Donald Rumsfeld killed on 9/11

[Simon]

Actually wouldn't Rumsfeld's death be better for how Iraq is handled as I've heard that a lot of the more bone head decisions (at least as far as military matters go) that led to how the US handled it came from him.

Well he was certainly pushing his high-tech reforms under the argument that they would allow a smaller and lighter force to be just as effective, if not more so, than the previous organisations. That's apparently a large part of why he went against Shinseki's force recommendations since he figured they were too high and Iraq would be the perfect place to showcase the results. Now to be fair there was probably a fair amount of truth to the idea provided that you were dealing with conventional opponents as shown by the initial invasion, it was the later occupation/counterinsurgency part where the wheels started to come off and you needed more boots on the ground.

I've no idea where Wolfowitz stood in the debate or whether being new to the position would allow him to ignore advice like Rumsfeld did, but if you can find a way to get a force structure more towards Shinseki's numbers that will be an immediate improvement. I definitely think that the invasion of Iraq will go ahead, just look at what was known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine that he wrote back in the late 90s.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

.... Now to be fair there was probably a fair amount of truth to the idea provided that you were dealing with conventional opponents as shown by the initial invasion, it was the later occupation/counterinsurgency part where the wheels started to come off and you needed more boots on the ground.

The wheels were falling off even before the Iraqi government disolved. One of the lesser known aspects was the disolution of the civil affairs section in Central Command during the mobilization for the OIF. Folks who were in that group have told me the staff was drawn down to ineffective levels in the months leading up to OIF. The post war occupations plans prepared by Central Command in the previous years/decades were not distributed, and nothing in those plans put into effect or prepared for. That came directly from the top according to my sources, either the Sec of Defense office or the White House. In the latter case Karl Rove would have been the instigator as he fully believed the "Shock and Awe" thing, and bought off on the idea of a happy, grateful, compliant, and peaceful Iraqi citizenry returning to work the Monday after the war. Rove was also one of the inner circle who was behind the "We Dont Do nation Building" slogan in the 2000 presidential campaign and the early Bush presidency.

.I've no idea where Wolfowitz stood in the debate or whether being new to the position would allow him to ignore advice like Rumsfeld did, but if you can find a way to get a force structure more towards Shinseki's numbers that will be an immediate improvement. I definitely think that the invasion of Iraq will go ahead, just look at what was known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine that he wrote back in the late 90s.

Wolfowitz was as much behind the "We Dont Do nation Building" thing as anyone else on the control deck at the time. I suspect the details might be different but the US military no better prepared for occupation than under Rumsfeld.

Post 2003 the reorganization of the US Army might look different.

 

[SgtBaz]

snip.

Carl

Never heard that about the Civil Affairs (CA) section being drawn down and the plans ignored...but it wouldn't surprise me. Having been in the Army's Civil Affairs for almost 15 years (at a low level as a CPL and SGT), I got to see what looked like severe disfunction on a national (Iraq) level for CA projects/programs of all types in both 2003/04 and 2008/09. Seemed to get better later but by then the US was drawing down and spending less and talking to everyone a bit more.

Not to derail the OP's thread, but I can probably offer a few educated guesses as to why the senior levels of the military and government ignored CA.

1. CA is not sexy. To the more exciting areas of the Army at least, we don't blow lots of stuff up, conduct daring missions behind enemy lines, or need to have expensive vehicles built for our use.

2. CA is 95% (roughly) Army Reserve and the Active Duty Army doesn't like (at least in 2003, slightly better now) the Reserves/National Guard. To Active Duty, Reserves/NG are 'weekend warriors' and not as good as them. Not all see it that way but a good portion do.

3. CA needs lots of support when deployed from units they are attached to. Food, ammo, fuel, vehicles, security when on mission, etc. and seem to offer no direct way of repayment; most things CA does takes time to have an impact. Best way (I think at least) I put across what CA can do for kinetic units (infantry, armor, etc.) is the following: On a perfect afternoon with perfect conditions) an Infantry squad (9 soldiers) can probably defeat 60 terrorists (random number), on that same afternoon a CA team (4 soldiers) doing its mission could keep 600 potential terrorists from ever showing up.

4. CA takes time, money, understanding of local culture/government and understanding of civilians. Time and money easy to understand; culture lot harder if you don't care and your only mission is to kill the enemy. And if you spend a long time in the military or if your only experience as an adult is in the military, its a lot harder for some people to relate to a civilian and how their life operates.

A little short and quick but didn't want to take this thread too far off its track.

 

[Alstein]

To be fair, there's the possibility that Rumsfeld dying on 9/11 butterflies away the 100,000+ deaths that resulted from the Iraq war and occupation in the form we saw, which most people would consider a decent trade-off. In that context, 'celebrating his death' is a much more reasonable position.

Of course its also possible (and my gut instinct leans to this) that Rumsfeld's death changes little significantly and the whole stupid mess goes ahead much like it did in OTL.

Iraq still happens, but is much more competently run, fewer US deaths.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Carl

Never heard that about the Civil Affairs (CA) section being drawn down and the plans ignored...but it wouldn't surprise me.

The informant who was in the CA Central Command at the time cant have his name divulged. For another part of the story look up Ann Wright who was the assistant ambassador to Afganistan at the time. She was a reserve officer in Central Command CA earlier in the 1990s. Plough through her public statements after her retirement (reposted from Afganistan to Mongolia in 2003) and you can put together a partial picture of how the Bush Administartion made it harder in 2003.

Having been in the Army's Civil Affairs for almost 15 years (at a low level as a CPL and SGT), I got to see what looked like severe disfunction on a national (Iraq) level for CA projects/programs of all types in both 2003/04 and 2008/09. Seemed to get better later but by then the US was drawing down and spending less and talking to everyone a bit more.

A bit of advice from a old fart to a young stud. Save docs, make notes, and generally write it down now while the memory is fresh and you can still get your hands on the paper. that is the research for the book you should publish eventually needs to be collected now. Keep a diary, names, dates, places.

 

[Simon]

The wheels were falling off even before the Iraqi government disolved. One of the lesser known aspects was the disolution of the civil affairs section in Central Command during the mobilization for the OIF. Folks who were in that group have told me the staff was drawn down to ineffective levels in the months leading up to OIF. The post war occupations plans prepared by Central Command in the previous years/decades were not distributed, and nothing in those plans put into effect or prepared for.

Jesus, I'd forgotten all about that. I knew thanks to Jay Garner getting the push that they just seemed to be expecting everything to be received gratefully with democracy sprouting from the ground led by their guy Chalabi but this just double proves it. So to get a half-decent invasion you need to use Shinseki's numbers, dust off the old Central Command Civil Affairs plans, keep Garner in charge of things and be rather sceptical of Chalabi and his faction. Buggered if I know how to achieve all of that.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I cant recall whos idea it was to vaporize the Iraqi Army imeaditely after the shooting stopped. Garners? Or did that come down from above. In any case it was unprecedented. I am hard pressed to think of a example from the 20th Century where the conquered army was not kept under some sort of close supervision, and demobilized gradually. Make the Iraqi Generals clearly responsible for securing the weapons, confining the soldiers to the barracks, & keeping general order would have gone a ways in changing events. Shooting one or two in the first couple days for 'failing' would have done a lot to keep them honest.

Ann Wrights take was the occupation requirements calculated by the CA people of Central Command in the 1990s were too intimidating by their size. The number of people, quantitiies of material, and cost was 'large' and may have flummoxed the administration into trying to fairydust the entire problem away.

 

[black angel]

I cant recall whos idea it was to vaporize the Iraqi Army imeaditely after the shooting stopped. Garners? Or did that come down from above. In any case it was unprecedented. I am hard pressed to think of a example from the 20th Century where the conquered army was not kept under some sort of close supervision, and demobilized gradually. Make the Iraqi Generals clearly responsible for securing the weapons, confining the soldiers to the barracks, & keeping general order would have gone a ways in changing events. Shooting one or two in the first couple days for 'failing' would have done a lot to keep them honest.

Ann Wrights take was the occupation requirements calculated by the CA people of Central Command in the 1990s were too intimidating by their size. The number of people, quantitiies of material, and cost was 'large' and may have flummoxed the administration into trying to fairydust the entire problem away.

the who isn't 100% clear, there's a camp of thought that says that it was Paul Bremer all by himself, though maybe it came from Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz if they ordered it out and out or painted the idea in Bremer's mind, most people agree that President Bush had signed off on Garners' idea of keeping Iraqi Army/officers below the Devision level, many members of the Iraqi Army were in contact with ORHA, one officer even offered 10,000 Iraqi MPs to control the looting in Baghdad, he was turned down... of course.

 

[Simon]

My general idea would be to keep the Iraqi military on the payroll and in barracks where you can keep an eye on them whilst slowly screening out the undesirables. Another use would be to pair up say two or three platoons of Iraqi troops in fixed positions in a neighbourhood with a platoon of western troops that patrols between them and around to act as backup if anything happens and too keep an eye on things and to keep them honest, helps widen the Coalition's footprint when they're badly undermanned.