AHC: Accelerate the Union conquest of Atlanta and march to the sea by a year

[raharris1973]

How could the break-out of the Union western front in the American Civil War through Atlanta and across the Alleghenies and Appalachians to the Atlantic seaboard have been significantly accelerated, by like as much as a year, in some politically-militarily plausible way?

If that is bit too much to ask, how could it have been accomplished at least six months faster?

 

[SWS]

The only viable POD I can think of concerns Buell's operations eastward along the line of the Memphis and Charleston toward Chattanooga in June-July 1862.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Accelerating by a full year means that the Union must be in Atlanta and Savannah by September and December 1863, respectively. That is pretty difficult. Principally, in the Western Theater, there were two thrusts: the push to the Mississippi and the push to the Confederate heartland. A big issue for both thrusts, especially the latter, is logistics - the latter is especially dependent on land-based transportation that could be disrupted by guerrillas or cavalry raids. It would have to be a set of fortunate events for the Union to make it on time, such as:
1. 1862 Kentucky Campaign aborted: Although the campaign has often been pronounced as a magnificent failure for the Confederates, Bragg had accomplished a lot (although his conduct and boldness definitely faltered by the middle phase of the campaign). Bragg had revived the Army of Tennessee from its stupor at its diseased camps in Tupelo, disrupted the Federal push into Chattanooga and recaptured a good portion of Middle Tennessee. Earl J Hess once echoed Grant's argument that Buell could have thrust into Chattanooga during June-July, detaching three divisions to guard the supply lines as the Confederate garrison there were still badly outnumbered and concentrated at Knoxville.
2. A solid Shiloh victory: this could have knock on impacts for future campaigns. If the Army of the Tennessee had been more alert and had Lew Wallace's lost division struck the Confederate's rear, Day 1 of Shiloh could be a painful Confederate defeat. It could be a POD of C. F. Smith not getting injured and being more vigilant than Sherman, allowing for a more consolidated defense by the afternoon.
3. Early Vicksburg surrender: there's been talk on this forum about the possibility of Vicksburg falling without much of a struggle. If it is true, then the Army of the Tennessee could have been committed to pushing towards Chattanooga, accelerating the timetable. Alternatively, if Grant was committed to a Siege of Mobile, then he could strike Atlanta along the Atlanta and West Point.

Of course, there is Confederate reaction to continuous losses, which could include redeploying units from the coast or even the Army of Northern Virginia. Come to think of it, a campaign for Mobile is perhaps the best way to point a dagger at Atlanta (along with the industrial cities of Selma and Columbia) much faster than OTL, but without a set of PODs to free up manpower, it's unlikely that much will come of it.

 

[bguy]

Does the POD have to come in the Western Theater itself? It's easy enough to imagine scenarios where the Union wins a crushing victory against the Army of Northern Virginia in the Peninsula Campaign, at Antietam or even at Fredericksburg (if Halleck gets the pontoon bridges to the Army of Potomoc in a timely manner), and if the Confederates suffer a serious defeat in Virginia in 1862, then they will likely have to pull a significant number of troops from the west to try and restore their position in Virginia which should enable the Union to advance much faster in the west.

 

[Hastings]

Yeah, Kentucky campaign for the flack it gets arguably was one of the more successful campaigns for the Confederates, flipped quite a bit of territory back to Confederate control after the first half of 1862 was an absolute disaster in that sense. The western theater came awful close to completely spiraling out of control for the Confederates in 1862. Places that ended up being hardfought in following 18 months like Vicksburg and Chattanoga could easily have fallen in late spring.

 

[SWS]

Yeah, Kentucky campaign for the flack it gets arguably was one of the more successful campaigns for the Confederates, flipped quite a bit of territory back to Confederate control after the first half of 1862 was an absolute disaster in that sense. The western theater came awful close to completely spiraling out of control for the Confederates in 1862. Places that ended up being hardfought in following 18 months like Vicksburg and Chattanoga could easily have fallen in late spring.

Definitely. Never-minding Kirby-Smith's manipulation of the East Tennessee situation and hunt for individual glory beyond Cumberland Gap, I feel pretty strongly that the so-called Kentucky campaign from Tupelo to Munfordville was Bragg's finest performance of the War, strategically and logistically. If it was his object to prevent a "descent into Georgia", much like Lee sought to prevent another investment of Richmond, both of which were fatal to the Confederacy, he succeeded entirely.

 

[raharris1973]

Alternatively, if Grant was committed to a Siege of Mobile, then he could strike Atlanta along the Atlanta and West Point.

Was this a rail line?

Come to think of it, a campaign for Mobile is perhaps the best way to point a dagger at Atlanta (along with the industrial cities of Selma and Columbia) much faster than OTL, but without a set of PODs to free up manpower, it's unlikely that much will come of it.

Why so? Was mobile especially well connected by rail with Selma, Atlanta, and Columbia?

Where could sufficient manpower have come from? I've heard a proposed Mobile landing op was postponed in 1863 I think to do a landing on the Texas coast to show a tough posture against the French in Mexico. That enough to get it done? If not, maybe do a little less on the Carolina coast and Wilmington? I doubt the Union would lose much by it, and could still blockade.

or even at Fredericksburg

Was Fredericksburg '63 rather than '62?

Does the POD have to come in the Western Theater itself?

Not necessarilly, though I did like the idea.

if the Confederates suffer a serious defeat in Virginia in 1862, then they will likely have to pull a significant number of troops from the west to try and restore their position in Virginia which should enable the Union to advance much faster in the west.

If this happened, would Lee (especially having built up less of a legend) and Davis have the clout to get relevant State Governors and commanders in other sections of the CSA to release significant numbers of troops for reinforcing Virginia? And could the troops from CSA western front(s) arrive in a timely enough manner to make a positive difference holding CSA lines within Virginia?

The western theater came awful close to completely spiraling out of control for the Confederates in 1862. Places that ended up being hardfought in following 18 months like Vicksburg and Chattanoga could easily have fallen in late spring.

That suggests a serious chance of earlier bisection and penetration of the CSA heartland in the western theaters.

I guess my favorite would be if Chattanooga led the way, rather than Vicksburg, like here:

Buell's operations eastward along the line of the Memphis and Charleston toward Chattanooga in June-July 1862.

1. 1862 Kentucky Campaign aborted: Although the campaign has often been pronounced as a magnificent failure for the Confederates, Bragg had accomplished a lot (although his conduct and boldness definitely faltered by the middle phase of the campaign). Bragg had revived the Army of Tennessee from its stupor at its diseased camps in Tupelo, disrupted the Federal push into Chattanooga and recaptured a good portion of Middle Tennessee. Earl J Hess once echoed Grant's argument that Buell could have thrust into Chattanooga during June-July, detaching three divisions to guard the supply lines as the Confederate garrison there were still badly outnumbered and concentrated at Knoxville.

 

[SWS]

From Basil Duke:

This campaign [Kentucky] demonstrated conclusively the immense importance to the Confederacy of the possession of East Tennessee, and the strategic advantage (especially for offenso-defensive operations) which that vast natural fortress afforded us. While that region was firmly in the Confederate grasp, one half of the South was safe, and the conquests of the Federal armies of the rest were insecure. It is apparent at a glance that so long as we held it, communication between the armies of Northern Virginia and of Tennessee would be rapid and direct; co-operation, therefore, between them would be secure whenever necessary. While these two armies could thus practically be handled almost as if they were one and the same, communication between the Federal army of the Potomac and that of the Ohio was circuitous, dilatory, and public. No advance of the enemy through Tennessee into Georgia or Alabama could permanently endanger the integrity of the Confederate territory, while the flank and rear of his army was constantly exposed to sudden attack by formidable forces poured upon it from this citadel of the Confederacy.

 

[SWS]

Was this a rail line?

Yes. "The road was chartered in 1847; construction began in 1849 and was completed in 1854. This very important road fed Atlanta from the fertile southwest and was the most direct route from the Selma foundry and government works."

Why so? Was mobile especially well connected by rail with Selma, Atlanta, and Columbia?

Not just by rail. From Richard Taylor: "Mobile had excellent communications with the interior. The Alabama, Tombigby [sic], and Black Warrior Rivers afforded steam navigation to central Alabama and eastern Mississippi, while the Mobile and Ohio Railway reached the northern limit of the latter State. Supplies from the fertile "cane-brake" region of Alabama and the prairies of eastern Mississippi were abundant."

This affords some idea of the "backdoor" route to Atlanta. The Mobile and Great Northern was completed in November 1861, and the Selma and Meridian one year later.

Finishing the Selma-Montgomery connection and the rail-bridge at Demopolis seems necessary to me in order to render it a feasible campaign, particularly if Grant is operating from the Vicksburg-Jackson-Meridian line. From Meridian he can menace and strike either Mobile or Selma, if he can overcome the bluffs at Demopolis first.

 

[bguy]

Was Fredericksburg '63 rather than '62?

Fredericksburg started on December 11, 1862. However, Burnside's army reached the Rappahannock on November 19, so if the pontoons had been there when they were supposed to be the campaign would have started almost a month earlier.

If this happened, would Lee (especially having built up less of a legend) and Davis have the clout to get relevant State Governors and commanders in other sections of the CSA to release significant numbers of troops for reinforcing Virginia?

I would think so just because Virginia is so incredibly important to the Confederates. It's their most populous and industrialized state, a major food source, and has the Tredegar Iron Works (which produced something like half the artillery used by the Confederate Army.) For the Confederates to lose Virginia is to lose the war.

(And of course if the Confederates don't reinforce Virginia then that frees up tens of thousands of veteran Union troops from the Army of the Potomoc and the other eastern Union armies to be sent west.)

And could the troops from CSA western front(s) arrive in a timely enough manner to make a positive difference holding CSA lines within Virginia?

Hmmm. That probably depends on which major Union victory in the east scenario we are using.

A decisive Union victory in the Peninsula Campaign: probably not. McClellan is right next to Richmond, so it will fall long before any Confederate western troops can arrive.

A decisive Union victory at Antietam: probably. The victorious Army of the Potomoc is up in Maryland and will be pretty worn out even in victory, and McClellan being McClellan, it's not likely that he will be a hurry to resume the offensive anyway (and he'll have a lot more political cover to resist Lincoln demanding that he move with speed ITTL after winning such a crushing victory), so the Confederates should have time to rush reinforcements to Virginia.

A decisive Union victory after Burnside crosses the Rappahannock: Probably. I think the best case scenario for the Union in a "the pontoons arrive on time at Fredricksburg" scenario is that Burnside successfully steals a march on Lee by crossing the Rappahannock before Lee has any meaningful forces at Fredericksburg, then advances to Hanover Junction and smashes Longstreet's corps there before it gets reinforced by Jackson. That's probably the most that Burnside can realistically hope to accomplish given how late in the campaign season it is, and he'll have to resume the drive on Richmond in the spring of 1863, so the Confederates should have time to rush reinforcements eastward.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Where could sufficient manpower have come from? I've heard a proposed Mobile landing op was postponed in 1863 I think to do a landing on the Texas coast to show a tough posture against the French in Mexico. That enough to get it done? If not, maybe do a little less on the Carolina coast and Wilmington? I doubt the Union would lose much by it, and could still blockade.

As @SWS explained very well the logistics of a campaign in Alabama to Atlanta, I'll focus on addressing the manpower point. The manpower requirements of a thrust to Atlanta from Mobile grows exponentially with each step to Atlanta. The first phase is the least manpower intensive: closing Mobile Bay. This entails the destruction of the defending Confederate fleet and the seizure of Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell. Historically, this required Farragut's 17 men-of-war and one reinforced brigade to accomplish within a month. Accomplishing this diminishes the value of the city's port, but the city's rail network and river communications along with its intrinsic resources retains strategic value worthy of being the target of a major operation.

The second phase is the Siege of Mobile. Historically, E.R.S. Canby led 45,000 men to besiege the 8,000 strong garrison in 1865, but the number of defenders fluctuated greatly. Reading Paul Brueske's "The Last Siege: The Mobile Campaign, Alabama 1865", Mobile was pretty consistently defended by 4,500 troops, but there will likely be reinforcements to Mobile, to the detriment of the Armies of Northern Virginia and Tennessee. Historically, in 1865, General Maury (the defending general) received 1,500 surplus artillerymen and four brigades from the Army of Tennessee [Confederate], amounting to an aggregate ~3,500 men. Moreover, when Vicksburg fell, there was an Army of Mississippi (made up mostly of the Army of Relief that failed to relieve Vicksburg). This amounted to about 30,000 men, assigned to defend the Mississippi interior. Again, this was a detriment to the Confederate cause as it sapped away about 1 cavalry division and 2 infantry divisions from Bragg's army [Confederate] (9,500 veteran infantry and 3,019 cavalrymen) as well as sucking in manpower from the coastal garrison, depleting reserves. These forces were gradually shifted back to the Army of Tennessee [Confederate] and made Polk's Corps [Confederate] during the Atlanta Campaign.

Thus, there is a need for a proper buildup in strength before Mobile can be attacked, especially since the city was surrounded by triple barricades and entrenchments to the west and the south, with only two weak points. First, there was only a single line of entrenchments to the north of Mobile, but this direction was meant an extremely difficult operational maneuver for the Federals as its rear would be vulnerable to Confederate attack from the Selma-Montgomery axis. Second, if Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely can be seized, the western defense of Mobile would be badly compromised if the Confederates cannot bring substantial reinforcements to cover the breach.

For forces to deploy for this task, I'm assuming the Army of the Tennessee [Union], Army of the Cumberland [Union] and Army of the Gulf [Union] have been established. The most obvious source is the Army of the Gulf, but their manpower is limited: it must defend Louisiana from the threat of Richard Taylor's army. IOTL, Taylor came dangerously close to capturing New Orleans during the Port Hudson campaign. Banks did wish to do it, but was also restrained by demands to attack Texas. Failing that, we could use the X Corps [Union], but that has about 12-15,000 men (I have yet to determine how many are garrison units). X Corps gets us the manpower to start the closure of Mobile Bay but is far from the manpower needed to besiege Mobile. The Army of the Tennessee [Union] is probably the best force to do it and could approach it from two routes: an overland route (which would involve a lot of foraging over some of the South's best breadbaskets) or landing near the beaches of the captured forts.

The main downside of continuing from Mobile to Atlanta is the manpower needed to garrison Alabama, which, if history is any indicator, might have required something close to an infantry corps to accomplish.

Nevertheless, if we combine a good Shiloh victory, no Kentucky Campaign, early 1862 Vicksburg win and a threat to Mobile, the Confederate forces in the West would be stretched very thin between defending Alabama and Georgia.

 

[raharris1973]

As @SWS explained very well the logistics of a campaign in Alabama to Atlanta, I'll focus on addressing the manpower point. The manpower requirements of a thrust to Atlanta from Mobile grows exponentially with each step to Atlanta. The first phase is the least manpower intensive: closing Mobile Bay. This entails the destruction of the defending Confederate fleet and the seizure of Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell. Historically, this required Farragut's 17 men-of-war and one reinforced brigade to accomplish within a month. Accomplishing this diminishes the value of the city's port, but the city's rail network and river communications along with its intrinsic resources retains strategic value worthy of being the target of a major operation.

The second phase is the Siege of Mobile. Historically, E.R.S. Canby led 45,000 men to besiege the 8,000 strong garrison in 1865, but the number of defenders fluctuated greatly. Reading Paul Brueske's "The Last Siege: The Mobile Campaign, Alabama 1865", Mobile was pretty consistently defended by 4,500 troops, but there will likely be reinforcements to Mobile, to the detriment of the Armies of Northern Virginia and Tennessee. Historically, in 1865, General Maury (the defending general) received 1,500 surplus artillerymen and four brigades from the Army of Tennessee, amounting to an aggregate ~3,500 men. Moreover, when Vicksburg fell, there was an Army of Mississippi (made up mostly of the Army of Relief that failed to relieve Vicksburg). This amounted to about 30,000 men, assigned to defend the Mississippi interior. Again, this was a detriment to the Confederate cause as it sapped away about 1 cavalry division and 2 infantry divisions from Bragg's army (9,500 veteran infantry and 3,019 cavalrymen) as well as sucking in manpower from the coastal garrison, depleting reserves. These forces were gradually shifted back to the Army of Tennessee and made Polk's Corps during the Atlanta Campaign.

Thus, there is a need for a proper buildup in strength before Mobile can be attacked, especially since the city was surrounded by triple barricades and entrenchments to the west and the south, with only two weak points. First, there was only a single line of entrenchments to the north of Mobile, but this direction was meant an extremely difficult operational maneuver for the Federals as its rear would be vulnerable to Confederate attack from the Selma-Montgomery axis. Second, if Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely can be seized, the western defense of Mobile would be badly compromised if the Confederates cannot bring substantial reinforcements to cover the breach.

For forces to deploy for this task, I'm assuming the Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Cumberland and Army of the Gulf have been established. The most obvious source is the Army of the Gulf, but their manpower is limited: it must defend Louisiana from the threat of Richard Taylor's army. IOTL, Taylor came dangerously close to capturing New Orleans during the Port Hudson campaign. Banks did wish to do it, but was also restrained by demands to attack Texas. Failing that, we could use the X Corps, but that has about 12-15,000 men (I have yet to determine how many are garrison units). X Corps gets us the manpower to start the closure of Mobile Bay but is far from the manpower needed to besiege Mobile. The Army of the Tennessee is probably the best force to do it and could approach it from two routes: an overland route (which would involve a lot of foraging over some of the South's best breadbaskets) or landing near the beaches of the captured forts.

The main downside of continuing from Mobile to Atlanta is the manpower needed to garrison Alabama, which, if history is any indicator, might have required something close to an infantry corps to accomplish.

Nevertheless, if we combine a good Shiloh victory, no Kentucky Campaign, early 1862 Vicksburg win and a threat to Mobile, the Confederate forces in the West would be stretched very thin between defending Alabama and Georgia.

Thanks for the thorough response. Could you do me a favor, and make some edits to your post, after some of the places where you name Armies and units threatening places could you label which side they are on in bolded brackets [Union], [Confederate], so I can keep it straight and not be confused, I lose the narrative in a couple places. Thanks.

A decisive Union victory in the Peninsula Campaign: probably not. McClellan is right next to Richmond, so it will fall long before any Confederate western troops can arrive.

It would be really interesting to see a decisive victory in the Peninsula Campaign, Richmond falling long before any western Confederate troops arrive, then the sequel operations of relieving Confederate forces turning into the CSA forward defense forces of North Carolina-Southwest Virginia-East Tennessee clashing with Union forces onward marching from Richmond, while the Union presses on other fronts down the Mississippi and toward the Tennessee river.

It would be interesting to see how the dynamics of campaigns on both sides play out, attempts or offers at diplomacy or negotiation, the internal politics of each side, and final terms of capitulation and occupation.

Peninsula campaign was first half of 1862, right?

It is hard to get past the threshold of suspending disbelief of McClellan attacking with the persistence, speed, and alacrity to crush CSA forces and forcing CSA abandonment of a defenseless Richmond, however. How could a win be had plausibly in the campaign? Could McClellan be eliminated by a bullet or a horse or artillery accident, or dismissal, and be replaced by someone who would actually proceed without interruption and do better? Or would any change of command cause a suspension of campaigning. Could the Confederates botch their operations so bad McClellan can't throw away the chance to win?

 

[Geekhis Khan]

Truly wacky idea: Sherman follows through with his planned Late September 1861 invasion of East Tennessee! The one that the East TN Bridge Burning Conspiracy was supposed to support.

East Tennessee bridge burnings - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

He had IIRC about 8,000 under George H. Thomas set to invade and another 5,500 under Bull Nelson launching the Big Sandy Expedition capable of reinforcement against Zollicoffer's 5,000, many of whom lacked proper field arms, with 10,000 under Bragg in Pensacola and about 2000 under Floyd in Southwest Virginia hypothetically able to reinforce.

Supply lines will be tenuous for the Yanks (Cumberland Gap) and great for the Rebs (railroads), but the locals are Union friendly. Yanks could rely on a flood of East TN recruits to join them, possibly a few regiments of irregulars.

Assuming the Yanks roll straight 6s and the Rebs straight 1s you could have Knoxville securely in Union hands by Christmas and move on Chattanooga, possibly in pincer with Ormsby Mitchel if Buell cooperates, in the Spring of '62.

Even if the campaign fails, you're diverting forces from the Shiloh Campaign.

 

[raharris1973]

Truly wacky idea: Sherman follows through with his planned Late September 1861 invasion of East Tennessee! The one that the East TN Bridge Burning Conspiracy was supposed to support.

East Tennessee bridge burnings - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

He had IIRC about 8,000 under George H. Thomas set to invade and another 5,500 under Bull Nelson launching the Big Sandy Expedition capable of reinforcement against Zollicoffer's 5,000, many of whom lacked proper field arms, with 10,000 under Bragg in Pensacola and about 2000 under Floyd in Southwest Virginia hypothetically able to reinforce.

Supply lines will be tenuous for the Yanks (Cumberland Gap) and great for the Rebs (railroads), but the locals are Union friendly. Yanks could rely on a flood of East TN recruits to join them, possibly a few regiments of irregulars.

Assuming the Yanks roll straight 6s and the Rebs straight 1s you could have Knoxville securely in Union hands by Christmas and move on Chattanooga, possibly in pincer with Ormsby Mitchel if Buell cooperates, in the Spring of '62.

Even if the campaign fails, you're diverting forces from the Shiloh Campaign.

Maybe have East Tennessee, Western North Carolina, southwest Virginia counties join the West Virginia ones in the convention creating a new states that ain't just West Virginia, but Appalachia?

 

[Geekhis Khan]

Maybe have East Tennessee, Western North Carolina, southwest Virginia counties join the West Virginia ones in the convention creating a new states that ain't just West Virginia, but Appalachia?

East TN actually tried to secede and form its own State, but the temptation would be for them to just absorb the rest of TN as Middle and West TN fall to the Union into a "Restored State of TN". Maybe if an Alt Heartland Campaign retakes Nashville or something while ETN holds you get the impetus for a State of Franklin/Frankland, and perhaps some West NC counties sign on. SWVA is a harder sell as the region was less pro-Union than NWVA (thanks to the Virginia and Tennessee Railway), but OTL the US didn't make much distinction between "Pro-Union County" and "Pro-Confederate County" when they formed WV. Essentially the counties of WV align to where the front lines were in 1863 when it was founded and many Pro-Reb counties (e.g. Pocahontas and Greenbriar) were pulled into WV at bayonet point. So depending on circumstances a "Greater Franklin" and/or "Greater WV" is definitely possible.

 

[raharris1973]

East TN actually tried to secede and form its own State, but the temptation would be for them to just absorb the rest of TN as Middle and West TN fall to the Union into a "Restored State of TN". Maybe if an Alt Heartland Campaign retakes Nashville or something while ETN holds you get the impetus for a State of Franklin/Frankland, and perhaps some West NC counties sign on. SWVA is a harder sell as the region was less pro-Union than NWVA (thanks to the Virginia and Tennessee Railway), but OTL the US didn't make much distinction between "Pro-Union County" and "Pro-Confederate County" when they formed WV. Essentially the counties of WV align to where the front lines were in 1863 when it was founded and many Pro-Reb counties (e.g. Pocahontas and Greenbriar) were pulled into WV at bayonet point. So depending on circumstances a "Greater Franklin" and/or "Greater WV" is definitely possible.

I was wondering if "one big mountain state" would be preferable, because even though two new mountain states could be singled out for creation for being composed of mostly Union loyal elements, two new states would start to dilute the sectional strength of the north and west.

 

[bguy]

Peninsula campaign was first half of 1862, right?

Correct.

It is hard to get past the threshold of suspending disbelief of McClellan attacking with the persistence, speed, and alacrity to crush CSA forces and forcing CSA abandonment of a defenseless Richmond, however. How could a win be had plausibly in the campaign? Could McClellan be eliminated by a bullet or a horse or artillery accident, or dismissal, and be replaced by someone who would actually proceed without interruption and do better?

Stephen Sears suggests in his book, "Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac" that McClellan could have won a smashing defensive victory at Gaines's Mill that would have left Richmond in his grasp, if he had just refrained from countermanding his own order to send Slocum's division to reinforce Porter's V Corps. That wouldn't even require McClellan to take the offensive. Lee was attacking him when he was on favorable defensive ground. All McClellan had to do was not rethink an order he had already issued.

 

[Arnold d.c]

In regards to the early Eastern Theater victories, my opinions are as follows:
1. To me, the most direct benefit to Western Theater lies in draining the Confederacy's reserve pool of coastal units. IOTL, there were considerable reinforcements that were entrained to the Western Theater. Of the top of my head, I can think of Bragg's Pensacola units that joined up for Shiloh, various regiments from coastal states during the Siege of Corinth and a total of 6,886 men from three South Carolina garrison brigades (S.R. Gist, W.H.T. Walker and N.G. Evans) reinforced Joseph Johnston's Army of Relief in 1863.

2. Transfer of units from the Army of Tennessee [Confederate] and Army of Northern Virginia [Confederate] is plausible, especially if the loss of Richmond is fresh. I am more skeptical of a transfer of Confederate regiments from the west to the east in a less dire situation, including a bad defeat. Not even the heavy losses of the Overland Campaign and the Siege of Petersburg induced the Confederates to transfer units from the west to the east amidst the Atlanta Campaign. If Richmond is lost during the Peninsula Campaign, I could imagine that there would no Kentucky Campaign as Confederate soldiers from the western armies are stripped away for a Richmond counterattack.

3. Transfer of units from Army of the Potomac [Union] to the Federal Western armies is quite unlikely, even if there is greater success in the east. Prior to the Siege of Chattanooga, corps-level transfers were incredibly rare. The ones I can think of are the redeployment of IX Corps from Kentucky to Vicksburg to aid Grant's siege of Vicksburg and Grant's transfer of XIII Corps to the Army of the Gulf [Union] after the siege was over. After Chattanooga, large chunks of the Army of the Gulf was transferred to the Shenandoah Valley for Sheridan's Campaign and for the Mobile Campaign. In all cases, large troop transfers were prompted by a crisis of some sort. There were a few Federal regiments that transferred from east to west, including the regiments that surrendered at Harpers' Ferry. At Champion Hill, those men were urged to charge with the taunt, "Go in, Harper's Ferry cowards!"

 

[Geekhis Khan]

I was wondering if "one big mountain state" would be preferable, because even though two new mountain states could be singled out for creation for being composed of mostly Union loyal elements, two new states would start to dilute the sectional strength of the north and west.

It could honestly go either way, though I'm leaning towards Two States for a few reasons:

1. Political. SWVA and NETN were Democratic, though very Whiggish Dems (Floyd was a major advocate for railroads) and VA Whigs were largely powerless so there were plenty of DINOs like Floyd that might have gone Whig in another state. Putting a dividing line between WV and Franklin either at Bristol or even Wytheville would further dilute this, meaning two solid Republican States and four Republican Senators.
2. Geographic. There's the Holston/Tennessee River Valley and the Kanawha/New River Valley, Knoxville-centered and Charles Town-centered. One was liberated via Ohio, the other via Kentucky, by different armies, with different provisional governments. One is tied to Richmond and Atlanta via rail and to other to the Ohio River. One will have a coal-based economy, the other based on metal mining and goods shipping and industry. This means that the two regions will likely diverge economically.
3. Cultural. Though both a part of the larger Appalachian Culture, there are distinct regional cultures and histories.

Now, a Charlestown to Knoxville rail connection (hard to build) could mitigate these, but if I'm Lincoln I'd rather have two solid Republican States than one and there's a host of justifications. And while small by "southern" standards, both states are far bigger than most New England states.

That said, a Greater Franklin (one state) is certainly a possibility.

All McClellan had to do was not rethink an order he had already issued.

ASB

Joking aside, Mac certainly had plenty of opportunities to do better on the Peninsula. Perhaps some sharp-eyed picket sees through Magruder's theater ("I swear, that's the third time I've seen that same Reb march by!") or Mac is away in DC and a Corps Commander takes initiative earlier, you could have Yorktown fall quickly, the AoP advance up to Williamsburg much sooner, and have an intact AoP reach the outskirts of Richmond before JJ can bring the bulk of the ANV to bear, perhaps while Jackson is still in the valley, or alternately Jackson has to leave the valley earlier and McD can advance on Richmond on schedule. Assuming a Union victory at an alt-Seven Pines you could have Richmond under siege by the summer of '62.

 

[bguy]

3. Transfer of units from Army of the Potomac [Union] to the Federal Western armies is quite unlikely, even if there is greater success in the east. Prior to the Siege of Chattanooga, corps-level transfers were incredibly rare. The ones I can think of are the redeployment of IX Corps from Kentucky to Vicksburg to aid Grant's siege of Vicksburg and Grant's transfer of XIII Corps to the Army of the Gulf [Union] after the siege was over. After Chattanooga, large chunks of the Army of the Gulf was transferred to the Shenandoah Valley for Sheridan's Campaign and for the Mobile Campaign. In all cases, large troop transfers were prompted by a crisis of some sort. There were a few Federal regiments that transferred from east to west, including the regiments that surrendered at Harpers' Ferry. At Champion Hill, those men were urged to charge with the taunt, "Go in, Harper's Ferry cowards!"

Surely though the reason IOTL that it was relatively rare to see troops from the Army of the Potomac sent west was because the Army of Northern Virginia was still intact and Richmond was still in Confederate hands until the very end of the war and thus those Union troops were still needed in the east. In a timeline where the Union takes Richmond and smashes the AoNV in 1862 though the situation is very different. There will be much less need for Union troops in the east in such a timeline, so why wouldn't Lincoln start sending troops from the Army of the Potomac to the western theater?