AHC: A 1943 Carrier Battle
- Thread starter Tom_B
- Start date
A scenario where the Japanese win at Midway, but the island invasion is repulsed, likely no American counterattack at Guadacanal in August, but Japanese get conservative themselves.
American start their pushback late 1943 at Gilbert's, or Aleutian Islands, or Guadacanal, with the new Essex class carriers and Japanese commit their largely intact carrier force, plus surviving light carriers and land based air, thinking they have a good chance at a decisive battle victory, but are absolutely destroyed by the Americans with their Hellcats, radars, etc...
American start their pushback late 1943 at Gilbert's, or Aleutian Islands, or Guadacanal, with the new Essex class carriers and Japanese commit their largely intact carrier force, plus surviving light carriers and land based air, thinking they have a good chance at a decisive battle victory, but are absolutely destroyed by the Americans with their Hellcats, radars, etc...
Last edited:
For something closer to OTL...
In September and October 1943 the Combined Fleet sortied from Eniwetok in response to American carrier raids on outlying islands in Japan's defense perimeter. Both times the carrier force consisted of Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Zuiho, in accompaniment with a strong screen - battleships YAMATO and NAGATO and cruisers TAKAO, ATAGO, MYOKO, HAGURO and destroyer screen in September; battleships YAMATO, MUSASHI, FUSO, NAGATO, KONGO, HARUNA; cruisers TAKAO, ATAGO, MAYA, CHOKAI, MOGAMI, SUZUYA, TONE, CHIKUMA, AGANO, OYODO and destroyer screen in October.
Opposing the Japanese in September would've been fleet carrier Lexington; light carriers Princeton and Belleau Wood; light cruisers Santa Fe, Birmingham, and Mobile; and ten destroyers . Opposing them in October would've been a much more formidable carrier force consisting of fleet carriers Essex, Lexington, and Yorktown; light carriers Independence, Cowpens, and Belleau Wood; heavy cruisers New Orleans and San Francisco; light cruisers Birmingham, Nashville, Santa Fe, and Mobile; and 21 destroyers.
The first sortie in September is easier to mash into a carrier battle; the two islands were closer to Eniwetok than wake and Japanese response was faster. Happily, it means a more even force - even carrier numbers, near-even plane counts. The problem is that even the swift Japanese response was to slow, given they only learned of the raid on the night of the 18th when the islands were bombed and by the next evening the Americans were gone.
In September and October 1943 the Combined Fleet sortied from Eniwetok in response to American carrier raids on outlying islands in Japan's defense perimeter. Both times the carrier force consisted of Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Zuiho, in accompaniment with a strong screen - battleships YAMATO and NAGATO and cruisers TAKAO, ATAGO, MYOKO, HAGURO and destroyer screen in September; battleships YAMATO, MUSASHI, FUSO, NAGATO, KONGO, HARUNA; cruisers TAKAO, ATAGO, MAYA, CHOKAI, MOGAMI, SUZUYA, TONE, CHIKUMA, AGANO, OYODO and destroyer screen in October.
Opposing the Japanese in September would've been fleet carrier Lexington; light carriers Princeton and Belleau Wood; light cruisers Santa Fe, Birmingham, and Mobile; and ten destroyers . Opposing them in October would've been a much more formidable carrier force consisting of fleet carriers Essex, Lexington, and Yorktown; light carriers Independence, Cowpens, and Belleau Wood; heavy cruisers New Orleans and San Francisco; light cruisers Birmingham, Nashville, Santa Fe, and Mobile; and 21 destroyers.
The first sortie in September is easier to mash into a carrier battle; the two islands were closer to Eniwetok than wake and Japanese response was faster. Happily, it means a more even force - even carrier numbers, near-even plane counts. The problem is that even the swift Japanese response was to slow, given they only learned of the raid on the night of the 18th when the islands were bombed and by the next evening the Americans were gone.
Another possibility is a clash during Operation KE, the evacuation of Guadalcanal. The Japanese had Zuikaku, Zuiho, and Junyo on hand to potentially opposed Enterprise and Saratoga; this one seems to have been avoided mostly by the Americans having little idea of what KE was supposed to be and thus feeling no urgency to interdict it.
Most of the evacuated troops were deemed 'useless for further operations' so in hindsight the Americans were not missing very much. Furthermore I don't think it's likely the Japanese would have sortied any of those three in support of KE. On the whole, the Japanese were nowhere as bold to commit their resources as the Americans were, even if they possessed quantitative or qualitative superiority.
In order to have a carrier battle in 1943 (i'm mostly looking at November-December, though CV12Hornet has some good ideas too) the japanese must grit their teeth and must NOT send the carrier airgroups in the Solomons (where they were destroyed), don't send Cardiv2 (Junyo, Hiyo-torpedoed in June- and Ryuho) planes in July (69 Zero, 36 D3A, 26 B5N) and don't do RO-GO in November (82 Zero, 45 D3A, 40 B5N, 6 D4Y from Shokaku, Zuikaku and Zuiho). You have 300 planes ready to do battle with the USN, still having some good pilots among them. It's a formidable force.
And as i'm a sucker for an ATL Midway in which some KB carriers survive (suggested above already), if we add say Akagi and Hiryu (likely another 120 plus planes, say about 36 D3A, 32 B5N and 3 D4Y, and about 56 Zeros), you have 420 plus planes.
If they manage to conserve these, they could likely challenge Pownall's TF50 during the Gilbert-Marshall operations. Now as i understand it Pownall was not the best of commanders, and TF50 seems to have operated in separate groups, inviting defeat in detail (i would however much welcome more info as to how exactly TF50 operated at this time, especially the distances between the various TGs) . In fact it seems the way it operated was not unlike Spruance's TF58 at Marianas (tied to the landing area). They sent only 6 carriers to attack the Marshalls in early December, which to me looks like a golden opportunity for Ozawa to attack and overwhelm. What's more, during these operations Pownall had Independence and Lexington pranged by Goro Nonaka's G4Ms in dusk/night attacks, so TF50 defences were far from flawless.
You can cite the example of the 11th of November japanese attack against the 3 US carriers that was repulsed with no damage, BUT there were very few attack planes, only 27 D3A and 14 B5N. In this ATL carrier battle there will be HUNDREDS of them, in fact i see Ozawa operating pretty much as he did at Marianas, staying 300-350 miles away from Pownall and hurling strikes at him.
And as i'm a sucker for an ATL Midway in which some KB carriers survive (suggested above already), if we add say Akagi and Hiryu (likely another 120 plus planes, say about 36 D3A, 32 B5N and 3 D4Y, and about 56 Zeros), you have 420 plus planes.
If they manage to conserve these, they could likely challenge Pownall's TF50 during the Gilbert-Marshall operations. Now as i understand it Pownall was not the best of commanders, and TF50 seems to have operated in separate groups, inviting defeat in detail (i would however much welcome more info as to how exactly TF50 operated at this time, especially the distances between the various TGs) . In fact it seems the way it operated was not unlike Spruance's TF58 at Marianas (tied to the landing area). They sent only 6 carriers to attack the Marshalls in early December, which to me looks like a golden opportunity for Ozawa to attack and overwhelm. What's more, during these operations Pownall had Independence and Lexington pranged by Goro Nonaka's G4Ms in dusk/night attacks, so TF50 defences were far from flawless.
You can cite the example of the 11th of November japanese attack against the 3 US carriers that was repulsed with no damage, BUT there were very few attack planes, only 27 D3A and 14 B5N. In this ATL carrier battle there will be HUNDREDS of them, in fact i see Ozawa operating pretty much as he did at Marianas, staying 300-350 miles away from Pownall and hurling strikes at him.
Last edited:
Some good possibilities. If the japanese conserve their airgroups as i suggest above, then a September battle could pitch 5 japanese vs 3 US carriers. If we have some Midway carriers too, that's 7 vs 3! In October it would be 5 vs 6 or 7 vs 6. All in all far better odds for Ozawa than at the Marianas. Not to mention probable support from land based planes that could be shuttled to Wake or Tarawa. Fascinating to ponder the US actually losing /having crippled most of their brand new carriers, sure they have a lot more in the pipeline but it will be a while to rebuild the numbers.
Last edited:
THIS!
The US turned the Solomons into a meat-grinder for Japanese air, and the navy fed their carrier groups into it.
In his The Jolly Rogers VF-17 book, Tom Blackburn makes the point that the US was bombing Rabaul with B-24s mostly to lure the Japanese fighters into combat with the bombers' escorts.
Agreed as well on @CV12Hornet having good scenarios as well!
Regards,
-Allies decide to begin Italian campaign with invasion of Sardinia, July 1943
-Additional time for Italy to (barely) complete CV Aquila in early fall 1943
-Allied invasion of Sicily takes place November 1943.
-Recognizing risk of losing Sicily and despite fuel shortages and Allied airpower, the Regia Marina is ordered to sortie in an effort to disrupt the Sicily landings.
-Aquila sorties in company of six battleships and their screening elements, charged with using her 38 available RE.2001 to protect the battleline from Allied airpower.
-Initially detected and attacked by allied land-based aircraft, Aquila's air group shoots down several attackers and suffers some operational losses herself, while two of the battleships suffer non-fatal damage.
-British carriers Indomitable and Formidable, supporting six battleships, launch strikes with the intention of picking off Aquila and depriving the Italian battleline of its close air support.
-Seafires and Martlets tangle with the RE.2001 CAP while Albacores come in low and slow to launch torpedoes.
-Despite losses to heavy Italian AA and the CAP, Indomitable's Albacores score two hits on Aquila.
-Seriously damaged, Aquila falls behind the Italian battleline and ceases to be a priority target for Allied airpower.
-As the surviving Italian battleline meets its British foes off Cape Murro di Porco, Aquila and two destroyers withdraw toward Taranto at fifteen knots.
-This brings her into sight of the Greek submarine Papanikolas, which dispatches her with a further two torpedoes and escapes while the Italian destroyers rescue survivors.
-Additional time for Italy to (barely) complete CV Aquila in early fall 1943
-Allied invasion of Sicily takes place November 1943.
-Recognizing risk of losing Sicily and despite fuel shortages and Allied airpower, the Regia Marina is ordered to sortie in an effort to disrupt the Sicily landings.
-Aquila sorties in company of six battleships and their screening elements, charged with using her 38 available RE.2001 to protect the battleline from Allied airpower.
-Initially detected and attacked by allied land-based aircraft, Aquila's air group shoots down several attackers and suffers some operational losses herself, while two of the battleships suffer non-fatal damage.
-British carriers Indomitable and Formidable, supporting six battleships, launch strikes with the intention of picking off Aquila and depriving the Italian battleline of its close air support.
-Seafires and Martlets tangle with the RE.2001 CAP while Albacores come in low and slow to launch torpedoes.
-Despite losses to heavy Italian AA and the CAP, Indomitable's Albacores score two hits on Aquila.
-Seriously damaged, Aquila falls behind the Italian battleline and ceases to be a priority target for Allied airpower.
-As the surviving Italian battleline meets its British foes off Cape Murro di Porco, Aquila and two destroyers withdraw toward Taranto at fifteen knots.
-This brings her into sight of the Greek submarine Papanikolas, which dispatches her with a further two torpedoes and escapes while the Italian destroyers rescue survivors.
Can i ask, is there a POD you have in mind for this scenario, either before Midway or after Midway or perhaps something else? Thanks.
@Tom_B
Another interesting possibility, although earlier in the year, is in July. The Allied landings on New Georgia (Solomons) were covered by Task Group 36.3 with USS Saratoga and HMS Victorious as the carrier component. The British carrier operated its own 3 squadrons of F-4F Wildcats (36 aircraft) and two US squadrons of another 24 F-4Fs. It was to act as the fighter direction controller for CAPs. Saratoga was the strike carrier, with its own Avenger squadrons and the 16 Avengers of an FAA squadron. Plus at least one fighter squadron as raid escort. The TG also had 3 Battleships (Indiana, North Carolina and Washington) plus a couple of cruisers and 8 destroyers.
OTL the Japanese Combined Fleet was in Home Waters, rebuilding its carriers’ air groups after losses in I-Go. But, had it still been at Truk, it could have sortied to support the Rabaul based cruiser/destroyer force that fought 3 actions during the campaign. Although a POD with fewer losses in I-Go would probably be required for this.
Happy to provide further details if this intrigues you.
Another interesting possibility, although earlier in the year, is in July. The Allied landings on New Georgia (Solomons) were covered by Task Group 36.3 with USS Saratoga and HMS Victorious as the carrier component. The British carrier operated its own 3 squadrons of F-4F Wildcats (36 aircraft) and two US squadrons of another 24 F-4Fs. It was to act as the fighter direction controller for CAPs. Saratoga was the strike carrier, with its own Avenger squadrons and the 16 Avengers of an FAA squadron. Plus at least one fighter squadron as raid escort. The TG also had 3 Battleships (Indiana, North Carolina and Washington) plus a couple of cruisers and 8 destroyers.
OTL the Japanese Combined Fleet was in Home Waters, rebuilding its carriers’ air groups after losses in I-Go. But, had it still been at Truk, it could have sortied to support the Rabaul based cruiser/destroyer force that fought 3 actions during the campaign. Although a POD with fewer losses in I-Go would probably be required for this.
Happy to provide further details if this intrigues you.
Mostly it is a broad curiosity I have had as IRL we go from the Battle of Santa Cruz a limited Japanese victory to the dumpster fire which is Philippine Sea with no genuine point of reference in between. Having said I have of late been curious about the Japanese committing carriers to the Salamaua-Lae invasion resulting in a Battle of Papua Gulf.
I’ll look into the state of the Combined Fleet with the POD and report back. Probably take a while though.
Here's a link to the Allied naval forces involved in "Operation Toenails" and their organisation. In addition to the ground forces there would also have been support from AIRSOLS aka the Cactus Air Force based on Guadalcanal.
The Japanese would have a surface action group at Rabaul and a sizeable air group also. Details when I find themn amidst my references book. And in this scenario the Combined Fleet would be at Truk and seek to intervene.
I'm afraid i can't see the link.
This is i believe when Cardiv2's planes i mentioned earlier were send to land bases to oppose the landings. So in this ATL they stay with the carriers. Recall that in May the japanese were planning operation KITA against the Attu landings, involving i believe at least 4 carriers, possibly more (i have to look it up). Shokaku and Zuikaku were part of it so their airgroups must have been ready. The carrier groups haven't suffered THAT many losses during I-GO, presumably some of the iirc 25 Zeros and 21 D3As listed as lost must have been from land bases.
Oops, sorry must have missed a step. I won't be home until very late but will try to repost it tomorrow.
I think up to five Japanese carriers could have been at Truk in July with no I-Go operation. And no diversion of Shokaku & Zuilkaku to the Aleutians. For I-Go around 160 planes came from CarDiv2 and 190 from the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul.
It would have been a rare opportunity for the IJN to fight a carrier battle with possibly superior numbers. Missed opportunity??
Looking forward to the info you have. Certainly Saratoga and Victorious would have faced steep odds. As to aircraft available for late June 1943 i have found the following:
Victorious 60 F4F + Martlets.
Saratoga 12 F4F, 36 SBD and 20 (USN) +15 (RN) TBF
Total 143
The above info is from here
www.armouredcarriers.com
This against likely Shokaku, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo, Ryuho (will need to re-count their aircraft, but it's a lot, something like 250 of them). The IJN would have better odds than at Santa Cruz.
Victorious 60 F4F + Martlets.
Saratoga 12 F4F, 36 SBD and 20 (USN) +15 (RN) TBF
Total 143
The above info is from here
Armoured Aircraft Carriers
The ship that never was: USS Robin HMS Victorious' sojourn in the USN, with USS Saratoga November 23, 1942, to September 26, 1943
www.armouredcarriers.com
This against likely Shokaku, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo, Ryuho (will need to re-count their aircraft, but it's a lot, something like 250 of them). The IJN would have better odds than at Santa Cruz.
Last edited: