WI: Manuel I Komnenos Didn't Make Peace With the Turks and Kept Up the Pressure?

[Atrahasis]

This seems to imply a lot more interest in helping Manuel in Anatolia than either Louis or Conrad ever displayed is also a thing.

I mean by taking the land route to the Holy Land they are pretty much forced to take every important holding of the Seljuks, but Ankara, and Ankara is the city that is the most vulnerable to the emperor; like at this time they don't even control Amasya, by just passing through Anatolia the kings would be destroying the authority of the Seljuks.

The real problem of the matter is that Manuel expected to have/obtain treatment very similar to that which Alexios I had with the participants of the first crusade, i.e. an oath of submission ( albeit informal ) which recognizes his superior authority towards Conrad and Louis ( which is a bit difficult to make a King and an aspiring Emperor accept, compared to the "simple" nobles ) certainly the small skirmishes between the Crusaders and the Byzantines during the journey to Constantinople did not help, but it goes Having said that any " feudal Kings " of the time would have extreme difficulty in constantly keeping his soldiers in line compared to the Byzantine army, therefore it is not that all the clashes were actively sought, but rather they arose spontaneously, finally there is consider the small problem of the issue, called the problem of the two Emperors, where it was very common for the two Caesars to " diplomatically insult " each other by denigrating the other as King of the Greeks/Germans, rather than with the official title of Roman Emperor ( only when relations were good or Byzantium was in a weak situation, that HRE was officially recognized as a legitimate Emperor, most of the time of the Franks, in particular cases such as Caesar of the West, prime example Otto III with Basil II ) if Manuel had decided to take the first step ( 1 ), recognizing Conrad's claim to the imperial title ( without specifying whether he was a Caesar of the Romans or not ) then it is likely that relations between the two would have immediately improved ( just see what happens then in Otl , when they became very good friends ) so the chances of the latter helping him slightly in Anatolia against the Seljuks would be good


1 ) of course we must also keep in mind that it was the first time for Manuel in which he met or interacted directly with prominent exponents of Latin Europe, therefore he had not yet developed his diplomatic ability and wide knowledge of Latin politics ( for example just see how he actually wisely tried to seek the support of the Pope and the Italian cities/nobility to take the title of HRE away from Frederick I a decade later ) , which he then naturally had in the future, therefore it can be said that perhaps out of fear of not appearing weak or politically inexperienced / immature, you insist more on his role as legitimate Basileus of the Rhomanoi, unnecessarily creating friction

This is such a good explanation of Manuel's behaviour in the situation tbh

 

[Elfwine]

I mean by taking the land route to the Holy Land they are pretty much forced to take every important holding of the Seljuks, but Ankara, and Ankara is the city that is the most vulnerable to the emperor; like at this time they don't even control Amasya, by just passing through Anatolia the kings would be destroying the authority of the Seljuks.

If John II could cross from the Byzantine-held parts of Anatolia to Antioch without having to take everything the Seljuks had, and without destroying the authority of the Seljuks utterly in the process, a few years earlier- why is this different for Conrad and Louis?

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

Interesting discussion.

This was before longitude could be calculated, so they didn't have the nice maps that we have now. Their cartography pretty much just showed which roads led to which towns. Could that be the reason for the lack of focus on Anatolia, that without modern maps its strategic importance wasn't apparent?

 

[Putnam]

If John II could cross from the Byzantine-held parts of Anatolia to Antioch without having to take everything the Seljuks had, and without destroying the authority of the Seljuks utterly in the process, a few years earlier- why is this different for Conrad and Louis?

Yeah, the only real way to destroy the Seljuk's Authority would be to wage yearly (or nearly yearly) campaigns of destruction into the Plateau. Not necessarily engaging the Seljuk army either. This is something that would take years, perhaps decades.

Theoretically you could engage the Seljuks directly in combat (the Mongols certainly did it in the 13th century). In theory, that would've been the goal of the Myriokephalon campaign. Unfortunately, that whole campaign was ill-advised. Normally the Romans knew it was too risky a gambit to fight Steppe Nomads in a standard battle and they generally didn't do it when they were thinking smart. Unfortunately Manuel wasn't thinking as a Roman Emperor in that campaign, he was thinking as a leader of a Crusade. The only saving grace of that campaign was that the Imperial Army was largely left in tact.

 

[Elfwine]

Theoretically you could engage the Seljuks directly in combat (the Mongols certainly did it in the 13th century). In theory, that would've been the goal of the Myriokephalon campaign. Unfortunately, that whole campaign was ill-advised. Normally the Romans knew it was too risky a gambit to fight Steppe Nomads in a standard battle and they generally didn't do it when they were thinking smart. Unfortunately Manuel wasn't thinking as a Roman Emperor in that campaign, he was thinking as a leader of a Crusade. The only saving grace of that campaign was that the Imperial Army was largely left in tact.

I'm not sure it was doomed, but it was definitely a gamble - not helped by the fact that once things fell apart, Manuel's response seems to have been "I did not expect this!" as opposed to this:

"In every battle there comes a time when both sides consider themselves beaten, then he who continues the attack wins."

There's a reason that wasn't standard Byzantine strategy, but once in a battle like Myriokephalon unfolding as it was in the first place (and given how big an army Manuel brought, I have to assume he expected some kind of fight somewhere), flinching was not going to salvage the situation.

 

[Avrorrange]

Yeah, the only real way to destroy the Seljuk's Authority would be to wage yearly (or nearly yearly) campaigns of destruction into the Plateau. Not necessarily engaging the Seljuk army either. This is something that would take years, perhaps decades.

Theoretically you could engage the Seljuks directly in combat (the Mongols certainly did it in the 13th century). In theory, that would've been the goal of the Myriokephalon campaign. Unfortunately, that whole campaign was ill-advised. Normally the Romans knew it was too risky a gambit to fight Steppe Nomads in a standard battle and they generally didn't do it when they were thinking smart. Unfortunately Manuel wasn't thinking as a Roman Emperor in that campaign, he was thinking as a leader of a Crusade. The only saving grace of that campaign was that the Imperial Army was largely left in tact.

And in hindsight,the Battle of Myriokephalon was fairly inconsequential except for the fact that the Seljuk state was not destroyed. In other words, it’s a battle Romans could afford to lose but the Turks could not.

 

[Putnam]

it’s a battle Romans could afford to lose

Only because of the way it went. Had the Imperial Army been mauled by the Turks just as much as the Crusader portion, it would've been pretty damn bad for the Romans. Heck, it's possible Manuel could've died!

 

[Avrorrange]

Only because of the way it went. Had the Imperial Army been mauled by the Turks just as much as the Crusader portion, it would've been pretty damn bad for the Romans. Heck, it's possible Manuel could've died!

Crusaders don’t know what they were doing most of the time, but even the ones in the Crusader states eventually developed tactics to counter the Turks. The Romans know what they are doing due to having to fight the Turks on a daily basis and had plenty of Turkic auxiliaries amongst their ranks. Which brings back to the notion that the premise of the nomads somehow having a decisive superiority over the Romans in field battles is false.The Romans have had experience in destroying actual nomadic tribes like the Pechenegs in battle. I don’t think the Seljuks in this period are any more nomad than the Pechenegs, and a lot of sources indicate that they aren’t really nomad anymore.

 

[Atrahasis]

If John II could cross from the Byzantine-held parts of Anatolia to Antioch without having to take everything the Seljuks had, and without destroying the authority of the Seljuks utterly in the process, a few years earlier- why is this different for Conrad and Louis?

Because crusader armies and commanders do not behave like a Byzantine army and didn't have the same goals. Like John's campaigns against the Seljuks were pretty much to secure the coasts and in the Anatolian interior he didn't try to take anything much further than Isparta and this conquests were pretty much only to secure Antalya. In other examples of Byzantine campaigns against the Seljuks there is that of the late reign of Alexios, who got as far as Philomelion but only aimed to resettle Christians in the region. The only serious attempt of the Komnenoi to take down the Seljuks once and for all was that of the late reign Manuel, that ended in Myriokephalon.

Why are the crusaders any different? These guys are insane, they literally aim to take Iconium just to replicate what the people of the First Crusade did; and with support of Manuel they definitely can get the job done. To give you an example this kind of campaign would be more like that of John Tzimiskes in Bulgaria, while the campaigns of John Komnenoi were more like that of Basil in Bulgaria too; one is aimed to take down the enemy once and for all and the other wants a more progressive and safe advance.

 

[Elfwine]

Because crusader armies and commanders do not behave like a Byzantine army and didn't have the same goals.

The first example of this that comes to mind is that Louis and Conrad were not interested in taking land in Anatolia. They didn't even focus on Edessa once they got through Anatolia.

I'd happily agree that if Louis and Conrad were determined to take (for example) Iconium that it's far from impossible especially with Manuel's help - but that's a far cry from either showing, at any point, any interest in doing so.

 

[Atrahasis]

The first example of this that comes to mind is that Louis and Conrad were not interested in taking land in Anatolia. They didn't even focus on Edessa once they got through Anatolia.

I'd happily agree that if Louis and Conrad were determined to take (for example) Iconium that it's far from impossible especially with Manuel's help - but that's a far cry from either showing, at any point, any interest in doing so.

At least Conrad wanted to take the same route of the first crusade, so they are forced to pass through and take Iconium, unless Sultan Mesud just decides to give them free passage and either give them resources (which is practically impossible) or ignore the fact that they will sack every village and town in their way, as supply lines from Manuel would be extremely stretched at that point and the Crusaders would be forced to sack anything they could and even with that there would still be shortages, taking Iconium is just the logical decision. And even if Sultan Mesud somehow accepts to give them free passage and ignore the sacking, there's no guarantee the crusaders would respect that, Kilij Arslan and Barbarossa had an agreement of free passage before his march through Anatolia and he still battle the Turks and sacked their capital.

 

[Silver01]

really even after manuel so long as some one half way decent got the throne instead of andronikos or Isaac they could have done better i mean i see they are debating the what if of Conrad and Iconium but Barbarossa actually did that and the byzantine empire was to weak to take advantage of it

 

[Elfwine]

At least Conrad wanted to take the same route of the first crusade, so they are forced to pass through and take Iconium, unless Sultan Mesud just decides to give them free passage and either give them resources (which is practically impossible) or ignore the fact that they will sack every village and town in their way, as supply lines from Manuel would be extremely stretched at that point and the Crusaders would be forced to sack anything they could and even with that there would still be shortages, taking Iconium is just the logical decision. And even if Sultan Mesud somehow accepts to give them free passage and ignore the sacking, there's no guarantee the crusaders would respect that, Kilij Arslan and Barbarossa had an agreement of free passage before his march through Anatolia and he still battle the Turks and sacked their capital.

I am sure that Conrad's army would pillage everything in its path

Just not sure that it means destroying the Seljuks as a power without more commitment to this than "I want to get through Anatolia as soon as possible and waiting up for Manuel is secondary at best."

Edited to add: I do want to emphasize that this is a matter of "I don't think Conrad would", not "I don't think Conrad could." It's hard to put any of the Second Crusade's friction as far as Germans and Byzantines, French and Byzantines, French and Germans etc. on any one set of shoulders as far as the overall problem, but I do think it's particularly hard to believe any of these rulers should have assumed someone else's purposes and his were one from the start.

 

[Putnam]

The Romans have had experience in destroying actual nomadic tribes like the Pechenegs in battle.

Dude, that's literally the worst example to use. The Pecheneg Wars literally lasted for nearly 50 years and took the loss of Anatolia to the Turks and the loss of the last remaining native traditional Roman Army formations to defeat them.

Yes, Romans could defeat Steppe Nomads in pitched battles, but it was generally considered far too risky and generally when a Roman Army went up against a nomadic force it ended in crushing defeat for the Romans. A good Roman general takes the advice of avoiding pitched battles with them and takes a more indirect approach with them.

 

[Silver01]

Dude, that's literally the worst example to use. The Pecheneg Wars literally lasted for nearly 50 years and took the loss of Anatolia to the Turks and the loss of the last remaining native traditional Roman Army formations to defeat them.

I don't know what your talking about the Pecheneg revolt died down and while it started the whole mess of seriously devaluating while the Pecheneg raids would continue the Pechenegs didn't become a major problem until after manzikert as the empire defenses collapsed the Pechenegs but to be fair Alexios victory was the fact that he used good diplomacy to split the nomads and the Pechenegs got very overconfident due to easy plunder for years

 

[Avrorrange]

Dude, that's literally the worst example to use. The Pecheneg Wars literally lasted for nearly 50 years and took the loss of Anatolia to the Turks and the loss of the last remaining native traditional Roman Army formations to defeat them.

Yes, Romans could defeat Steppe Nomads in pitched battles, but it was generally considered far too risky and generally when a Roman Army went up against a nomadic force it ended in crushing defeat for the Romans. A good Roman general takes the advice of avoiding pitched battles with them and takes a more indirect approach with them.

I don't know what your talking about the Pecheneg revolt died down and while it started the whole mess of seriously devaluating while the Pecheneg raids would continue the Pechenegs didn't become a major problem until after manzikert as the empire defenses collapsed the Pechenegs but to be fair Alexios victory was the fact that he used good diplomacy to split the nomads and the Pechenegs got very overconfident due to easy plunder for years

@Silver01 Yeah, I don’t know what @Putnam is on about either. The most serious of the Pecheneg Wars took place in earnest after the loss of Anatolia to the Turks. Alexios and John ended the Pechenegs with pitched battles, not sieges or anything. The only way you can destroy nomads is through all out pitched battles. There is NO alternative, since the whole point of nomads is that they can flee. At this point in time, I am not sure you could really call the Seljuks of Rum nomads as noted earlier, since they clearly inhabit cities like Iconium and have fortresses etc. As noted, the Romans have plenty of nomadic cavalry in the form of Cumans and Pechenegs after the end of the Pecheneg Wars. There is little to suggest that the Seljuks have a qualitative advantage over a Roman field force that has not only defeated other nomads like the Pechenegs, but have in turn absorbed them. If he was referring to the Pecheneg War during the reign of the Doukas, then I think he is barking at the wrong tree. The Doukas regime was a fairly incompetent one.They were almost incapable of doing anything right. I don’t see how the results of the Doukas war could represent a good example.