A less ad hoc ABDA: British Empire offers guarentee to the Dutch East Indies in 1940

[HJ Tulp]

In our timeline ABDACOM (American-British-Dutch-Australia Command) was set up as a unified command of all Allied forces in South East Asia in an effort to jointly resist the Japanese offensive. Activated on 7 January 1942 it utterly failed in it's task of defending the Malay Barrier and was disbanded less than two months later. ABDACOM faced a myriad of problems but being only set up a month after the hostilities started (and only conceived a week or two before being activated) made a bad hand worse.

OTL starting up ABDACOM was not possible. The United States were neutral and it wasn't until december 1941 that this position started to change. Furthermore, while the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were certainly allies in the war against Germany, this did not mean that the British Empire and the Dutch East Indies were allies in Asia! The DEI government (which had/took quite some autonomy after the occupation of Holland) knew that it would be doomed in a one-on-one war against the Japanese and didn't want to antagonize them by anything but strict neutrality towards the British. For this reason there was barely any cooperation or coordination between the forces of Britain and Australia on one hand and the Dutch forces on the other. Australian forces destined for Ambon and Timor could only start moving after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During the campaigns in South East Asia it quickly became obvious that the Allied forces had not been exercising together. From signals to languages to SOPs the forces simply didn't match. A lot of those problems were being solved during the campaign but it was to little to late.

DEI neutrality was far from principled though. Money was raised to buy Spitfires for use in the Battle of Britain for example and the Governor-General made clear that he was perfectly willing to align the colony with the British Empire, provided the British Empire would do the same though. If the United Kingdom would guarantee the territorial integrity of the Dutch East Indies there was nothing standing in the way of a worldwide alliance. The British government balked at this though, as the Admiralty concluded it did not have the forces to guarantee that territorial integrity with more than words. The British Empire would only offer such a guarantee in concert with the US. Which refused to do so.

What if the British Empire did guarantee the DEI though? Would Japan use this as a Casus Belli to attack the British and Dutch colonies? If not, how much difference would a fully operational BDACOM make when the Japanese come knocking? At the very least the KNIL would be a bit better prepared as it's neutrality severely hampered it's efforts at buying arms in the United States. Besides that the Aussies and Dutch might have been able to work out an agreement on more equal footing with the British instead of being faced with a fait accompli by the Americans and British together as OTL. This in turn could have positive effects such as not having the naval recon units being combined with the other air units.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Is this going to be another one in a series of threads of mine that are either too cool or not coole enough for replies?

 

[McPherson]

In our timeline ABDACOM (American-British-Dutch-Australia Command) was set up as a unified command of all Allied forces in South East Asia in an effort to jointly resist the Japanese offensive. Activated on 7 January 1942 it utterly failed in it's task of defending the Malay Barrier and was disbanded less than two months later. ABDACOM faced a myriad of problems but being only set up a month after the hostilities started (and only conceived a week or two before being activated) made a bad hand worse.

OTL starting up ABDACOM was not possible. The United States were neutral and it wasn't until december 1941 that this position started to change. Furthermore, while the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were certainly allies in the war against Germany, this did not mean that the British Empire and the Dutch East Indies were allies in Asia! The DEI government (which had/took quite some autonomy after the occupation of Holland) knew that it would be doomed in a one-on-one war against the Japanese and didn't want to antagonize them by anything but strict neutrality towards the British. For this reason there was barely any cooperation or coordination between the forces of Britain and Australia on one hand and the Dutch forces on the other. Australian forces destined for Ambon and Timor could only start moving after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During the campaigns in South East Asia it quickly became obvious that the Allied forces had not been exercising together. From signals to languages to SOPs the forces simply didn't match. A lot of those problems were being solved during the campaign but it was to little to late.

DEI neutrality was far from principled though. Money was raised to buy Spitfires for use in the Battle of Britain for example and the Governor-General made clear that he was perfectly willing to align the colony with the British Empire, provided the British Empire would do the same though. If the United Kingdom would guarantee the territorial integrity of the Dutch East Indies there was nothing standing in the way of a worldwide alliance. The British government balked at this though, as the Admiralty concluded it did not have the forces to guarantee that territorial integrity with more than words. The British Empire would only offer such a guarantee in concert with the US. Which refused to do so.

What if the British Empire did guarantee the DEI though? Would Japan use this as a Casus Belli to attack the British and Dutch colonies? If not, how much difference would a fully operational BDACOM make when the Japanese come knocking? At the very least the KNIL would be a bit better prepared as it's neutrality severely hampered it's efforts at buying arms in the United States. Besides that the Aussies and Dutch might have been able to work out an agreement on more equal footing with the British instead of being faced with a fait accompli by the Americans and British together as OTL. This in turn could have positive effects such as not having the naval recon units being combined with the other air units.

Let me think on it.

The problem is mostly political and it involves conflicting self interests among three proximate empires faced by a common enemy. The British are overextended and they have severe problems that they have refused to address in region for a generation. The Netherlands East Indies have a long history of friction with the British and the French in region. The Americans as recent arrivals are still trying to figure things out as they both act as typical colonial imperialists, but also attempt the astonishing feat of decolonizing the Philippine Islands. (Although if it had gone the way Roosevelt had wanted, it would have been more of a Puerto Rico outcome in theory than the mess it RTL became.

I can write that I believe that without some massive changes in the British and American civil administration and military leadership in region, that British Eastern Command and the idiocy that is the MacArthur manure fest still takes ABDACOM down with it, as it did.)

There is a curious germ of an idea of having the Australian and Dutch NEI governments work closer together in the interregnum. It might be only a year in PoD time, but it could show an ATL alternative that offers hope. What could they do?

It has to be something serious enough that forces London to listen and get their act together. The Americans are not in it until the planes at Clark Field are in ruins. What can the NEI do about that one? Any ideas?

 

[raharris1973]

Would Japan use this as a Casus Belli to attack the British and Dutch colonies?

Yes - and that is immediate trouble Britain doesn't need.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Yes - and that is immediate trouble Britain doesn't need.

Will the Japanese attack be immediate though? An attack has to be prepared and that will take at least a few months. Besides that, isn't the strategic calculus the same for Japan? That means that the Philippines are still a threat they cannot ignore.

 

[raharris1973]

Will the Japanese attack be immediate though? An attack has to be prepared and that will take at least a few months. Besides that, isn't the strategic calculus the same for Japan? That means that the Philippines are still a threat they cannot ignore.

The Philippines are weak enough in 1940, even in early 1941, to be ignored at first. The US only has so many assets and crew to spread around at the time. If the islands are enveloped, it becomes a genuine question for the USA how many of its limited but growing stock of naval military assets it wants to stuff into a surrounded, isolated position, versus everywhere else.

....And if not ignored, the Philippines are weak enough at this time to be taken with a few months of preparation. That plan has long term problems of course, but short term it could look plausible to Tokyo.

 

[McPherson]

That means that the Philippines are still a threat they cannot ignore.

It was not. Took eventually about eight division equivalents, a whole surface action group, 300,000 tonnes of shipping (destroyed), one of Japan's two siege trains and six months to solve.

The Philippines are weak enough in 1940, even in early 1941, to be ignored at first. The US only has so many assets and crew to spread around at the time. If the islands are enveloped, it becomes a genuine question for the USA how many of its limited but growing stock of naval military assets it wants to stuff into a surrounded, isolated position, versus everywhere else.

....And if not ignored, the Philippines are weak enough at this time to be taken with a few months of preparation. That plan has long term problems of course, but short term it could look plausible to Tokyo.

See previous remark.

 

[HJ Tulp]

It was not. Took eventually about eight division equivalents, a whole surface action group, 300,000 tonnes of shipping (destroyed), one of Japan's two siege trains and six months to solve.

It was for the Japanese though. Which is what matters right?

 

[HJ Tulp]

The Philippines are weak enough in 1940, even in early 1941, to be ignored at first. The US only has so many assets and crew to spread around at the time. If the islands are enveloped, it becomes a genuine question for the USA how many of its limited but growing stock of naval military assets it wants to stuff into a surrounded, isolated position, versus everywhere else.

....And if not ignored, the Philippines are weak enough at this time to be taken with a few months of preparation. That plan has long term problems of course, but short term it could look plausible to Tokyo.

So if the British guarantee is made right after the Japanese move into French Indochina - for the moment ignoring that the British might have guaranteed FIC as well - in September 1940, when do you think that the Japanese push into the DEI would start?

Below are some excerpts that could be interesting for this discussion:

Until around June or July 1940, the Army Department of IGHQ had thought that Great
Britain and the Netherlands could basically be separately [dealt with]. Since about August,
it had started considering Britain and the Netherlands as inseparable [when dealing with
them], but the United States and Britain as still separable. However, by the end of 1940, it
18 Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War
had concluded that Britain, the United States and the Netherlands were inseparable.(17) The
reason was that the circumstances had changed: Britain had pulled itself together again and
a German landing on British soil had become unlikely; the United States had started its active
support for Britain, China and the Netherlands; moreover, in Singapore the [defense] conference
between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had [also] been held. The
Army Department, considering it imperative to avoid war with the United States, kept a very
close watch on the resumption of negotiations with the Dutch and on the [Japanese] mediation
between French Indochina and Thailand.(7, 17)

]
The findings of
Staff Officer Okamura’s investigations were in outline as follows17)
The military strength of Java is built around a core of two divisions, but with about two-thirds
of the force consisting of indigenous troops, they do not have much of a fighting spirit. Although
more and more pillbox positions are built in all areas of the Dutch East Indies, even those along
the Bandung stronghold front are perfunctory and of a typical standard type. The barbed-wire
entanglements that are being constructed are little more than a poor excuse. If it were possible
to land unexpectedly and carry out a surprise attack, we could probably force the surrender of
the whole Dutch East Indies Army on Java within a couple of days with only one of our brigades.
However, from the point of international good faith we cannot do this. [On the other hand,] if
we were to attack a militarily prepared Java, it would come down to an assault. In this case, we
would need to deploy two divisions. But once the landing is carried out successfully, Java could
be conquered in about one week because of its well-developed grid of good motorways.

but in the middle of August it made a comprehensive study of
these four areas together.(18) In this study, the assessment was made that if Japan were to settle
things in the southern area, both the Dutch and the British would put up resistance while
maintaining an inseparable relationship; the United States, however, would maintain a cautious
attitude in East Asia.(17, 18) Thus a plan was conceived which proposed the following: in
dealing with the southern area one army with two divisions as its core would deliver a surprise
attack on the Dutch East Indies, followed by an attack on Malaya by another army; if
the situation should require it, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya were to be attacked simultaneously;
when war against the United States was inevitable, again another army would attack
the Philippines; the sequence of the attacks on the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and the
Philippines was to be determined according to the contingency of a war against the United
States.(18)
As it was, the German air raids against Britain failed to show the desired results and gradually
Britain showed signs of recovery. In the meantime, while actively supporting Britain,
the United States showed a willingness to contain Japan. In the Navy Department of IGHQ
the view grew stronger that if [Japan] were to resort to military force in order to settle the
southern question, war against the United States would be inevitable because the United
States and Britain were inseparably tied together. Therefore, on 28 August the Navy Department
presented the Army Department with a memo about the interpretation of the Outline
of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation (as previously explained the
decision by the Liaison Conference [between the IGHQ and the Government] on 27 July to
“seize a favorable opportunity to settle the southern question”) and requested the Army Department
to take it into careful consideration. At the time, the Army Department had been
entirely preoccupied with the matter of stationing troops in northern French Indochina based
on the Outline, and did not have any attention to spare for the Dutch East Indies issue.(17, 18)

“As the German forces are expected to land on the British mainland
Chapter III / Operational Preparations Prior to the War 17
next spring,(10, 17) and we may assume that the United States and Britain can be separately
[dealt with], we need to take advantage of the favorable opportunity to settle the South
(Dutch East Indies and Malaya) in order to settle the China Incident.” Subsequently, the Army
Department laid down its course of preparing “an operation to first capture the Dutch East
Indies by a sudden attack with an army consisting of the 5th and the 48th Divisions as its
core, and then to capture Malaya with another army with four divisions as its core, including
the Imperial Guard Division and the 18th Division.” Accordingly, on 12 October, it issued
orders that the 5th Division assemble at Shanghai, and, on the 22d, that the Imperial Guard
Division assemble in Shantou [Swatow], the 18th Division in Guangdong [Canton] and the
48th Division on Hainan.(10) The Navy Department initially agreed to this; however, at the
end of the month, it stated to the Army Department that “dealing with the South would ultimately
come down to war against the United States. If anything, Japan should [face this
fact and] be determined to fight the United States from the start.”(7, 10)

in the meantime the following measures had been put into
effect:
1. In October the 5th Division was ordered to carry out landing operation exercises. Moreover
in December, the Imperial Guard Division, the 18th and the 48th Division received
orders to carry out exercises for operations in tropical environments, in particular for
landing operations. These divisions had been unofficially informed that their area of operation
would be Malaya.(1, 10)
2. In addition, in December the Research Department of the Taiwan Army was established
and instructed to carry out investigations, examinations and tests of direct necessity to a
southern operation by March 1941.(16)
3. Concerning the Dutch East Indies, sorting of information had been started since about
December. Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke, head of the Southern Group of Department 2
(Intelligence Bureau; and later intelligence staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion
army), along with Lt. Cols Furuki Shigeyuki, Kadomatsu Shōichi and Ishikawa Susumu,
and Maj. Hashida Sei, all of the same department, had been assigned to the study and
sorting of data.(19)
Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō, member of the Transport Section of the Economic Mobilization
Bureau at the Ministry of War (and later staff officer for shipping of the Dutch East Indies
invasion army) had been ordered to examine the data particularly from the standpoint of
shipping transport and landing operations.(44)
4. In about December, the Inspectorate General of Military Training (whose deputy chief
was Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, and whose chief of its General Affairs Department was
Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō; Lieutenant General Imamura later became commander of
the Dutch East Indies invasion army, and Major General Okazaki its chief of staff) conducted
a study exercise of bicycle units from Toyohashi City to Kanamarugahara [Kanamaruhara]
in Tochigi Prefecture simulating the traversing of Malaya from north to south.(36)
5. From January through February 1941, a training trip for staff officers was held in Kyūshū,
during which operation rehearsals, mainly for landing operations, were carried out by
the relevant staff officers.(17)
6. From late March through early April, the Army Department of IGHQ held an exercise of
its ground, sea and air units with the 5th division serving as the core, in which after crossing
the sea from eastern China and landing at Karatsu in northern Kyūshū, they were
supposed to capture Sasebo. The exercise simulated the crossing of the ocean, landing at
“the neck” or a narrow part of the Malay Peninsula, and then capturing Singapore. Com
mander of the army of this exercise was Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, the deputy chief of
the Inspectorate General of Military Training.(17)

The whole book can be downloaded in English at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/35184

 

[marathag]

....And if not ignored, the Philippines are weak enough at this time to be taken with a few months of preparation. That plan has long term problems of course, but short term it could look plausible to Tokyo.

And what could sortie from the Philippines in early 1942, if ignored?

Some B-17 to do attacks on Taiwan, and S-boats followed by Fleet boats. Longer term, the Pearl Harbor Battleline

Obvious countermeasures is to think about ASW, and Interceptors and AAA at first.

If the Imperial Japanese Army could get an ASW program going, so could the IJN.

So OK, the PI are ignored at first.
What can Japan do with another four Divisions of Troops, and the logistics to support them in the field for several months?

 

[HJ Tulp]

There is a curious germ of an idea of having the Australian and Dutch NEI governments work closer together in the interregnum. It might be only a year in PoD time, but it could show an ATL alternative that offers hope. What could they do?

I came across this article which could be of help https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/journal/j29/herman

There was very much a willingness (if not eagerness) for the Australians and Dutch to cooporate and even during the neutrality phase quite a lot was being done already. Australia helped supply the KNIL with small arms ammunition and in February 1941 it was decided that Australia would reinforce Ambon and Timor if war would break out. During the Four-Power Conferences it became clear that Australia did see the DEI parts of the Malay Barrier as way more important than the British with their focus on Singapore. From May 1941 on the planning for the Australian move to Ambon and Timor became more serious but at the same time direct action was hampered by neutrality. For this reason the Australian units could enter the DEI until war was declared.

It has to be something serious enough that forces London to listen and get their act together. The Americans are not in it until the planes at Clark Field are in ruins. What can the NEI do about that one? Any ideas?

I have to review my sources on the pre-1941 conferences as I do remember that it was not yet set in stone that Singapore was to be the end all be all of Allied efforts in the SEA. The Singpore Strategy was certainly the linchpin of the British position in Asia during the Interbellum but there were still military officers and politicians - especially in Australia - who didn't think it should be all or nothing. Interallied (staff) exercises might help a bit as well. With regards to getting the Americans involved I have severe doubts that anything is going to get the Yanks to abandon neutrality until it was too late. If the war starts like OTL both the KNIL and it's air component will be better armed though, as DEI neutrality put a stop to most arms deals in that period.

 

[McPherson]

I came across this article which could be of help https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/journal/j29/herman

Sir Percy Noble... GRRR.

There was very much a willingness (if not eagerness) for the Australians and Dutch to cooperate and even during the neutrality phase quite a lot was being done already. Australia helped supply the KNIL with small arms ammunition and in February 1941 it was decided that Australia would reinforce Ambon and Timor if war would break out. During the Four-Power Conferences it became clear that Australia did see the DEI parts of the Malay Barrier as way more important than the British with their focus on Singapore. From May 1941 on the planning for the Australian move to Ambon and Timor became more serious but at the same time direct action was hampered by neutrality. For this reason the Australian units could enter the DEI until war was declared.

Shakes head. Those secret airbases on Borneo, could have been of some benefit if the right air force assets had been present.

It is also rather amazing to read how under-estimated the need for munitions was by the Dutch mission to Australia. Tanks were of course out of the question. 5 million rounds of .303 and 100,000 rifle barrels, trench mortars, associated machine guns? The quantities of the need were an order of magnitude out of whack.

{23} On 1 October 1940 the Australian Minister in Washington reported that the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, had been approached by the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He had asked for immediate private staff meetings to be held between the USA, Britain, Australia and The Netherlands to discuss technical problems should these countries be involved in united defence action, although Hull stipulated that these talks were to be technical, and would have nothing to do with political policy [34]. It was the start of a chain of events which lead eventually to staff talks between all four powers, two of which were officially neutral.

{24} In a military appraisal in early August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staff had already expressed their view that "One aim of our policy should be ultimately to secure full military co-operation with the Dutch"[35]. It is therefore not surprising that both the Australian and British Governments welcomed the American initiative and made immediate plans for these talks. After some haggling about the place (both London and Washington were suggested), agreement was reached for the talks to take place in Singapore, and the British Government approached the Dutch about being present [36]. The Dutch Government, however, supported Governor-General Tjarda's opinion that even secret staff talks formed a breach of Dutch neutrality, and could represent a pretext for the Japanese to intervene if they got to hear of them. Due to their excellent intelligence, this would only have been a matter of time. The fact that the Americans did not show up worsened matters. Roosevelt faced an election challenge on November 5, 1940 and did not want to do anything which might endanger his re-election. Their involvement in staff talks was postponed for the time being [37]. Accordingly, on 22 October 1940 the Defence Conference at Singapore was attended only by Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The report of the conference, however, had two appendices which listed points for discussion with Dutch and American authorities as soon as that became politically possible [38]. The report also revealed such an alarming weakness in the defences of Singapore that the Australian Cabinet decided that Menzies should travel to London to discuss this and other matters directly with Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff [39].

Note the underlined. It was FDR, through Hull, suggesting that the British get their house in order. His admirals were telling him things were headed south... literally. The Americans did not show up at Singapore because of a security breach AT SINGAPORE. Guess who told the Menzies government that the Malay Settlements were in trouble?

To his amazement, Kennedy found out that the Commander-in-Chief of the British China Station, Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Layton, was already reporting the position of Australian warships to the NEI authorities [42]. This showed that far more informal but effective Anglo-Dutch naval co-operation at operational level had been taking place than had been approved by the respective governments. A very good personal friendship between Layton and his Dutch counterpart, Vice-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich, helped considerably. The Dutch also gave them information about the positions of minefields, and advised the Australians that they would re-route all their shipping to and from the US West Coast through the Torres Straits to minimise Japanese interference. It was also agreed that Tjilatjap harbour on the south coast of Java would be expanded to handle more freight.

Once again, the Royal Navy is doing things without telling the people who needed to know, what they needed to know. It was about this time that Thomas Hart smelled a rat.

Menzies started his first meeting at the Foreign Office in London on 26 February 1941 by asking "whether we regarded the Netherlands East Indies as vital" (meaning that the invasion of that territory would be a casus belli) [46]. The Foreign Office left the question unanswered for the time being. The Naval Staff were less diplomatic, for during talks between Menzies and the Vice Chief of Naval Staff on 8 March 1941, Vice-Admiral T.S.V. Phillips stated that "we should not go to war with Japan over their occupation of any part of the Netherlands East Indies; this would only add to the number of our enemies, and if Germany could first be defeated we could turn to Japan later and deal with her" [47]. It was a straight answer, but not the one Menzies was expecting.

That was the rat.

{32} The Australian Government was less happy about the failure of the conference to draw up a co-ordinated naval defence plan for the Far East and it therefore urged that a third conference be held to formulate such a plan [49]. During the parallel US - British Staff Talks held in Washington from January to March 1941, the British secured the American commitment to attend the next Singapore conference as official participants. In that capacity they had already attended the Anglo-Dutch-Australian-American Combined Services Communications Conference which had taken place on 27 February 1941. At that conference the four parties disclosed to each other the frequencies and station calls of ships and shore installations and air bases. The Dutch representatives disclosed the existence and call signals of the top-secret Samarinda-II and Singkawang-II airfields in Dutch Borneo, and codes and ciphers were standardised and exchanged. The importance of this conference has been overlooked in most official military histories of the countries concerned.

That was when an Allied command (ABDACOM) should have been established and serious staff-work begun. It did not happen.

{33} The third Four-Power Singapore Staff Conference took place on 21-27 April 1941, with the Americans now as full participants. It was an important conference which laid the foundation for the later ABDA-Allied Integrated Command, the first of its kind during the Second World War. During this conference the Dutch-Australian agreements with regard to the eastern part of the NEI were upheld against the wishes of the British delegates, who wanted to focus specifically on the defence of Singapore and its surroundings [50]. It was here that, for the first time, the Australians used the expression "Malay Barrier" to describe the importance of the NEI for the defence of Australia.

Note the underlined. That could have only happened if the Americans had thrown their weight into it.

{34} The importance of this third and last Singapore Staff Conference was the feeling of all parties that, despite the political expediency of delaying declaration of a guarantee towards the NEI, the prospective allies were all in the same boat. The Dutch were officially still neutral, at least in south-east Asia, but at the operational level the frequency of contact had increased considerably since the last conference. It was the feeling of no longer being isolated that gave the Dutch the courage to join the American embargo against Japan a few months later, even though, politically, they had no obligation to do so and, militarily, it meant that a Japanese attack on the NEI oilfields would only be a matter of time.

Same again. KNIL starts shopping American in earnest about this time. I would suggest it was about a year too late.

I have to review my sources on the pre-1941 conferences as I do remember that it was not yet set in stone that Singapore was to be the end all be all of Allied efforts in the SEA. The Singapore Strategy was certainly the linchpin of the British position in Asia during the Interbellum but there were still military officers and politicians - especially in Australia - who didn't think it should be all or nothing. Interallied (staff) exercises might help a bit as well. With regards to getting the Americans involved I have severe doubts that anything is going to get the Yanks to abandon neutrality until it was too late. If the war starts like OTL both the KNIL and it's air component will be better armed though, as DEI neutrality put a stop to most arms deals in that period.

Menzies out... Curtin in.

{38} It was only after repeated urgings by the Australians that the British Government (in early October) finally contacted the Dutch Government in exile about the issue of larger advance parties in uniform. This was to ensure discipline, which could not be maintained among soldiers wearing civvies. The new Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, tired of British foot-dragging, instructed Bruce to contact the Dutch Government in exile immediately on this matter. On 23 October 1941 he met the Dutch Minister to talk the subject over [57]. The Dutch government agreed to the Australian request concerning maintenance parties of 100 Army personnel and 52 Air Force personnel being based on Ambon, and 100 Army and 19 Air Force personnel being sent to Koepang in uniform. Nevertheless, the Dutch rejected the proposal to establish more troops at those sites before the outbreak of war because they feared "undesirable incidents with the population", especially at Ambon [58]. Their real fear, though, was loss of face in the eyes of the local population because of the obvious Dutch inability to defend their colony.

Meanwhile, up north, the Filipinos are being summarily drafted and drilled with whatever can be scrounged up locally. The KNIL could solve the command problems with the Australians by "promoting" the Dutch colonel at Ambon to a brevet major general, but that would require thinking outside the bollix that seems to have afflicted the Allies in that part of the world at that time.

{44} There were many factors which prevented early and effective co-operation between the Dutch and Australian Governments. First, although they disagreed with the British because of the vital interest they had in their own defence, the Australians adhered strictly to the British policy of not giving any guarantee for the territorial integrity of the NEI. This resulted in a serious loss of time. Secondly, the Dutch adhered to their traditional policy of aloofness as upheld by the Governor-General. This resulted in a year’s delay in the establishment of closer defence co-operation. Thirdly, Australia failed to achieve all-out industrial mobilisation before Pearl Harbour, as is evident from the production loss due to labour strikes. Consequently, the Dutch became dependent on one supplier of weapons only: the USA, which also had other interests to consider with respect to their prospective allies. The fourth factor was the weakness and vacillation of the Dutch Government in exile during their first year in London. This gave the Governor-General the opportunity to determine his own foreign policy, leading to much doubt in Australian, British and American political and military circles about the willingness of the Dutch to defend themselves should the Japanese attack. There was always the possibility that the Dutch administration in the East Indies would adopt the "French Model" of Indo-China if the Japanese put more pressure on them. Consequently, there was great reluctance by the US Government to export weapons to the NEI, especially in 1940 and early 1941. Dutch political and military aloofness as executed by the Governor-General therefore proved self-defeating [62]. It must be said, however, that Menzies did not share these doubts; early on he instructed his government to assist the Dutch to obtain modern weapons wherever possible.

I will have a conclusion.

It was in Australia's own interest to maintain the Malay Barrier as a protective shield, but the Australian Government faced formidable problems with the British Government in trying to justify this difference in attitude. The Dutch, however, appreciated the Australian position. In May 1941, the then Chief-of-Staff of the KNIL noted that co-operation with the Australian counterpart was excellent, remarking that Ambon and Timor had seen more Australians in the previous few weeks than in the hundred years before [63]! This appreciation of the positive Australian attitude towards the NEI can also be found in a cablegram, sent by the Governor General to the Dutch Colonial Minister on 14 April 1941 [64]. It was therefore no coincidence that after the Japanese invasion the Netherlands East Indies Government in exile established itself in Australia with the remnants of their armed forces, in the vain hope that the colony would be recaptured from there. That attempt was described in depth by Jack Ford [65] in his monumental study of Australian-Dutch relationships during the Second World War, and falls beyond the scope of this article.

Three factors... British hesitancy and utter incompetence in Eastern Command, Helfrich, and poor American management of the Pacific crisis prior to the outbreak of war. Lot of impediments.

It is a SAD story. No wonder Thomas Hart was infuriated with the results and practically told Admiral Phillips to his face where he could put his "Singapore Bastion Defense" in the final Manila Conference of 6 December 1941.

McP.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Shakes head. Those secret airbases on Borneo, could have been of some benefit if the right air force assets had been present.

The Dutch historian P.C. Boer has written a series on the airwar in the Dutch East Indies. When I finally have some time I will start reading them so my knowledge on the subject is still....lacking. I do know that Boer sees the Allied efforts in the Java Sea as too little, too late . According to him the war was lost at Borneo and Strait Makassar when Allied (air)forces failed to prevent the loss of the airbases on Borneo proper.

It is also rather amazing to read how under-estimated the need for munitions was by the Dutch mission to Australia. Tanks were of course out of the question. 5 million rounds of .303 and 100,000 rifle barrels, trench mortars, associated machine guns? The quantities of the need were an order of magnitude out of whack.

The Netherlands had never fought a modern war. The KNIL has loads of combat experience but only against domestic enemies.

Note the underlined. It was FDR, through Hull, suggesting that the British get their house in order. His admirals were telling him things were headed south... literally. The Americans did not show up at Singapore because of a security breach AT SINGAPORE. Guess who told the Menzies government that the Malay Settlements were in trouble?

According to my source Menzies got alarmed because of the First Singapore Staff Conference. Am I correct that you are implying Menzies was informed by the US?

That was when an Allied command (ABDACOM) should have been established and serious staff-work begun. It did not happen.

The benefits could have been substantial:
1. More arms in the hands of the KNIL and KNIL-ML.
2. Commonwealth forces on the ground on Ambon, Timor and maybe other places, months in advance. This makes the defense of those areas much tougher - though the endresult might not change - as defensive positions are more extensive and known, and communications and responsibilities with local forces are worked out.
3. Better relations between the Britons and Americans on the one hand and the smaller Allied powers. The latter ones were pretty miffed as the formation of ABDACOM took them totally by surprise. They had to hear they fully supported it from BBC Worldwide.
4. Less confusion in the command structure. The Allied powers had at least some worked out plans (the PLENAPS) which were made before hostilities started. After hostilities started that was all thrown away and suddenly a unified command structure is (somewhat) set up. Of course most of the confusion was caused by the quick Japanese advance but still, it didn't help.
5. Singapore Strategy-Lite is a possibility.

The fifth is the big one of course. According to Van den Berg (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a612211.pdf page 27) it was at the Third Singapore Staff Conference where it was decided that the defense of Singapore would take precedence above all else and that for this, Dutch support was instrumental. The Dutch were only supporting the Britons in their efforts to prove they were on the right side. ATL this is not necessary as the DEI is a full blown ally already.

Note the underlined. That could have only happened if the Americans had thrown their weight into it.

And the US refused to involve itself until it was (way) too late.

Same again. KNIL starts shopping American in earnest about this time. I would suggest it was about a year too late.

Well the Netherlands Purchasing Commission had started submitting shopping lists already on 22nd of May 1940. The problem was not that the Dutch didn't want to shop in the US. The problem was that the US was (very) reluctant to supply weapons to the DEI. The reasons for that are twofold: 1. Great Britain was the higher priority and 2. The Americans didn't trust the Dutch East Indies to be sufficiently anti-Japanese. The latter reason disappears in our scenario.

 

[McPherson]

According to my source Menzies got alarmed because of the First Singapore Staff Conference. Am I correct that you are implying Menzies was informed by the US?

Yes.

1. More arms in the hands of the KNIL and KNIL-ML.

Unless Melvin Johnson gets the treatment J. Walter Christie got and middle fingers the USG, the small arms route will probably be more productive pre-war with South America (Argentina) or Belgium.

Pistol
Rifle
SMGs
Argentina will sell to anybody.

2. Commonwealth forces on the ground on Ambon, Timor and maybe other places, months in advance. This makes the defense of those areas much tougher - though the end result might not change - as defensive positions are more extensive and known, and communications and responsibilities with local forces are worked out.

The defense of the western oil fields, nay of western Indonesia is very difficult once the Philippine Islands are gone. It is very difficult. The NEI government is concerned about Java, but the Americans are looking at Borneo as the likely defense fallback. They've have written off the Philippine Islands and the Malay Settlements due to Japanese positions in Thailand and Southeast Asia and with the geography involved, who can blame them?

3. Better relations between the Britons and Americans on the one hand and the smaller Allied powers. The latter ones were pretty miffed as the formation of ABDACOM took them totally by surprise. They had to hear they fully supported it from BBC Worldwide.

I guess American Isolationism has to be felt in the context of the time to understand how much it handcuffed the USG politically in the strategic sense. The way Woodrow Wilson and his clique of racist gangsters screwed the American people left and right in WWI and its aftermath is incredibly evil. There was a solid reason FDR tread very carefully on the razor blade of American public opinion from 1935 forward. Roosevelt was undersecretary of the USN during that horror show of incompetency, mendacity, and rotten governance and he saw that cesspool of autarchy from the inside. He was a more moral man than the unreconstructed Wilson and he was truer to the "republican" spirit of American governance (will of the people). So his government had to eggshell its way through the popular will until it hardened to the necessity of the day.

And to be honest, the USG was surprised by the British on more than one occasion throughout the War. The British tended to forget who was calling the shots where and when, or what had been agreed to by whom. Sometimes it worked (North Africa) and sometimes it blew up in their face (SWPOA/CBI).

4. Less confusion in the command structure. The Allied powers had at least some worked out plans (the PLENAPS) which were made before hostilities started. After hostilities started that was all thrown away and suddenly a unified command structure is (somewhat) set up. Of course most of the confusion was caused by the quick Japanese advance but still, it didn't help.

Too many hats Wavell. If one was going to make ABDA work, then Helfrich, Blamey or Hart, but pick ONE and kick the British OUT once they fucked everything up at Singapore. Eastern Command was totally incompetent. So were the boobs in Manila.

5. Singapore Strategy-Lite is a possibility.

I would like to point out that Singapore anything was impossible from November 1941 to March 1942. If and it is a big if, the monsoons had kicked in early and the Japanese had to delay until April, then the Southern Resources Area would have been a much tougher proposition, but the Japanese kicked off when they did, because they knew the weather, terrain, logistics window as well as their victims did.

Well the Netherlands Purchasing Commission had started submitting shopping lists already on 22nd of May 1940. The problem was not that the Dutch didn't want to shop in the US. The problem was that the US was (very) reluctant to supply weapons to the DEI. The reasons for that are twofold: 1. Great Britain was the higher priority and 2. The Americans didn't trust the Dutch East Indies to be sufficiently anti-Japanese. The latter reason disappears in our scenario.

See my previous comments. The American neutrality laws are very "weird" for the era, because of the reaction to Wilsonism.