1867 proposal: United States annexes Venezuela

[Plumber]

Forget Santo Domingo: in 1867 Minister Thomas Stilwell entertained the notion of annexing Venezuela in order to avoid dealing with corruptions in customs. Such a proposal seems to be a) an absurd overreaction b) imperialist arrogance c) unlikely to come to pass, given Sumner's resistance to annexing Santo Domingo. But aside from c), these are really just standard characteristics of US policy towards Latin America. So let's remove the convenient change of behavior on Venezuela's part and the obstacle c) imposes as well: either Grant uses the old annex-by-joint-session trick, or Sumner hits his head. What would be the ramifications of the US annexing Venezuela around the late 1860s or early 1870s?

No one wanted to rely upon Venezuelan officials, wrote one U.S. minister in 1867, three weeks after his arrival in the country. "Its President, its Cabinet, and Chief Officers, if one half of what I hear may be relied upon, worse than robbers, appropriating the revenues of the Government to their own use without authority of law, in fact without any, save that which might, and a rabble soldierly give them." The preceding U.S. minister had reported a few months earlier that Venezuelan judges were "subject to the suspicion of bribery and often easily controlled in their action by dislike to foreigners," and that "the honesty of almost every public man in this country is doubted."

To avoid the need to rely upon corrupt Venezuelans, Minister Thomas Stilwell proposed annexation to the United States. At this moment President Grant was having difficulty convincing Congress to annex the Dominican Republic, and so he decided that a better approach would be not simply to impose a lien but also to take actual control of Venezuela's customs collections. His proposal to this effect became moot before the new U.S. minister could deliver it, however, because Venezuela began to pay its creditors.' For a few years the government in Caracas was able to service just enough of its debt to forestall intervention, but never enough to provide full satisfaction.

Lars Schoultz. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America (Kindle Locations 2473-2481). Kindle Edition.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think at this point certain European powers (note the British) might object. The US doesn't really have much in the way of power projection capability at this time - her ironclads are mostly coastal and riverine and her warships mostly only a step or two above converted civilian ships.

(The exceptions are fairly impressive as they go, but the US has no line-of-battle and her frigate fleet is outnumbered. The ocean going monitors will have to face a navy able to put in the water - as of Jul 1 1867 - about eighteen ironclads.)

Faced with that disparity of firepower, then if the British make an issue of it it seems likely the US will simply back down. After all, the naval force differential means that the Americans will be unable to take possession of Venezuela and will instead be able to - best case - invade Canada.
And if they wanted Canada they'd just invade Canada.

 

[Dave Howery]

I'd assume the Venezuelans would object to being annexed, and fighting there might be difficult for the US... no real navy, a (potentially) big and experienced army (lots of veterans to recall to arms) but not a good way to get them there, and that army has zilch experience in fighting in tropical climates. If the UK objects, you can forget the whole thing...

 

[Saphroneth]

Aside - it's worse than I thought...


The US ironclad ocean going fleet at this point is:


USS Dictator.
USS Stonewall.



...no, really, that's it. There's also five more monitors on the stocks - Puritan and the Kalamazoos - as well as the Stevens Battery.
The Dunderberg was sold to France in May.
Atlanta sank on the way to Haiti so seaworthiness is questionable.
Columbia is a half-rotten hulk with unfinished repairs.
Tennessee isn't yet sold for scrap, so could theoretically be employable but is not ocean going.