goes like this: "The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization had been negotiation with the Federal Aviation Administration for months about securing a new contracts". The second goes like this: "First, Carter viewed the strike as particularly offensive given the nation's energy demands. He found any decisions hat would jeopardize American energy production as selfish and short-sighted". Keep up this great alt-history, Vidal!
The great irony of the whole situation is that is would have been entirely better for both sides to avoid the strike (the PATCO strike is one of those things that really hurt labor unions' reputation IOTL, and Carter, for all his skepticism of them, needs labor on board to get the stuff he wants done as president) but, lacking our hindsight, cannot see how they screw themselves more in the long term.ON STRIKE
“The president simply doesn’t give a damn about labor.”
-Landon Butler
Also, that Reagan endorsement really was an enormous self-own, wasn't it? (I mean, obviously it's not why Reagan won the White House IOTL, but it was absurdly short-sighted. Imagine if, after the Poli statement goes out, Reagan publicly criticizes Carter for not being sufficiently harsh to PATCO)
Thanks, Vidal!ON STRIKEJuly 11, 1981
“The president simply doesn’t give a damn about labor.”
-Landon Butler
The White House — Washington, DC
The meeting had covered most of the essential issues. Energy and the environment. Healthcare reform. Updates on Congressional relations. It would end with a discussion of Charlie Kirbo’s nomination to the Supreme Court. But before it closed, Jack Watson decided it was time to bring the president in on the issue of the PATCO negotiations.
The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization union had been negotiating with the Federal Aviation Administration for months about securing a new contract. Their demands were extensive. They wanted their work week reduced to 32 hours, a $10,000 pay increase for all air-traffic controllers, and a more expansive benefits package that included early retirement. The FAA was not in the position to award such a contract.
Months later, the FAA decided to come back to the table with a proposal for a three-year contract that would include $105 million in raises to be paid at 11.4% increases over the course of three years. Their proposal represented a raise that was more than twice what other federal government employees were making. By the end of the three-year period, air-traffic controller salaries would exceed private sector pay by 8%. PATCO rejected the proposal, citing the fact that it did not include the earlier retirement they had requested or a reduction in their work week. [1]
Watson had been monitoring the negotiations closely and sending over periodic briefings to the president. Stu Eizenstat was also deep in the conversation, and he was meeting regularly with Transportation Secretary Neil Goldschmidt. None of them liked where the negotiations were heading, and Watson feared a nationwide walkout from the air-traffic controllers. He also feared the reaction he’d get from the Carter White House.
Jimmy Carter’s first brush with a union strike came in December of 1977 when a four-month strike from coal miners brought about a 60% reduction in the production of coal. The situation angered Carter for many reasons and left him with a residual bitter feeling towards organized labor. First, Carter viewed the strike as particularly offensive given the nation’s energy demands. He found any decisions that would jeopardize American energy production as selfish and short-sighted. Second, he came to personally dislike George Meany, the head of the AFL-CIO, who misrepresented Carter’s interactions with Meany during the strike.
When Carter left a lunch meeting with Meany, he turned to Stu Eizenstat and said, “Stu, I will never do this again.” [2] He was plainly referring to a cordial meeting with Meany, but his comment also carried an edge to it — a feeling that he would not let himself be pushed around by labor again. As Carter saw it, he had the interests of the nation to look out for while labor was only preoccupied with their own bottom line.
The Carter administration’s handling of the Coal Strike received outsized attention from the press. Wrote the New York Times: “Mr. Carter's handling of the situation will shape the public's impression of his early Presidency probably more than any other with the possible exception of the Middle East. The prolonged strike touches the two areas in which he has been most criticized: his competence as an executive and his ability to lead.” [3]
The Carter administration had been hesitant to get the federal government heavily involved in the negotiations, preferring to let them continue without White House involvement for months. Watson looked at that decision and learned a lesson: The White House should prevent the strike from happening in the first place, and it could do so by getting involved earlier.
“Mr. President, the FAA is still having trouble finalizing a deal with PATCO for a new contract. The last agreement, as you know, would have marked a significant concession toward the union, but it was rejected by PATCO leaders,” Watson began.
Jordan interrupted and asked for the details of the agreements.
“Initially, PATCO asked for a $10,000 pay raise for air-traffic controllers, a reduction to a 32-hour work week, and a new retirement package, with the main component being an earlier retirement age,” Watson explained. “The FAA came back to them with a three-year contract that offered n 11.6% pay raise each year for the three years, but they didn’t concede on the work week or on an earlier retirement age.”
Jordan was scribbling notes. “And where does that put them in relation to the private sector.”
Carter already knew these answers as he’d been keeping up with Watson’s memos, but Eizenstat jumped in to give Jordan the numbers. “Right now, air-traffic controllers are about 18% behind the private sector when it comes to their wages. The FAA’s offer would get them to 8% ahead of the private sector by the end of the contract.”
Jordan nodded. “So they’re hosing us.”
Watson feared this would be the reaction. “I don’t know that I would go that far. It’s a unique job — demanding, stressful — we know the mental health of these air-traffic controllers is impacted by the kind of job they do.”
“Nobody made them do it,” the president offered. It was a sentiment he’d held during the Coal Strike.
“I understand, Mr. President, but we are also talking about one of the most critical jobs in our nation’s economy. We cannot afford a strike at the peak of summer air travel,” Watson said.
“We can’t afford to offer them these concessions, either, Jack. What are you proposing?”
“I think it’s time for us to get involved in the negotiations and see what kind of a deal we can hammer out between PATCO and the FAA.”
Jordan sighed. “Stay out of it, Mr. President. This isn’t our fight, and if we look like we’re tipping the scales we alienate either the right or the left. We have too much ongoing right now to piss off labor — the fate of healthcare is practically up to them, we need to hold the liberals on Kirbo — it’s too risky to get involved at this point.”
“Or this is an opportunity to for us to get labor back on our side, and that will give us additional leverage with them when it comes to healthcare.”
“Jack, I want to be clear about something,” Carter said now, “I am not going to give in to a 32-hour work week. Why should their work week be an entire day less than the average American’s? What happens to our economy if we set a precedent that the president will give in to the demands of labor when they want to work less for more pay?”
“I think if we can offer them a better retirement package, we can get them to concede on the 32-hour work week,” Eizenstat added. “Their initial demands are outrageous, and, in my opinion, that’s a clear sign that they asked for a lot knowing they’d need to make concessions. They just want someone to come to the table with them.”
“The FAA already has,” Carter said.
“But not enough. We can find some kind of compromise on the early retirement issue.”
Carter looked at Jordan who continued to shake his head no. “Say what’s on your mind, Ham.”
“Mr. President, I think we are asking for trouble if we wade into this. You and I both know our relationship with labor is strained enough. If we get involved and don’t give in to their demands, we could be blowing up our relationship with them when we need them for this healthcare bill.”
“Mr. President, with all due respect to Ham’s opinion, I don’t think we can afford to not do this. Labor is going to expect you to come to the table at this point. The negotiations have gone on too long already. If you’re not there, your absence will say enough. And I would also point out that PATCO is its own beast here. It falls under the umbrella of organized labor, but we know the biggest unions aren’t always on the same page,” Watson interjected.
“Ham, Jack — get me a memo from each of you outlining the issue, and I’ll decide from there. What’s next?”
July 18, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
President Carter summoned representatives of the FAA and PATCO to the White House Roosevelt Room for a negotiation about the new contracts. It was a familiar role for Carter as he had long been eager to play the middle man — between nations, between candidates, between staffers with different opinions on an issue. Here, Carter hoped to negotiate a reconciliation that would prevent the union from going on strike.
Robert Pool, President of PATCO, was not willing to compromise. He saw his fight as an ideological battle for the Democratic Party. Carter was the first anti-union Democrat to be president since the New Deal, at least the way he saw it, and he wasn’t willing to roll over for the president. His demands had been made, and he expected them to be met, or he would walk.
PATCO had joined the Teamsters and the Air Line Pilots Association in endorsing Reagan over Carter. Now, they expected to inflict pain on him during their first term.
As Poli walked into the White House, he stopped to address the scrum of reporters waiting outside. “I have no doubt,” he said, “that if we were going to meet with President Ronald Reagan right now, it would be to say thank you for his help in meeting our demands. We have here a president who is not a friend of labor, but we will not come up short. We are not asking for anything more than is necessary to ensure the continued health and safety of our employees and all of those who fly commercially in the United States.”
“Hell of a way to make an entrance,” Jordan grumbled.
Poli’s blustering rhetoric forecast an equally gloomy negotiation. Carter was several minutes late to the meeting, reflecting a near-total disinterest in the actual proceedings. As Jordan would later recall, “I didn’t think he should be there, and he didn’t want to be.” But Carter agreed that it was important to try and avoid a standoff that threatened to ground commercial flights in the United States.
“Welcome, everyone,” the president said as he arrived in the Roosevelt Room. He took his seat at the center of the table. Poli sat on his right and FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond sat at his left.
“I think it’s important that the American people know its government is doing everything it can to avoid a strike that would cripple air travel and imperil our economy. Everyone at this table has a responsibility to avoid a strike from happening, and so that will require compromise on the part of all of us. It’s my hope that we can come to a working proposal that both sides can take from here and discuss with their memberships and colleagues.”
When he was done with his brief statement, the president turned it over to Poli to begin the meeting.
Poli quickly launched into a dramatic telling of the complex job of being an air traffic controller, noting the stress and long hours, and demanding pay commensurate with airline pilots. “Our jobs are no less important,” he said at the table. “We are expecting higher pay,” he continued. “Our most experienced air traffic controllers deserve a salary of $73,000 a year, and they deserve an hourly schedule that accounts for the stressful nature of their job.”
Bond found it difficult to sit through Poli’s remarks having already resigned himself to the fact that a strike was imminent. He wanted desperately to remark upon the fact that back in November, Poli had reminded his members that they had a $2 million strike fund ready to go should they need it, and he’d released a contingency plan for how the federal government should respond to a strike. [4] Now, sitting at the White House, Bond couldn’t shake the feeling this was all performative on Poli’s part. Nonetheless, he proceeded.
“Mr. President, I first want to say thank you for inviting us to be here. Your commitment to the stability of America’s air economy is much appreciated. The position of the FAA has been clear throughout this entire process: We agree with the premise that air traffic controllers deserve better compensation and working conditions, and we are happy to bargain to that effect, but we cannot, in good conscience, endorse the total and uncompromising proposal set forth by Mr. Poli and his union. It is not fiscally prudent, nor would it be fair to others involved in the industry.”
After opening statements, Carter asked each side to briefly summarize their positions on each of the major sticking points: salary, work hours, and early retirement/benefits package. Unsurprisingly, Carter quickly came to the conclusion that the FAA was getting the worse end of the deal and that the union’s demands were over-the-top.
Just as Jordan feared, Carter’s involvement was only going to bring the White House into further conflict with labor, all while Kennedy and other Democrats on the Hill were desperately seeking their support on healthcare legislation.
They broke for lunch and then returned to hear the president’s assessment of the negotiations. Carter decided to begin with where he thought there was room to meet the PATCO members, namely earlier retirement. Poli was enthused and quickly latched on to the president’s support. His eagerness was short-lived.
“But Richard, I can hardly justify moving the hourly schedule down to a 32-hour work week. Most Americans work a 40-hour work week. Why should the air traffic controllers get more pay for less work? You’re trying to have it both ways.”
Poli was predictably offended. “Mr. President, we are not asking for more pay for less work. We are asking that our salary reflect the work we are already doing, and we are asking that our schedules reflect the realities and tenor of the job we’re called upon to do. Air traffic controllers monitor screens, coordinate with pilots in the air, and are responsible for the safety of thousands of Americans each day. It is an incredibly demanding job, and if we are going to keep the skies safe, we need to ensure that our air traffic controllers are well-rested and ready to do the job when they show up to work.”
Carter smiled. Does he realize he’s talking to the man with the most stressful job on the planet? Carter wondered to himself.
“Thank you, Richard. I appreciate your perspective.” Carter had little else to say. He appreciated it, but he didn’t agree with it.
The president turned to Bonds and asked if he had any closing statement he’d like to make. Bonds shook his head no.
“Well, I think we all have a lot more to think about. Richard, I would encourage you to go back to your members and see where you’re able to make compromises. Langhorne, when he does that and returns with answers, I hope the FAA is able to accommodate them.” Then, Carter stood and adjourned the meeting.
As he walked out of the room, Watson asked what he thought of the meeting.
“It was a waste of time,” Carter said. “They’re going to strike.”
August 3, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
The Carter White House continued to work behind the scenes to craft an agreement between PATCO and the FAA. Stu Eizenstat was heavily involved in the negotiations and presented a final White House proposal that included some $150 million in pay increases over three years (Poli asked for $600 million), nearly the entire benefits package as requested by the union, but with a 40-hour work week.
It seemed as though Poli may relent and take the Carter proposal. Even Ted Kennedy, friend of labor in the 1980 Democratic primaries, was privately urging the union to take the deal, believing they’d overextended their hand.
Jordan and Caddell, usually astute readers of the political winds, put it bluntly in an Oval Office conversation: “They overplayed their hand,” Jordan said. Caddell echoed, “They have to take the deal.”
Pat Caddell was wrong.
By the evening of August 2nd, the Carter White House had yet to hear from Poli, and Eizenstat felt a lump developing in his throat. “Mr. President, I don’t have a good feeling about this,” he said.
Carter, for his part, was not phased by the back-and-forth. Typically, the president was intimately involved in negotiations of this caliber, but he’d been rather hands-off in his approach to PATCO. He was simply uninterested in bowing to labor.
As Carter and his team sat in the Oval Office on the evening of the 2nd, the president opined that the strike would end as he hoped. “Long-term, this will be good for the Party,” he said. “Our victory over Kennedy last year proved that labor’s chokehold is undeserved. Now, this — it’ll be the final nail in their influence, and it’s all their doing.”
Jordan nodded in agreement. Anne Wexler worried about how she was goin to clean up the mess with interested parties if PATCO really did strike.
Carter’s hostility towards organized labor was not reflective of a lack of concern for the working man. Instead, it was the opposite. He believed that the union bosses, especially at the national level, had become too power-hungry for their own good. They had stopped worrying about their members and the greater good and instead become focused on their own paychecks and influence. Carter did not hope that a defeated PATCO strike would bring about the demise of organized labor. Instead, he hoped it would be a needed reality check for the union leaders and bring them back to the table with reasonable negotiations that would advance the original goals of the labor movement.
In the days leading up to the 2nd, Carter had said publicly that any strike by PATCO would be in violation of federal law, and he urged Poli to avoid that outcome.
At seven o’clock the next morning, Carter learned that his warnings were not heeded. PATCO had declared a strike. The FAA’s offer rejected, Carter told his team to release the statement they’d already drafted. Carter invoked the Taft-Hartley Act and ordered the striking controllers back to work. Approximately 1,000 controllers crossed the picket line and went into work that day.
Three hours later, Rik Hertzberg and Chris Matthews arrived in the Oval Office with a prepared address for the president to deliver. Carter read it over. Matthews, for whom blue collar values were especially important, was proud of the address. “Mr. President,” he said, “I think we hit the right note here.”
Carter leaned back in his chair behind his desk and read it over, mumbling the words to himself. He made a few edits and put the speech down.
“It’s good. Thank you,” he said, and then he waved them out of the office.
Then, the president called Watson, Jordan, and Powell into the Oval and explained that he was going to order them back in and give them 72-hours before they were all fired. Jordan, unsympathetic to the workers, muttered that it was “generous.” Hearing no objections, the president went forward with his speech, delivered from the Rose Garden.
“Today is a sad day,” Carter began. “I am disappointed that the air traffic controllers have chosen to reject a favorable union contract and launched into an illegal strike.
“From the outset, my administration has been involved in these negotiations, seeking to bring both sides to the table so that we could arrive at a fair and honest compromise.
“In the end, my responsibility is to all of the American people. It is in the interests of all — including the air traffic controllers — that this strike come to a swift end. Under my direction, Attorney General Bill Clinton has moved to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, and we have ordered the striking air traffic controllers back to work.
“I am pleased to report that a small number have already gone back to their duties. Anyone who does not return to work in the next 72-hours will be dismissed from their position.
“I have not taken this action lightly, but they are completely necessary to ensure the safety of those Americans who are traveling by air, and to ensure that the economic disruption caused by this action are minimal.
“The package I have proposed is generous. It includes substantial pay increases and earlier retirement options. It does not meet every demand set forth by the PATCO union leaders, and I recognize that, but no compromise can. We must balance the needs of our air traffic controllers, who serve honorably in a high-stress environment, with the economic and budgetary realities of the day. My proposal does that. Theirs does not.
“I hope that we can resolve this matter in the next 72 hours. If not, I am prepared to replace them with trained military who can do the job, and we will begin hiring to replace those fired immediately.
“Thank you.” [5]
August 4, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
Richard Poli awoke on August 4th dismayed to learn that nearly a third of his union had crossed the picket line and gone back to work that morning after the president’s threat of firing the union members.
That morning, the press coverage was favorable to Carter. Poli couldn’t believe the framing of the issue on the Today Show’s intro that morning: “Face-off. President Carter stands up to the air traffic controllers union and orders them to work, invoking the Taft-Hartley Act. The president says he is acting with the nation’s best interests in mind. Will union leaders blink?”
Carter watched it with excitement. Bonds appeared on the show via satellite that morning. “Tom, let me be perfectly clear with you: The president gave the union leaders advanced warning of this. We said from the outset that if they chose to go on strike, the president would have no other options. They decided to go ahead. Frankly, I do not think the union leadership is acting in the interests of its membership, but that’s not for me to determine.”
That afternoon, Poli arrived at the White House for another meeting with Bonds and Carter’s senior staff. The president was not there at the start of the meeting.
“Richard, our offer still stands,” Bonds said, “You can take the higher salaries, you can get most of what you wanted on the benefits package —”
Poli wasn’t there to argue the merits. “This is an insult to the American labor movement,” he began.
Theatrically, Carter had just walked into the room through a door on the other side.
“With all due respect, Richard, your demands are an insult to the American labor movement.” Poli scrambled to his feet. “We have been nothing but generous and nothing but forgiving. You have our deal, bring it to another vote. It still stands. I do not want to fire all of these people.”
“You can’t afford to fire us,” Poli said. “It’ll be a disaster.”
“We are managing today, aren’t we?” Carter said unblinking. Many flights had been canceled, but the use of military-trained controllers and the fact that nearly a third of those in the union had showed up for work had avoided a grounding of all commercial flights.
Poli hammered home the need for more money for raises and a shorter work week, but Carter was not in the mood to compromise.
“You have our offer, Richard,” he said, and he left the meeting.
Eizenstat and others continued to discuss the proposal with PATCO members, but the conversations were circular. They had been having the same debate for months. Now, it seemed the only question left was who would cave first. Carter had given strict instructions: It would not be the government.
August 5, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC
Stu Eizenstat walked into the Oval Office on the morning of August 5th with some news for the president. The nigh before, he’d gotten drinks with one of Poli’s staffers at the hotel bar at the Willard, and while they’d tried to avoid talking about the negotiations, it was inevitable that work crept its way into their conversations. Such was the way of the town.
Sitting across from Carter, Eizenstat argued that PATCO just needed an off-ramp. “At this point, if they just take your deal and return to work, it shows they’ve lost. Poli is worried about what comes next for him if —”
“He should be,” Jordan interrupted unhelpfully.
“Regardless, my point is that any modest move in their direction is going to be enough to get them to our position, and we can end this whole thing.”
“I don’t like it,” Powell chimed in. “The public loves this display of strength, and frankly, it’s exactly the kind of thing we need after the Hostage Crisis to shore up your numbers on being a strong leader. It’s going to give us the momentum we need to get healthcare over the finish line.”
“The opposite,” Eizenstat argued. “If we don’t move an inch in the union’s direction, labor is going to be too pissed to come to the table on healthcare, and they’ll sink the whole thing. We can’t afford a defeat on that issue again.”
“We didn’t lose it last time,” Jordan said.
“That’s not the point, Ham, come on,” Eizenstat pleaded. “If we just increase the amount of money for raises — just a bit — I really think they’ll cave. And if they don’t, it only reaffirms that you’ve done everything you can to get them back to the table before we fire them, and if we’ve done that, then nobody on the Hill can say we hate labor when we try to round up votes for healthcare.”
“What do you have in mind, Stu?”
“Mr. President, I say let’s give them $200 million. It’s only a third of what they asked for.”
Jordan scoffed. “They’re hanging us out to dry.”
“Offer ‘em one seventy-five. If they want it, they can have it. If not, they’ve lost out. And they have until two o’clock today. I’m not going to spend another whole day on this.”
“Thank you, Mr. President.” Eizenstat left to place a call.
• • •
That afternoon, Carter invited Richard Poli and other representatives of PATCO to the Rose Garden for a press conference. They had secured a deal. PATCO blinked and took the offer of $175 million. They’d conceded the 32-hour work week, some of their benefits request, and some of the salary increases they’d hoped to secure, but standing behind the podium, Poli declared it a “win,” and he was polite at the White House.
“This is not a perfect deal, but I appreciate the president’s continued willingness to come to the table with us. Ultimately, it is a step in the right direction, and we look forward to continuing these conversations under the next administration,” Poli said. Vice President Mondale smiled behind him.
The reporters attempted to goad Poli into disparaging the president, but he largely avoided it. Gone was the bluster of his earlier statements when the negotiations had begun. Now, he was humbled by the fact he’d nearly lost his job — and his union.
The president shook Poli’s hand and thanked him for his work “on behalf of some of the hardest-working Americans.”
“I know that this is not the deal that many in PATCO wanted,” the president conceded, “and, frankly, I wish there was more for me to offer, but this is a responsible agreement that takes into account the realities of our present day economic situation. It is my hope, too, that in the future we will be able to more fully express our gratitude to the air traffic controllers who do such important work.”
>>>>>>>>>>>>
[1] This is all per OTL.
[2] The Outlier, 295.
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/1978/03/12/archives/a-test-of-crisis-management.html
[4] https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch...-strike/e5497593-1dc9-4ed9-9823-3026637b051e/
[5] I’ve based this off of Carter’s remarks during the coal industry strike. You can read those remarks here.
So, in other words, might unions be stronger in this version of America? And might the industrial heartland (Ohio, Michigan, western PA) not turn into the “Rust Belt”? (Although that might be too far along already.)
The rust belt is unavoidable, damage done (much as happened in most industrial countries) because plant wasn't renewed early enough and now they have overseas competition they can't compete with. The Unions might end up stronger but that's mostly if they manage to clean their own houses. Certainly the "relationship" with the Mob needs to be dealt with (especially if the Five families decline as they did OTL) and the Pocket liners have to go in favour of people who actually care about the membership.
This always cracks me up eveytime I’m reminded of it. Way to secure the future of organised labour.
Cmiiw but isn't it a popular myth that air controllers there still raise a fuss whenever they're reminded that the airport's been renamed after Reagan?
Do wonder if we'll see similar kvetching here in TTL as well... (that's of course assuming that the airport also gets renamed after the President, herein Carter instead, but still...)
Do wonder if we'll see similar kvetching here in TTL as well... (that's of course assuming that the airport also gets renamed after the President, herein Carter instead, but still...)
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To be fair, Carter was not their friend, either. For them, in 1980, there was no good choice.
Honestly I feel bad for labor here. They are dealing with a President of a party they should be able to trust who refuses to deal in good faith due to a grudge.
But I suppose we shouldn't be surprised after Carter blew his chance at Healthcare in the first term with the same tactics. ( Refusing to deal in good faith and compromise with Kennedy / Liberals. )
But I suppose we shouldn't be surprised after Carter blew his chance at Healthcare in the first term with the same tactics. ( Refusing to deal in good faith and compromise with Kennedy / Liberals. )
Great update. Been wondering ever since Carter won in 1980 how he would handle the PATCO strike. Obviously he differs from Reagan quite a lot. Great job
Another great update!
Was wondering how Bill was faring in this TL! It’s a logical landing spot for him after his 1980 defeat, but man does this put his political career on a different trajectory than OTL, especially since this means he wouldn’t return to the Governor’s Mansion in 1982 and would miss out on the 10 years in power that turned him into the presidential hopeful he was IOTL.
Loved the update; and its nice to see Organized Labor come out ahead from where they were in OTL (not that they'd recognize it, of course). On a side note - just to be THAT guy - you made a small typo early on when you refer to Robert Poli as Robery Pool, initially. Sorry; blame it on years of being an educator 
As others have said, I'm interested in seeing the impact that being AG has upon the career of Bill Clinton. We know from previous chapters that he WILL have a career after this term; its been mentioned that his future career is closely tied to Jimmy Carter. I'm not sure if he'll end up as President (there's always a reluctance, which I understand, among many authors t work in the same presidents from OTL. However, I do love when we see the occasional one pop up, but under different circumstances) but whatever he does seems as if it will be seen as being built largely off of his time in the Carter administration.
Also, I do love how its shown that, for all of Carter's moral fortitude and general 'goodness' - god he can be a grumpy, stubborn, crumudgeon someimes who needs to get dragged (kicking and screaming) to a compromise. It humanizes him to a great deal - and, as a fellow good natured, yet grump, stubborn, crumudgeon, its good to see
As others have said, I'm interested in seeing the impact that being AG has upon the career of Bill Clinton. We know from previous chapters that he WILL have a career after this term; its been mentioned that his future career is closely tied to Jimmy Carter. I'm not sure if he'll end up as President (there's always a reluctance, which I understand, among many authors t work in the same presidents from OTL. However, I do love when we see the occasional one pop up, but under different circumstances) but whatever he does seems as if it will be seen as being built largely off of his time in the Carter administration.
Also, I do love how its shown that, for all of Carter's moral fortitude and general 'goodness' - god he can be a grumpy, stubborn, crumudgeon someimes who needs to get dragged (kicking and screaming) to a compromise. It humanizes him to a great deal - and, as a fellow good natured, yet grump, stubborn, crumudgeon, its good to see
With Bill going down the AG path, I want to bring up the most interesting ripple effect of this with a question: does Hilary Rodham run in Illinois or make a go of it in Arkansas?