Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

The Royal Navy’s Force K, based in Malta, which had been reinforced, working with the RAF and Fleet Air Arm had been able to interdict many of the ships heading both away from and towards Tripoli. There had been a steady stream of transport aircraft also heading in both directions. Less of these were intercepted, and the arrival of a new Italian fighter, the Macchi C.202 Folgore flown by 1° Stormo Caccia Terrestre, proved a greater challenge to the Hurricanes and Tomahawks of the RAF.

General Ettore Bastico, as Governor-General of Italian Libya and commander-in-chief over all Axis forces in North Africa, faced with the British breakthroughs, appealed to Rome for instructions. The reply from Mussolini was that he was turn Tripoli into a fortress and fight for every street and house. This was an order that Bastico recognised as coming from desperation. It also clarified for him where his duty lay. He ordered contact to be made with the British to discuss the terms of surrender.
Ooh, the Folgore is one of the best pieces of Italian kit in the war, on par with the best contemporary planes of the great powers. Are any of them captured?

And, with a general not opting to commit large-scale suicide as what amounts to an empty gesture, the idea of an Italian North Africa comes to an end.
 

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Ooh, the Folgore is one of the best pieces of Italian kit in the war, on par with the best contemporary planes of the great powers. Are any of them captured?

And, with a general not opting to commit large-scale suicide as what amounts to an empty gesture, the idea of an Italian North Africa comes to an end.

Depends.....

Britain is not anti - colonialist - that the USA which is anti any colonies they don't control - and they calls theirs something else

So you have a large italian population in North Africa

An early surrender - no American involment maybe Italy keeps this place in the sun

Remember its a 1940 mindset not a 2020 mindset
 
*waggles hand*

TBH a lot of what happens with the US depends on what happened ITTL ABC-1 and what was agreed with in other conferences after it. I assume Allen is using the same outline as OTL if the US comes into the war.

But depending on what happens after Imperial Japan gives Peral a visit and how the British performs in the east as well a their already good performance in the west will influence how much and what the US will send to Europe. Also what the British are willing to give as well given how everything as gone they may not have sold all the family silver just yet so to speak.
 
The gloss of German Panzer superiority has been avoided in the TL, given the better results with German vs British combats in France, Greece and now Libya, so is possible there is less institutional fear of the German Heer overall

Even OTL, it can be argued that the Americans were unjustifiably confident in their own capabilities....so to your point, that greater success of the British in NA will likely only make that perception worse. The British having experienced the capability of the Wehrmacht in France, in Greece and now in North Africa, will again like OTL have a great deal of respect for their German opponents which they will try to impart on the Americans. The likely outcome is the Americans will mostly ignore the warning and will once again have to learn the lesson the hard way. Just as a side note, the success of British weapons systems and tactics in North Africa would likely result in several moments of self-criticism and self-evaluation which would lead to the OKW making a series of TTL adjustments that make their forces more effective in all theatres than they were OTL.
 
Defeat and failure are the best teachers at the end of the day but TBH a lot of those lessons with the Germans will depend on the officers both staff and field doing the thinking. Some may try to pin everything on the Italians or maybe the Africa Korps commanders and the staff for the Korps.

Also the British I think learned a lot more from this campaign than OTL and it helps that some commander's like Auk are still in place at their original posting. As well to reiterate a tired old point its given the British both time and chance to catch breath they didn't have OTL. Along with taking a great deal of pressures off the logistics and supply machine from OTL as well.
 
Also i still think that nuffield should maybe concetrate on doing a infantry tank wich would hopefully be attached to each infantry divison so each divison has organic tank support on the offensive and arent as weak against tanks. Something on the lines of late model churchill or black prince i guess would be the thought here . Mainly cause the brits arent yet super thrilled on relying on one design and universal tank yet and having 40-60 infantry tanks attached to each divison could help alot during ww2 atleast i think.

Another butterfly is that the afrika corps isnt sucking up alot of modern german tanks wich can probably be sent to the eastern front to restore the panzer divisons abit better than otl altough i imagine the germans will to deploy about a army to the italians to stiffen them up and avoid them falling sooner since the italians are even more reputably weaker than in otl. And this is also where some of the otl afrika corps tanks can go , a few panzer divisons maybe ?

Nuffield should probably continue concentrating on cruiser tanks like IOTL; their use of Christie suspension is good suited for cruisers and the insistence on the Liberty would hurt the lighter cruiser tanks less than heavier infantry tanks; plus, there's already Vickers (with the Valiant and Victor) and Harland & Wolff/Vauxhall (?) (with the Churchill, hopefully developing into a Black Prince with a Meteor) there's already enough competition on that end, while the cruiser tank field is more bare.

The big butterfly I see with Nuffield is the IOTL Cromwell with the 75mm QF being skipped (or having a much truncated production run) and a more Comet-like version version with the Vickers 75/76mm gun being produced instead; with the Victor able to serve in the cruiser tank role as well, Nuffield/Leyland will have the time to redesign the Cromwell and disrupt production tol have the better gun once they realize it won't fit with the turret ring it has.

Most likely fewer panzer divisions than you'd expect in Italy; the terrain conducts itself better to infantry (mountain) warfare and defensive lines than tanks, tbh.
 
Nuffield should probably continue concentrating on cruiser tanks like IOTL; their use of Christie suspension is good suited for cruisers and the insistence on the Liberty would hurt the lighter cruiser tanks less than heavier infantry tanks; plus, there's already Vickers (with the Valiant and Victor) and Harland & Wolff/Vauxhall (?) (with the Churchill, hopefully developing into a Black Prince with a Meteor) there's already enough competition on that end, while the cruiser tank field is more bare.
Nuffield should be given over to subsidiary production of other designs, that way the might output something better than 'barely adequate'.

The big butterfly I see with Nuffield is the IOTL Cromwell with the 75mm QF being skipped (or having a much truncated production run) and a more Comet-like version version with the Vickers 75/76mm gun being produced instead; with the Victor able to serve in the cruiser tank role as well, Nuffield/Leyland will have the time to redesign the Cromwell and disrupt production tol have the better gun once they realize it won't fit with the turret ring it has.
With the Victor coming in 1943, anything akin to the OTL designs prior to the Comet is a waste of resources.

Most likely fewer panzer divisions than you'd expect in Italy; the terrain conducts itself better to infantry (mountain) warfare and defensive lines than tanks, tbh.
A good place for the Churchill maybe?
 
The big butterfly I see with Nuffield is the IOTL Cromwell with the 75mm QF being skipped (or having a much truncated production run) and a more Comet-like version version with the Vickers 75/76mm gun being produced instead; with the Victor able to serve in the cruiser tank role as well, Nuffield/Leyland will have the time to redesign the Cromwell and disrupt production tol have the better gun once they realize it won't fit with the turret ring it has.

Although no longer applicable to this timeline, I always found it interesting that the British didn't prototype and develop the 6-pounder and 75mm QF tank guns in parallel.
 
Although no longer applicable to this timeline, I always found it interesting that the British didn't prototype and develop the 6-pounder and 75mm QF tank guns in parallel.
The 75mm ammunition would have come from the USA, so wouldn't be viable before 1942.
 
The 75mm ammunition would have come from the USA, so wouldn't be viable before 1942.
Britain bought hundreds of WWI vintage 75mm guns from the US in the post Dunkirk panic, plus a large amount of ammunition. Unlike a lot of the junk bought at the time these were at least useful training tools.
 
What could be an interesting change and one not discussed is America looking at the situation in Europe and comparing it with the situation in the East. With Britain on the ascendance in Europe and having secured all of North Africa (plus or minus the French bit) there may be a big push to "let Britain carry on" in Europe while America goes Pacific first. The practicalities of that notwithstanding it would likely make sense to quite a few people in America. After all Britain has shown it does not need massive help right now while Japan is overrunning the pacific (well most of it, Malaya should hold ITTL).
Anyone talking about British "ascendancy" in Europe is kind of missing the question of "who is occupying almost the entirety of continental Europe?". The British have scored a few wins in secondary theatres, but the most they can claim is that they've stabilised the situation in the Med and the Axis are no longer threatening to advance into Africa or the Middle East. If - big if if in 1941-2 - the Soviets can be relied on to hold out, then the Americans can feel justified in going for a methodical build up in Europe rather than rushing equipment or troops to the front to head off a crisis. But it would be less a case of expecting the British take the fight to Germany and more trusting the Brits - plus geography - to hold the line until the US are good and ready.

Britain isn't in immediate crisis, but it also doesn't have nearly the numbers needed to force a landing in Europe on its own. OTOH, with fewer British warships either sunk or damaged, or tied down running fast convoys to support Malta, the USN won't need to deploy as many ships in the Atlantic, and thus, will have more ships available for Pacific operations.
This. Something that gets lost in all the triumphalism is the little matter of sheer raw numbers. OTL the British hoped to field an army of ~55 divisions, of which ~35 would be British (including African troops) and the remainder from the Dominions. OTL, they even claimed to reach their 35 division target in 1941 - but at least a third of these units were AA and training divisions with no front-line utility. Lower casualties TTL will help a bit, but given how hard the manpower crunch bit OTL in 1944-5, the British can only realistically expect to maintain around 25 divisions in combat zones across all theatres - maybe 40 front line divisions worldwide once the Dominions are included.

The Germans meanwhile can field 50 divisions in the west even with 75% of their forces in Russia. Throw in the Italian Army plus the Axis minors and the ability of the Germans to withdraw forces from Russia and it is clear the British have no hope of liberating a significant chunk of Europe. They might be able to grab and keep a toehold somewhere like Greece or Norway, where geography prevents the Germans concentrating mass forces against them - but then they'd be committing themselves to a long-running attrition fight (which they don't want) in bad terrain, without tying down a significant German force. And any such toehold would be a long way from any critical areas and hard to break out of when the tide turned.

The British desperately need a major ally to do about 50 divisions' worth of heavy lifting in Europe and unless they plan to meet the Red Army on the Rhine, that ally can only realistically be the US. Which means that the US is always going to be the senior partner. And until the US Army is ready to go, the most the British can do is nibble round the edges of Occupied Europe and hope the Red Army keeps fighting.

In the short term, of course, this means that when the balloon goes up in the Far East, there will be several veteran divisions sitting around soaking up the sun in Tripoli, with no immediate need for them in Europe or North Africa...
 
Anyone talking about British "ascendancy" in Europe is kind of missing the question of "who is occupying almost the entirety of continental Europe?". The British have scored a few wins in secondary theatres, but the most they can claim is that they've stabilised the situation in the Med and the Axis are no longer threatening to advance into Africa or the Middle East. If - big if if in 1941-2 - the Soviets can be relied on to hold out, then the Americans can feel justified in going for a methodical build up in Europe rather than rushing equipment or troops to the front to head off a crisis. But it would be less a case of expecting the British take the fight to Germany and more trusting the Brits - plus geography - to hold the line until the US are good and ready.


This. Something that gets lost in all the triumphalism is the little matter of sheer raw numbers. OTL the British hoped to field an army of ~55 divisions, of which ~35 would be British (including African troops) and the remainder from the Dominions. OTL, they even claimed to reach their 35 division target in 1941 - but at least a third of these units were AA and training divisions with no front-line utility. Lower casualties TTL will help a bit, but given how hard the manpower crunch bit OTL in 1944-5, the British can only realistically expect to maintain around 25 divisions in combat zones across all theatres - maybe 40 front line divisions worldwide once the Dominions are included.

The Germans meanwhile can field 50 divisions in the west even with 75% of their forces in Russia. Throw in the Italian Army plus the Axis minors and the ability of the Germans to withdraw forces from Russia and it is clear the British have no hope of liberating a significant chunk of Europe. They might be able to grab and keep a toehold somewhere like Greece or Norway, where geography prevents the Germans concentrating mass forces against them - but then they'd be committing themselves to a long-running attrition fight (which they don't want) in bad terrain, without tying down a significant German force. And any such toehold would be a long way from any critical areas and hard to break out of when the tide turned.

The British desperately need a major ally to do about 50 divisions' worth of heavy lifting in Europe and unless they plan to meet the Red Army on the Rhine, that ally can only realistically be the US. Which means that the US is always going to be the senior partner. And until the US Army is ready to go, the most the British can do is nibble round the edges of Occupied Europe and hope the Red Army keeps fighting.

In the short term, of course, this means that when the balloon goes up in the Far East, there will be several veteran divisions sitting around soaking up the sun in Tripoli, with no immediate need for them in Europe or North Africa...

How do Axis Divisions (Primarily German & Italian) compare to a commonwealth division?
 
How do Axis Divisions (Primarily German & Italian) compare to a commonwealth division?
German Divisions are usually pretty strong though a lot of their support and logistics is still horse drawn outside of a few units like their panzers I think.

Italians tend to be weaker than a British or Commonwealth division due to how the fat man cut them up so he could claim more divisions. Logistically they are also a lot weaker as well.

For the other Axis allies out east like Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary their divisions are mixed bags though they by and large they suffer from their own issues particularly in supply and logistics. Though my knowledge here is very limited in scope.
 
Italians tend to be weaker than a British or Commonwealth division due to how the fat man cut them up so he could claim more divisions. Logistically they are also a lot weaker as well.
The only quibble here is that 'the fat man' in most discussions of the Axis forces refers to Hermann Goering, not Benny the Moose.
 
The only quibble here is that 'the fat man' in most discussions of the Axis forces refers to Hermann Goering, not Benny the Moose.
Fair tbh I've used fat man interchangeably between the two.

Though I tend to think of Goering as more of a Fop or maybe a hedonist than the Fat man.
 
How do Axis Divisions (Primarily German & Italian) compare to a commonwealth division?
How long is a piece of string ? ;)

British infantry divisions were very standardised - 3 brigades of 3 infantry battalions each, plus an artillery brigade, AT & AA regiments, MMG, armoured recon and engineer battalions. The divisions tended to grow in strength as the war went on and more support units were added, starting around 13,000 men and ending around 18,000.

German infantry divisions were anything but - some had 3 brigades/regiments, some had 2, some had 3-battalion brigades, some had 2-battalion regiments. There were about 5 "standard" organisations at any given time and things only got messier as the war went on. Unlike the British, the Germans reduced the nominal strength of their "standard" divisions later in the war as the manpower shortages began to bite and support units were increasingly "what was available". Also unlike the British, who were disbanding units to keep the remainder up to strength, the Germans tended to raise new units while letting existing ones wither, so from 1942 on German units were chronically understrength. By 1944, the British in Normandy were facing everything from 20,000-man SS divisions with the best of everything to 8,000-man "static" divisions with no armour or transport, obsolete artillery and a rifle strength largely composed of unenthusiastic non-Germans.

There are some discussion and comparisons here: https://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/services/dropoff/schilling/mil_org/milorgan_99.html

Italian divisions were small - Mussolini liked lots of divisions, so they reformed from 3-regiment division to 2-regiment "binary" divisions so he could have more of them. They were generally weak in support arms and short of artillery compared to the British/Americans/Germans. The Libyan divisions the British chewed up in 1940 were only around 8,000 men each. Later in the war the Italians attempted to reform to a larger base division with more armour and motorisation.

In general, man-for-man the Germans outperformed everyone else in combat and the Italian underperformed, so in the mid-war a 15,000-man British division was the rough combat equivalent of a 12,000-man 2-regiment German division. significantly weaker than a 15,000-man 3-regiment German division and substantially stronger than a 10,000-man 2-regiment Italian division. Panzer and panzergrenadier units tended to rip everyone up until about 1942-3, largely because they were practising effective combined-arms tactics and everyone else was still learning.
 
Italian divisions were small - Mussolini liked lots of divisions, so they reformed from 3-regiment division to 2-regiment "binary" divisions so he could have more of them. They were generally weak in support arms and short of artillery compared to the British/Americans/Germans. The Libyan divisions the British chewed up in 1940 were only around 8,000 men each. Later in the war the Italians attempted to reform to a larger base division with more armour and motorisation.
If memory serves those efforts were hampered by a lack of resources and issues with their industry efficiency also the fact by that point in the war the Italian Armed Forces were demoralised.
 
And unfortunately there's no way for Britain to utilise its army's greater strategic mobility.
Well, yes, there is.

Just not against Germany for the time being. It just requires the mindset of destroying the Japanese army in Malaya before worrying about the next step in Europe. A veteran corps from North Africa could give Yamashita kittens.

Butterflies the Burma campaign and turns the Pacific campaign on its head.

Gives up Sicily / Sardinia / Aegean in 1942 (unless the US do it as a training exercise) but probably with hindsight the best strategic move.
 
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